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ABSTRACT 
Throughout the period 1931-1949, the Australian Labor Party tended to be 
preoccupied with the role of money as a cause of, and cure for, economic 
instability. The party was very much influenced by a long tradition of economic 
thought which saw the business cycle as an essentially monetary phenomenon. In 
part, this tradition affected the A.L.P. through the influence of 'quack' writers in 
the 'monetary radical' tradition, who combined a monetary view of the business 
cycle with a fear of financial manipulation and a commitment to the abolition of 
interest. At least as significant as this unorthodox. influence was, however, the 
impact upon Labor thinking of the monetary views of the main school of 
expansionist economics of the 1920s. Labor's preoccupation with money was due 
in no small measure to the way in which much of the 'mainstream' economic 
debate focussed upon money in the 1920s and into the 1930s. 
Labor economic thinking was not suddenly transformed as a result of a 
'Keynesian revolution' following the publication of the General Theory in 1936. 
The party had absorbed much of the 'Keynesian' policy message - in particular, 
about the centrality of counter-cyclical public works - well before 1936. 
Nevertheless, because of its long attachment to purely monetary theories of 
capitalist economic instability, Labor did not readily absorb the 'Keynesian' view 
of the way in which the economic mechanism operates. The party was, for 
example, inclined to view public works not so much as an instrument of 'fiscal' 
policy, as a conduit for monetary expansion. Even in the 1940s, the A.L.P. 
remained deeply imbued with the traditional view that monetary mechanisms 
played an all-important role in the economy. In government, Labor's ideological 
zeal was directed towards banking reform. By contrast, Labor politicians were 
not greatly interested in the issues (concerning the role of planning in normal 
peacetime economic management, and the form and social content of a full 
employment program) which were dividing economists and public servants at the 
time. 
PREFACE 
Ideas are fundamental to politics. They shape, and are shaped by, political 
struggles. The role of economic ideas is particularly important. Much political 
debate is about the actions governments might take to improve economic 
performance. Economic policy also sets the parameters for public policy as a 
whole, particularly where public expenditure is involved. 
The interaction of economic ideas and political practice is, therefore, an 
important aspect of political history. Interaction is a two-way process. 
Politicians and political parties are usually highly derivative in their thinking. 
They draw from the available stock of ideas, selecting on the basis of relevance 
and values. This means that their political objectives and programs are 
inevitably shaped by the sorts of ideas that are available to them. New ideas, 
however, take time to absorb. Economists themselves are often slow to adjust to 
new economic ideas. Politicians, with much less time for reflection, are for the 
most part even slower. 'Statesmen and practical men of affairs usually have a 
social philosophy which they absorbed in their fomative years. They will often 
be found, therefore, trying to apply to current events a theory which is no longer 
suitable'. l When they are confronted with challenging new ideas which demand 
a response, they will often try to translate these new ideas into the 'old' 
conceptual language with which they are most familiar. It is often a procrustean 
procedure. 
This thesis looks at the way in which economic doctrine influenced the views of 
federal Labor politicians and the policy orientations of Labor governments in the 
1. L.G. Melville, 'Where Are We Going?', Economic Record, December 
1946, p.196. 
period from the Great Depression to the fall of the Chifley Government. Its 
focus is upon macroeconomic policy,although this inevitably requires many 
excursions into other, related fields of economic policy. Two issues stand out. 
The first concerns Labor's preoccupation with monetary issues : What were the 
intellectual roots of Labor's monetary attitudes and to what extent did Labor 
thinking drew on the broader intellectual currents present in Australian society? 
The second issue relates to the Keynesian 'revolution' in economics : What was 
the impact of Keynesianism upon Labor, and how did Keynesian ideas interact 
with the party's notions about the role of money? 
These questions have already received some attention from historians. Labor's 
monetary preoccupations have, for example, been carefully examined by Robin 
Gollan 2 and Peter Love 3. . These authors have offered provocative and 
attractive expositions of the social roots and political nature of Labor 'populism', 
and have shown the role that monetary themes played in this context. They are, 
however, less interested in the economic ideas themselves. One of the main 
purposes of this thesis is to examine the nature and intellectual roots of Labor 
monetary thinking. These matters have been to some degree misinterpreted (by 
David Clark 4 and, following him, Peter Love). Viewed in context, Labor's 
monetary 'obsession' is not as anomalous as has sometimes been represented. A 
proper understanding of Labor's monetary views also casts considerable light on 
the party's response to Keynesianism. 
2. R.A. Golian, The Commonwealth Bank of Australia: Origins and Early 
History, Canberra, 1968. 
3. P. Love, Labour and the Money Power : Australian Labour Populism, 
1890-1950, Melbourne, 1984. 
4. D. Clark, 'Was Lang Right?', in H. Radi and P. Spearritt, Jack Lang, 
Sydney, 1977. 
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Part One (Chapters One to Five) considers the period from the Great Depression 
to the Second World War. Chapter One looks at the principal issues which 
separated economists into expansionist and restrictionist camps at the time the 
Great Depression struck. Chapter Two discusses the nature and roots of certain 
unorthodox monetary ideas, and the links between those ideas and other schools 
of economic thought. Chapter Three reviews relevant aspects of the Australian 
economic policy debate in the 1930s, and looks at the impact of Keynesianism. 
Chapters Four and Five then draw on this material to explicate the views of 
Labor politicians - and, in particular, the views of those who were later to 
become ministers in the Curtin and Chifley Governments. 
Part Two (Chapters Six to Nine) explores the policy orientations of the post-war 
Labor Governments. This brings the views of Australian economists into 
especially close focus. During the war, most Australian economists were drawn 
into the public service. Because the policies of governments are formed as an 
interactive process between public servants and politicians, a perennial issue 
arises : who was setting the basic policy directions? More specifically, how far 
did the new role which was being mapped out for the state in the Australian 
economy reflect the programmatic objectives of Labor politicians? To what 
extent did the views of those politicians reflect the formative influences of the 
1930s? How important was the role of the economists? 
Chapter Six introduces Part Two with an overview of the Australian economic 
policy debate at the end of the war, and considers the relation ~etween 'planning' 
and macroeconomic policy. Chapters Seven and Eight then look at the principles 
of fiscal policy and monetary policy respectively, as manifested in the 1945 
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White Paper on Full Employment and the banking legislation of 1945-47. 
Chapter Eight is something of a postscript. It reviews the conduct of 
macroeconomic policy in the late 1940s and, in particular, the post-war planning 
experiment. In doing so, it develops further certain themes about the roles 
played by economists and politicians in these vital post-war years. 
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PART ONE 
CHAPTER ONE 
MONETARY THOUGHT IN THE 1920s AND EARLY 1930s 
Money and the Trade Cycle 
In the period up to the Great Depression, much of the debate in English-speaking 
countries about the means to economic stability focussed on the management of 
the supply of money. The Ricardian doctrine of the separation of monetary and 
real phenomena remained influential, but the notion that money supply changes 
had little effect on real activity had, like so many other elements of the 
classical tradition, 'largely disintegrated'. l Influential economists had few 
reservations in explaining economic fluctuations in terms which placed 
considerable emphasis upon monetary factors - so much so that it was common 
for the terms 'trade cycle' and 'credit cycle' to be used synonymously. 
Monetary factors were not the only ones which received the attention of business 
cycle theorists. Exogenous shocks, psychological and other factors also received 
attention as did, to a lesser extent, over-investment themes. Nevertheless, by 
the 1920s there had been a great deal of progress in the synthesising of 
conflicting business cycle theories, and a considerable degree of consensus had 
emerged. 2 There was wide agreement amongst economists that monetary 
factors played a key role in inducing, or at least greatly magnifying, cyclical 
movements in economic activity. The conventional notion of the 'credit cycle' 
ran roughly as follows: A change in the pace of economic activity would, in 
general, be associated with a parallel change in the amount of bank lending. This 
movement in the money supply would then lead to a change in the price level 
which would tend to magnify the initial disturbance to the economy. The key 
point was that certain costs - in particular, wages and the nominal rate of 
interest - could be expected to adjust to changes in the price level only in a 
2 
lagged fashion. If, for example, the money supply and price level increased, 
wages would rise more slowly and the cost of repaying existing loans would fall 
in real terms. Profits would, consequently, increase, further stimulating 
production, investment and employment. This effect would be reinforced if 
prices rose continuously without immediate equivalent increases in interest 
rates, so that there was a drop in the real interest rate. These same processes 
would operate in reverse to amplify any initial drop in activity and bank 
lending. 3 
The 'credit cycle' was, then, a cumulative process. The 'equilibrium is unstable', 
wrote the British economist R.G. Hawtrey: 'Every displacement from the 
equilibrium position tends to magnify itself'. 4' Psychological factors also 
reinforced these monetary dynamics. In a boom, businesses became increasingly 
over-confident and reckless. There were, however, limits to the process. 
Ultimately, a boom would lead to a crash. The American economist Irving Fisher 
described the process graphically: 
••• price fluctuations cause alternate fluctuations in business; that is, 
booms and crises, followed by contractions and depressions ••••• Briefly, 
the process is this: when prices rise, great profits are made because, as 
we have seen, the 'profiteer' or stockholder wins without effort from the 
bondholder and from the employees on salary or wages. His easy profits 
lead him to 'extend himself' until, when interest charges, rents, salaries 
and wages do catch up, his prosperity ceases, he gets caught in debt, 
becomes a bankrupt and involves others in a chain of bankruptcies. A 
general crisis or even panic may ensue. In fact, a crisis is defined by 
Juglar as the culmination of an upward price movement ••• Then when 
prices fall the 'fixed charges' are felt as a most serious drag on business 
and a depression of trade follows. 5 
In a nutshell, then, the credit cycle doctrine viewed the business cycle as closely 
linked with expansions and contractions in the money supply through price 
movements. The great influence of this 'credit cycle' theory can be seen in the 
extent to which, even into the 1930s, it was common parlance for a boom to be 
referred to as an 'inflation' and a slump as a 'deflation'. 6 
3 
Stabilisationists and Deflationists 
Even within the umbrella of credit cycle analysis, there was by the 1920s fierce 
controversy on policy. Orthodox theorists emphasised the ever-present danger 
of inflation, with its inevitable consequences of boom and slump. Hawtrey's 
comment that 'the expansive tendencies of credit are in perpetual conflict with 
the maintenance of a fixed standard of value' 7 succinctly summarises the 
orthodox belief that the central problem of monetary policy was the containment 
of dangerous expansionary forces. The fear of inflation contributed powerfully 
to the orthodox preference for a passive monetary policy and for fixed monetary 
rules such as the gold standard. The gold standard was, of course, not merely a 
principle of domestic monetary policy. It was also a principle of fixed (or near 
fixed) exchange rates. The theoretical and ideological roots of the international 
gold standard doctrine run deep, going back to the Ricardian principle of 
purchasing power parity. 
Orthodoxy had many critics, particularly in the period after the first world war. 
The debate had pre-war origins, but it was in the post-war years that the battle 
lines were really drawn. The starting point was the efforts of governments 
throughout the developed capitalist world to restore the pre-war gold standard. 
The gold standard had, during the war, been virtually abandoned. Almost 
universally, resort was had to large-scale monetary expansion as a technique of 
war finance, and there was widespread rapid inflation. At the end of the war, 
the dominant orthodoxy in countries such as the United States, Britain and 
France favoured the early restoration of pre-war gold parities for their 
respective currencies. This meant deflation - that is, deliberate monetary 
contraction - designed to lower prices towards pre-war levels. 8 The Americans 
set out on a deflationary course from around 1919, and the British followed a 
little later. The British resumption of the gold standard in 1925 has been aptly 
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described by Nicholas Kaldor as the start of the first bout of British 
monetarism. 9 Many other European countries followed the British example in 
the 1920s. Partly as a consequence of these moves, but for other more 
deep-seated reasons as well, the early 1920s were a period of serious recession in 
many countries. 
There were prominent and influential economists who resisted these policies 
from the outset, arguing in various degrees what might be called a 
'stabilisationist' position. Amongst these economists, there was an acute 
awareness both of the contractionary consequences of the deflationary process 
itself, and of the difficulties and social disruption which were implicit in any 
large-scale effort to force wages down in line with the deflation of prices. 
There was also great concern at the way in which price deflation increased the 
real value of debts, thus leading to a substantial redistribution from borrowers to 
the rentier class and to an increase in the real burden upon the taxpayer of the 
public debt. 
At a more general level, stabilisationist economists argued that the best means 
to broad economic stability lay in a monetary policy which aimed at the 
maintenance of price stability. Price stability was, they thought, more 
important than rigid rules of money supply management. This stance involved a 
· degree of confidence, quite foreign to orthodoxy, about the scope for 
'fine-tuning' monetary policy so as to control and stabilise the price level. 10 An 
even more heretical stabilisationist theme was the rejection of the gold 
standard, stemming from a recognition of the potential for conflict between 
fixed exchange rates and domestic price stability. 
5 
I 
i 
.... I 
One important critic of orthodoxy was the Swedish economist, Gustav Cassel. In 
his influential book, Money and Foreign Exchange After 1914 (published in 
English in 1922), Cassel attacked the drive to restore pre-war gold parity not 
only because he believed that 'the general depression at present prevailing 
throughout the world is very largely a result of this process of deflation', but also 
because 'a particularly harmful result of the process of deflation is that the 
burden of the public debts becomes heavier than the community can bear'. This 
emphasis on the consequences of an increased debt burden flew directly in the 
face of the orthodox argument which justified deflation on the grounds that (as 
Cassel summarised the view) 'justice is demanded for creditors of pre-war days 
who, through the fall in the value of money, have lost some part of their wealth'. 
Cassel's response to the orthodox argument was two-fold. He pointed out firstly 
that much of the debt under debate had in fact been contracted during, rather 
than before, the war-induced inflationary wave. Secondly, and more 
fundamentally, he pleaded that: 
If any mention is to be made of justice, some consideration should also 
be paid to all the heavily engaged businessmen and other debtors who are 
being ruined by deflation, as well as to the masses of innocent people 
who have been innocent sufferers under this process. 11 
In Britain, perhaps the strongest critic of deflationist policies was J.M. Keynes, 
who had with writings such as The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill (in 
which he attacked the return to the gold standard) earnt himself considerable 
repute in the 1920s as an economist and polemicist. In his Tract on Monetary 
Reform (1923) Keynes developed an aggressive critique of orthodoxy, albeit one 
still within the 'credit cycle' theoretical framework. Like Cassel, Keynes 
stressed the economic disruption and distributional injustice which flowed from 
deflation, arguing that 'it is worse, in an impoverished world, to provoke 
unemployment than to disappoint the rentier'. The increased public debt burden 
created by deflationary policies amounted, in his view, to the 'oppression of the 
6 
taxpayer for the enrichment of the rentier'. 12 Both Keynes and Cassel argued 
strongly that domestic monetary policy should give high priority to the 
preservation of price stability. As Cassel put it, 'the duty of a sound bank policy 
which has for its object the stabilisation of the currency must be to prevent any 
alteration in the price level'. 13 It was, however, Keynes who followed the logic 
of prices stabilisation through most fully by recognising the inherent conflict 
between inflexible exchange rates and price stability. It was this which led 
Keynes to bluntly attack the gold standard as a 'barbarous relic'. 14 
Keynes was not the only economist to argue vigorously in favour of domestic 
price stability over the claims of the gold standard. Irving Fisher had as early as 
1911 begun to put forward proposals for a radical alteration of the gold standard 
system, aimed at the stabilisation of prices. His plan, as put forward definitively 
in his Stabilising the Dollar (1920), was that the gold backing of paper currency 
should be systematically varied so as to preserve the purchasing power of the 
dollar as measured by an index of commodity prices. This would have amounted 
to a de facto abolition of the gold standard in favour of a prices stabilisation 
policy. 15 Fisher was in the forefront of the attack on deflationist policies in 
the United States, and was anything but modest in the claims he made about the 
social benefits which would flow from his stabilisation proposal: 
It is no exaggeration to say that stabilising the dollar would directly and 
indirectly accomplish more social justice and go farther in the solution 
of our industrial, commercial and financial problems than almost any 
other reform proposed in the world today. 16 
Keynes was well disposed toward Fisher,17 and although their views differed 
considerably in both content and sophistication, they were in the 1920s often 
linked together in commentaries by contemporary economists as key exponents 
of the stabilisationist outlook. 
7 
The Monetary Policy Debate in Australia 
The debate between the 'stabilisationists' and 'deflationists' was highly relevant 
to economic policy and discussion in Australia. In the 1920s, awareness of the 
theoretical debate on these issues was largely confined to economists. Douglas 
Copland was, for example, deeply influenced by Keynes (and to a somewhat 
lesser extent by Fisher), and became a strong advocate of central bank 
management of credit policy for price stability. He was not, however, prepared 
to go as far as Keynes in rejecting the gold standard and endorsing exchange rate 
flexibility. 18 The issue of prices stabilisation vs. exchange rate stability was 
actively debated amongst Australian economists in the 1920s.* In a 1925 
textbook, for example, the prominent Sydney economist R.C. Mills explicitly 
discussed Keynes' argument on this matter, and came out in qualified support of 
gradual deflation to restore the pre-war gold standard. Mills believed at this 
time that in the longer term Australia should seek to maintain a fixed exchange 
rate with Britain (the so-called 'sterling exchange standard'). 19 
It was the Great Depression which brought these debates into the public arena in 
Australia. The stabilisationist and deflationist analyses had considerable 
relevance to the circumstances of the Depression. Australia experienced a 
major drop in the price level and an enormous balance of payments deficit. In 
this context, two key policy issues arose. Firstly, should Australia attempt to 
retain exchange parity with Britain (even if this meant further contractionary 
* The question of the appropriate trade-off between exchange and price 
stability presented Australian economists with greater complexities than it did 
their British counterparts. In particular, the great trade and financial 
dependence of Australia upon Britain gave rise to a strong argument for 
exchange stability with sterling. Keynes himself had argued that small countries 
like Australia should attach themselves to major financial powers through the 
preservation of fixed exchange rates within blocs (the 'sterling bloc' in this case), 
on condition that those powers pursued prices stabilisation policies. Tract On 
Monetary Reform, pp.159-60 
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pressure on the Australian economy), or should it allow a depreciation of the 
exchange rate to take place? Secondly, what was the best response to the 
cost-price squeeze occasioned by the fall in prices? Was it best to rely upon 
money wage cuts and reductions in other costs in order to achieve balance at a 
lower price level? Alternatively, should there be deliberate monetary expansion 
aimed at reflating prices so as to at least partially obviate the need for wage and 
cost cuts? 
The 'battle of the plans' in Australia during the Depression has been far too well 
described by Schedvin and others to require more than a brief outline here. On 
the deflationist wing of this 'battle' there was, of course, the Niemeyer plan. At 
the other end of the spectrum was the Theodore plan. Between these poles of 
opinion, the Premiers' Plan · tended towards the deflationism, while the 
Giblin-Copland-Dyason 'Stabilisation Plan' of late 1930 inclined in the opposite 
direction. The Niemeyer plan called for the balancing of the budget, the 
maintenance of sterling parity, resistance to credit stimulus, and full-blooded 
wage cuts. By contrast, the Stabilisation Plan and the Theodore plan both 
favoured devaluation and the typically stabilisationist policy of controlled 
monetary expansion aimed at the restoration of the pre-depression price 
level. 20 Theodore summed up this key point when he spoke of 'the restoration 
of the value of our currency' - not that this saved him from the 'inflationist' 
label. 21 
Australian economists disagreed, at least at first, on the appropriate policy 
response to the Depression. There were, nevertheless, few advocates of purely 
stabilisationist or deflationist remedies. The circumstances of the Depression 
were such that devaluation, deficits and monetary expansion were absolutely 
unavoidable. In practice, even the more def lationist economists were well aware 
9 
of this reality. Leslie Melville, who before the Depression was a strong 
supporter of fixed exchange rates, recognised that the Depression circumstances 
made devaluation a necessity. 22 Even J.B. Brigden, who was decidedly on the 
orthodox side of the debate, could declare in 1930 that there was a role for a 
limited degree of 'inflation' to complement 'the slow process of restoring 
confidence by reductions of costs'. 23 
At the same time, the advocates of the stabilisation plan themselves strongly 
emphasised the need to combine reflationary monetary stimulus with 'drastic 
retrenchment of all expenditure, public and private, and the reduction of the 
standard of living throughout the community ••• including reduction of real wages 
even for basic wage earners'. 24 The argument was simple: the position which 
faced policy makers was not that of a threatened slump, but of an actual severe 
depression. Major losses of real income had occurred, and these had to be 
reflected in adjustments of real income for all. It was, from this point of view, 
Theodore's fatal weakness that his plan was largely silent about wage reductions. 
It was in this context that Copland represented the Stabilisation Plan as a 
'middle course between the extreme deflationary and inflationary courses'. 25 
Less plausibly, he later presented the Premier's Plan (which he was closely 
involved in drawing up) in the same light. 26 However, as Schedvin makes clear, 
the Premiers' Plan was cast in a considerably more orthodox deflationist mould 
than the Stabilisation Plan. This reflected both the general conservative 
political backlash which had taken place, and the backdown of Copland and 
others to a position where they were prepared to join with other economists in 
implicitly 'rejecting without qualification the theoretical basis of the 
stabilisation plan, and ..• returning to advocacy of strict deflation and aligning 
themselves with the banks'. 27 
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Copland's later description of the Premiers' Plan as a 'triumph' over the 
deflationists of 'quite special measures' which were 'regarded as unorthodox' 28 
was, nevertheless, not completely without foundation. There was at least one 
discretionary policy element of the Premiers' Plan which was significant from 
the standpoint of stabilisationist values. This was the attempt to reduce interest 
rates across the board, starting with the conversion of government bonds. The 
threat of compulsory conversion of government bonds to a lower rate of interest 
raised substantial business opposition when it was first put forward, but in the 
event the Premiers' Plan was used by the Labor government as a mandate for 
compulsory conversion. 29 The reduction of the interest rate burden was a move 
very dear to the hearts of those influenced by stabilisationist doctrine, given 
that a key stabilisationist argument against the deflationary process was that it 
was distributionally unjust and economically damaging because outstanding 
interest obligations were not adjusted downwards in line with falling prices. 30 
The reduction of the interest rate burden was also very much in tune with 
traditional Labor economic thinking. As we will see later, it was this, more than 
anything else, which enabled Labor politicians to believe that they had salvaged 
at least something of value in the general surrender of the Premiers' Plan. 
11 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MONET ARY HERESIES 
The issues of the stabilisationist/deflationist debate in the interwar period were 
not new. The central question was one which had preoccupied many earlier 
writers, and which has most recently regained prominence in the wake of the 
monetarist revival of the 1970s. It concerned the impact on prices and real 
activity respectively of changes in the supply of money. 
'Deflationism' was the descendant of Ricardian monetary doctrine. A key 
element of the Ricardian doctrine was the neutrality of money - that is, the 
belief that 'in the long run money was irrelevant and could realistically be 
ignored as having no lasting effect on the fundamental tendencies of real 
factors'. 1 This view was a very influential part of the classical tradition. It led 
directly to the deflationist belief that the effects of money supply changes on 
real output were temporary, artificial and unstable, and that the principal lasting 
effect of such monetary changes was on the price level. It was from this 
perspective that the deflationists viewed any attempt to bring about a sustained 
expansion of the economy by means of monetary stimulus as either futile or 
dangerous. 
The Ricardian 'neutrality' doctrine was fundamentally different from the 
conventional wisdom of the pre-classical age. The mercantilists had seen a 
direct link between the supply of money and the health of the national 
economy. 2 As the well-known eighteenth century mercantilist John Law put it: 
••• trade depends on money. A greater quantity employs more people 
than a lesser quantity. A lesser sum can only set a number of people to 
work proportioned to it ••• 3 
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The mercantilist doctrine was one with considerable commonsense appeal. 
Money was, after all, purchasing power. It was therefore natural to assume that 
a deficiency of money implied an insufficiency of demand, and that the 
existence of unemployment was evidence of monetary insufficiency. As Law put 
it 'the many poor we have always had is a great presumption we have never had 
money enough'. 4 
From this standpoint, the Ricardian notion that the supply of money was not a 
fundamental factor influencing employment and production must have appeared 
somewhat absurd. It is hardly surprising that even in Britain, where Ricardian 
doctrine achieved a particularly pronounced dominance, there remained into the 
twentieth century a significant undercurrent of monetary thought outside the 
Ricardian tradition. This undercurrent was even stronger in the United States, 
both in terms of popular influence and its links with academic economics. 
Many doctrines based on the mercantilist conception of the role of money have 
been put forward over the last two centuries. Common to all has been a view 
the slumps are caused by monetary insufficiency and that an adequate supply of 
money can assure stability and prosperity. The focus in this chapter is upon one 
important group of doctrines which combined this mercantilist view with a belief 
that gold is an inappropriate and dangerous foundation for the monetary system 
and that, more generally, the supply of money should not be based upon any 
commodity or group of commodities. 
Exponents of this anti-'commodity' money or 'monetary radical' view argued that 
the supply of gold could not be expected to keep pace with the growing needs of 
trade in an expanding economy and that attempts to overcome the supply 
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limitations of gold coin through note issues based on convertibility to gold were 
the principal cause of the bank crashes which were such a recurrent feature of 
economic life. (This was because the maintenance of fractional gold reserves 
meant that there was always a point at which loss of popular confidence and the 
consequent demand for gold could prevent any bank, no matter how conservative 
its gold reserve ratios, from meeting its obligations to depositors.) Monetary 
radicals also claimed that specie (and, indeed, any other imaginable 'commodity' 
money), was inescapably subject to disruptive fluctuations in supply and cost of 
production. The opening of a host of new gold mines might, for example, rapidly 
and disruptively increase the money supply. Financiers and money lenders could, 
moreover, hoard and speculate in gold. By deliberately withholding gold from 
circulation they could induce general monetary deficiency, with disastrous 
consequences for the economy as a whole. 
This approach can be contrasted with the bimetallist or 'free silver' approach, 
which also drew on the mercantilist tradition. The bimetallists, who were an 
important political force in a number of countries in the late nineteenth century, 
called for the expansion of the money supply through the remonetization of 
silver.* 5 Monetary radicals, however, thought this an inadequate solution to the 
problems of the monetary system. The remonetization of silver would increase 
the monetary base. All the other fundamental problems of the gold standard 
system - its susceptibility to hoarding, the flawed principle of convertibility, 
and the influence of extraneous movements in supply and cost of 
production - could, however, be expected to affect a bimetallic system in 
precisely the same way in which they affected the (monometallic) gold standard. 
* Bimetallic systems operated in a number of countries, including France and 
the United States, even into the nineteenth century. Their transformation into 
gold st.andard systems led many to trace depressions, bank crashes and 
unemployment to monetary contraction resulting from the withdrawal of silver 
money from circulation. 
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Exponents of the anti-commodity money view urged that, rather than being 
based on the supply of gold or other specific commodities, the supply of money 
should be determined solely according to the needs of the economy or the 
credit-worthiness of borrowers. They also demanded that gold-based currency 
should be replaced by a system of inconvertible paper money. This meant either 
the demonetization of gold or, alternatively, the abolition of the free minting of 
gold* and of fractional gold reserves for paper money, so that the total supply of 
money would bear no necessary relation to the amount of monetary gold in 
circulation. 
The Quantity Theory School 
Amongst those who rejected gold and other 'commodity' monies there were two 
major schools of thought about the principles which should govern the supply of 
money. One of these schools took as its starting point a credit cycle/quantity 
theory view of the impact of money supply changes. That is, it saw the chain of 
causation as flowing from money supply changes to the price level and thence to 
the level of activity. Like the stabilisationists, this school emphasised stability 
in the money supply and the price level as preconditions of broader economic 
stability. 
* The 'free minting' of gold ref erred to the system under which the government 
undertook to mint on behalf of its owners any privately owned bullion brought to 
it and, at the same time, permitted the melting down of gold coin by those who 
preferred to hold bullion. 
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This school of thought is exemplified in the writings of Alexander del Mar and 
Frederick Soddy. Del Mar was a nineteenth century American writer who held 
various public offices including that of director of the U.S. Bureau of Statistics. 
Soddy was an Englishman whose principal writings were published in the 1920s 
and 1930s. * Although Soddy and del Mar wrote at different times and in 
considerably different contexts, their analyses and policy proposals had a great 
deal in common. 
Like other monetary radicals, del Mar's starting point was the belief that 
'commercial crises' and bank crashes were the consequence of monetary 
contraction - of what he called 'Crescendo and Diminuendo money'. 6 Del Mar 
expressly endorsed what he called the 'quantitative principle' of money - that is, 
the view that the velocity of circulation was highly stable in the short run, and 
that 'the value of money varies inversely as its quantity'. 7 Money supply 
instability disrupted relative prices, causing distributional inequity and broader 
economic disruption: 
••• to increase money, or permit it to increase, is not merely to enhance 
all prices simultaneously; it is to enhance the price of some things in 
point of time before others; it is to benefit certain classes of the 
community at the expense of the remainder; it is to derange and throw 
into disorder all the varied and complicated interests of society. 
Contrariwise, to diminish its sum, or to permit it to diminish, is to 
depress the prices of certain commodities sooner than others, and to 
occasion a derangement of affairs even more perilous to 
society •••••• because a fall of prices hinders commerce and depresses 
production ••• 8 
Del Mar saw the gold standard as the principle villain of the piece. Where the 
free minting of gold obtained, he said, 'the owners of bullion could increase the 
currency by having their metal coined, or diminish it by melting the coins, and so 
*Soddy was a part-time writer on monetary matters. He was Professor of 
Chemistry at Oxford University, a Nobel prize winner and a major contributor 
to the development of physical chemistry. 
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could alter the Measure of Value at pleasure'. 9 He attacked vigorously the 
principle of commodity money and referred disparagingly to specie-based 
monetary systems as 'metallism'. 10 Gold, he suggested, lent itself to the 
'intrigues of the money-lending class', who were able to alternately inflate and 
depress prices with the consequence that producers were 'compelled at alternate 
intervals to yield up a large portion of their profits in trade to a body of 
cosmopolitan financiers'. 11 Interestingly, del Mar saw paper money as 
dampening rather than as exacerbating the volatility of a gold money supply. 12 
His principal policy recommendation had a strongly Friedmanite ring to it: 
money supply (including notes and gold) should be allowed to grow at a stable 
rate of 3.3% per annum to allow for the needs of growing trade and population. 
This policy would, he claimed, operate so as to eliminate 'contractions and 
stringencies of trade', to 'secure to each class of persons in a State the 
uninterrupted and peaceful enjoyment of their industrial advantages', and to 
'visit upon the labouring and indebted classes no unnecessary nor peculiar 
hardships'. 13 
The works of Frederick Soddy, the full thrust of which cannot be summarised 
here, were enormously influential within the 'monetary reform' movement 
throughout the English-speaking world during the 1920s and 1930s. Soddy's 
fundamental concern was that 'we now have a concertina instead of a 
currency'. 14 Like del Mar, he held to a version of 'the Quantity Theory of 
Money'. 15 Central to his writings was the notion of price stability through 
stability in the money supply. Like del Mar, however, he took the view that, 
while excessive contraction and excessive expansion of the money supply were 
both undesirable, monetary contraction was by far the more socially damaging of 
the two: 
In general it may be said that though variation in the value of money in 
either direction is an equal injustice morally, of the two, that done to 
the creditor class by debasing the currency is less injurious to the 
community, than that to the debtor class by attempting to raise the 
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value ••• The creditor class economically speaking is a burden rather than 
an asset. Under deflation, as now, the dead hand of the past ••. is apt to 
become too grievous to be borne. 16 
Although Soddy vigorously attacked the gold standard, describing gold as 'in all 
respects about the worst commodity to choose as a money standard', 17 his 
special contribution lay in the heavy emphasis he placed upon the 'invention and 
development of the cheque system' (as he slightly misleadingly referred to bank 
deposit creation) as the principal technique by which the banks manipulated the 
money supply. 18 He proposed the introduction of a '100% reserve' system (see 
below) the effect of which would have been to destroy the power of the banks to 
create 'cheque' money. Complete and direct power over the creation of money 
would then revert to the state, which would manage its supply so as to ensure 
price stability. 19 
Public or Private Money? 
As both these writers clearly demonstrated, concern about the principles 
governing the money supply was closely related to views on another perennial 
issue of monetary policy. Was money creation a legitimate field for private 
interests, or should it be undertaken exclusively by the state? If private money 
creation was to be permitted, how far should and could it be controlled by the 
government? Both Soddy and del Mar attributed monetary volatility to an 
enormous growth in private money-creation, whether in the form of private bank 
notes or of bank deposit money. Both looked back to a mythical golden age when 
the state was the sole creator of money. The prerequisite of a proper monetary 
policy was, they argued, the reassertion of this direct public control over the 
supply of money. 20 'Experience has abundantly proved', wrote del Mar, 'that 
neither individuals nor private corporations are competent to preserve a limit to 
money'. 21 Or as Soddy put it: 
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Once destroy the power of banks and private financial people to issue 
money, and confine their operations to legitimate transactions, and there 
would be not the least difficulty in maintaining the index number [i.e. 
the price level] so constant that no one could detect its variation. 22 
A closely related question was who should gain the direct benefits of money 
creation (seignorage, as it is technically known). The Soddy-del Mar school 
pointed to the public appropriation of seignorage as one of the key benefits 
which would flow from the elimination of private money creation. Soddy even 
went so far as to equate bank deposit creation with counterfeiting. 23 
These issues have been recurrent ones in the history of monetary thought. After 
each new wave of development in the monetary system, the state has normally 
sought to maintain or extend a degree of control over the money supply through 
changes to its regulatory framework. One major step in this was the elimination 
of private note issues in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the 
first half of the twentieth century attention focussed on the control of 
deposit-money aggregates, the most substantial regulatory moves being made in 
the decade or so after the Great Depression. 
The notion that seignorage should be the exclusive prerogative of government 
was not confined to 'quack' monetary thinkers. It was a view with deep roots in 
the history of economic ideas. One of the most influential advocates of this 
view was Ricardo himself. Not only did Ricardo attack private control of the 
note issue, he also outlined a method by which private note issues could be taken 
into public control. In doing so, he presented the 'quacks' with a plan which, with 
some adaption, proved eminently suitable to their purposes. 
Ricardo's focus was on private bank notes rather than deposit money and 
cheques. As early as 1816, in his Proposals for An Economical and Secure 
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Currency, he had criticised 'the policy of permitting a company of merchants 
[i.e. the Bank of England] to enjoy all the advantages which attend the supplying 
of a great country with paper money', and had noted that 'paper money may be 
considered as affording a seignorage •.. but seignorage in all countries belongs to 
the state ••• '. To remedy this situation, Ricardo touched briefly on the 
desirability of 'the state ••• becoming the sole issuer of paper money', with the 
actual power of issue being entrusted to 'commissioners responsible to 
parliament'. 24 This proposal (which Ricardo may have derived from Say 25) was 
reiterated, more forcefully and in greater detail, in The Principles (1817) 26 and 
in the posthumous pamphlet Plan For the Establishment of a National Bank 
(1824). 27 
Ricardo's principal concern in all this was the appropriation of seignorage rather 
than the control of the money supply. Although he was alive to the greater 
confidence a government note issue might inspire, 28 he nevertheless looked to 
the basic principles of the gold standard (free minting, and the obligation of the 
public note issuing authority to pay, on demand, notes for gold and gold for 
notes) as the proper safeguard against unwanted fluctuations in the money 
supply. 29 In other words, he favoured a more or less automatic - as opposed to 
managed - monetary system. While orthodox classical and neoclassical 
economics could at no stage be said to have unreservedly endorsed a purely 
automatic monetary system, there can be no doubt that in Australia, as in 
Britain, the 'official doctrine' and conventional wisdom leaned heavily in that 
direction. 30 
Ricardo's strong stand on the question of government note issues would appear to 
have been significant in legitimising and strengthening subsequent popular 
campaigns for the elimination of private issues, not only in Australia but in other 
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English-speaking countries. His view was not, however, representative of 
orthodox economic and business opinion. Orthodoxy distrusted government note 
issues, believing that governments were prone to excessive and inflationary 
monetary expansion. Orthodox opponents of government note issues also argued 
that the government could - by the simple expedient of a tax on private note 
issues - claim part of the seignorage profit without 'nationalising' the note issue. 
(Australian colonial governments, incidentally, all introduced note issue revenue 
taxes 31). Ricardo himself had acknowledged the 'great danger' of government 
abuse of the power to create money, but had argued that 'in a free country with 
an enlightened legislature' one could rely upon legislative guarantees of the 
independence of the note issue Commissioners (and of their adherence to proper 
gold standard principles). 32 
By contrast to the Ricardian approach, monetary polemicists in the 
Soddy-del Mar tradition favoured a public monopoly of money creation not 
merely because they wished to ensure the public appropriation of seignorage, but 
also because they saw it as a means of asserting public control over the money 
supply. Having rejected the supposedly 'automatic' gold standard system of 
money supply regulation (a system which they regarded as neither automatic nor 
stable), these writers were naturally propelled towards overtly 'managed' money. 
They were, moreover, far more fearful of private manipulation and contraction 
of the money supply than they were of inflationary monetary expansion by 
government. This reflected, amongst other things, a tendency to greatly 
exaggerate the capacity and inclination of the banks to manipulate the money 
supply (whether acting alone or through conspiratorial cabals). Highly distorted 
versions of the money multiplier theory of bank deposit creation were often put 
forward to justify these claims about the degree of discretionary power wielded 
by the banks. 33 
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It was for these reasons that anti-commodity money critics were, in Australia 
and America, amongst the most consistent and uncompromising advocates of 
what del Mar called the 'complete restoration of (monetary) control by the 
State'. 34 The basic principle of state control was applied to notes, 
deposit-money and even to gold itself. Del Mar, for example, focussed 
particularly on the need for state control of the gold money supply. 35 He was, 
perhaps, unusual. His contemporaries for the most part favoured the complete 
demonetization of gold, and focussed their attention on the need to abolish 
private note issues. Monetary radicals joined cause in the campaign for an 
exclusively 'national' note issue with many whose orthodox views on monetary 
policy were antithetical to their own. In Australia, private note issues were 
effectively prohibited in 1910. In some countries, it took even longer to 
'nationalise' the note issue (in New Zealand, this did not happen until the 1930s). 
The elimination of private note issues did not, however, mean the elimination of 
private money creation. Deposit-money and the 'cheque system' remained, and 
monetary radicals of the Soddy-del Mar school shifted their attention 
accordingly. Soddy was a pathbreaker here, extending earlier analysis to the 
problem of deposit-money. He did so, however, with an intriguing twist. Under 
his 100% reserve proposal, banks were to be required to keep reserves of 
government bank notes equal to their demand deposits. The only money they 
would be permitted to lend would be time deposits, and this would only be 
permitted insofar as the maturity structures of bank assets and liabilities 
matched exactly. As Soddy put it: 
The banks should by law be required to keep national money, pound for 
pound of their liabilities for customers' 'deposits' in current account, and 
only be permitted to lend money genuinely deposited into their keeping 
by its owners, who give up the use of it for the stipulated period of the 
loan ••• 36 
Soddy's proposal was, in short, designed to end bank deposit-creation while 
preserving the convenience of cashless fund transfers. Banks would be barred 
from lending long on short-term money and would, as a result, be unable to 
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create deposit money or affect the money supply. Their role in relation to time 
deposits would be simply that of safe-keeping and facilitating the transfer of 
funds. Their lending role, on the other hand, would be that of financial 
intermediation in the strictest sense - they could marshal and distribute actual 
savings. They would, in short, cease to be banks. As a result, the money supply 
would always be equal to the volume of 'national money' (government paper 
money), and would be under the exclusive control of the Government. 
Soddy's proposal was, however, only one possible way of ending private 
deposit-creation. * An obvious alternative to Soddy's proposal, on the analogy of 
private note issue 'nationalisation', was the 'socialisation of credit' - that is, the 
retention of the 'cheque system' as an exclusive prerogative of government 
banks. This particular proposal was, as we will see, to be especially influential in 
Australia. 
The Real Bills Doctrine 
There was another school within the monetary radical tradition which viewed the 
question of monetary control from a perspective quite different to the quantity 
theory outlook of the Soddy-de! Mar school. It was a school which might be 
dubbed 'national credit'. ** 
* The origins of Soddy's proposal can be traced back not to earlier writers in the 
monetary radical tradition, but to monetary restrictionists in nineteenth century 
America (and no doubt elsewhere) who had proposed a 100% specie reserve 
system as a means of preventing government abuse of public note issues. The 
idea was that all issues of paper money should be fully backed by gold specie. 
This would prevent the stock of money ever exceeding the stock of monetary 
gold, while allowing the continued use of paper money for convenience. 37 
** Not to be confused with 'social credit', which was merely one of its mutant 
forms. 
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National credit can perhaps best be understood by reference to the 'real bills' 
doctrine, which was the main theoretical alternative to the quantity theory 
throughout much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The essence of the real bills doctrine was a qualitative, as opposed to 
quantitative, view of the principles which should constrain the creation of bank 
credit. In its purest form, the doctrine held that the soundness of the monetary 
system would be assured, and monetary disturbances to the economy avoided, if 
banks issued notes only for the financing of bona fide trade transactions. These 
transactions would be financed by the discount of bills of exchange ('real' bills). 
Such an approach would, it was thought, give the money supply a desirable 
flexibility without the danger of excess, in that 
••• if only 'real' bills are discounted, the expansion of bank money will be 
in proportion to any extension of trade that might take place, or to the 
'needs of trade', and ••• when trade contracts, bank loans will be 
correspondingly paid off ••• the currency will have a desirable elasticity 
and the banks will at all times be in a liquid condition. 38 
Two other related ideas were central to the real bills doctrine in its pure form. 
The first was the 'law of reflux', according to which, as long as only real bills 
were financed, excess money could not be pumped into the economy because 
'notes not needed by the community would be returned to the issuing banks'. 39 
The other was that excessive and potentially dangerous monetary expansion 
could only take place as a consequence of the banks lending for speculative 
purposes through the discounting of 'fictitous bills' which did not reflect the 
requirements of trade. 40 
The real bills doctrine was much more than a prescription for sound prudential 
practice on the part of the banks. 41 It was logically antithetical to the quantity 
theory, which defined monetary excess in purely quantitative terms. During the 
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nineteenth century, there was a great deal of controversy, in Britain and a 
number of other countries, about the respective merits of the quantity theory 
and 'real bill' doctrines. The real bills doctrine, of which Adam Smith was the 
most famous proponent, has been described as 'the chief intellectual basis of 
banking theory at the end of the eighteenth century' in Britain. 42 In the 
nineteenth century it came under increasing pressure from quantity theory 
exponents. This pressure was exemplified in Ricardo's critique of Smith's 
monetary doctrine. The high point of this debate was the controversy between 
the 'Banking School' (real bills) and the 'Currency School' (quantity theory) over 
the formulation of the 1844 Bank Act. 43 Ricardian doctrine won convincingly in 
Britain and was enshrined in the Bank Act, although real bills notions were not 
completely obliterated. In America, by contrast, the triumph of Ricardianism 
was never as complete, even amongst economists. 44 
Mainstream 'real bills' exponents like Adam Smith did not view the doctrine as a 
rationale for easy money. It was, rather, conceived as a warning against types of 
lending (especially 'finance' and 'accommodation' bills) which could facilitate 
dangerous speculation. 45 Moreover, even though the real bills doctrine was, 
logically, an alternative to the gold standard, only a minority of real bills 
theorists went so far as to completely reject the gold standard. 46 Most took a 
more eclectic approach, upholding convertibility but arguing that the reserves 
held against note issues should embrace both gold and good commercial paper. 
That the real bills doctrine lent itself to adaption by easy money advocates is 
nevertheless hardly surprising. Real bills theorists suggested that the proper 
limit to bank lending was to be found in the legitimate needs of business, and 
that it was the duty of banks to meet those needs. 47 The real question, then, 
was what constituted a 'legitimate' business need. While Smith and others spoke 
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of the financing of bona fide trade transactions alone, others shifted the 
emphasis to the credit-worthiness of the would-be borrower. 48 This shift of 
emphasis was of enormous significance. 
The National Credit School 
The 'national credit' school was a variant of monetary radicalism which drew 
heavily on the real bills doctrine. National credit exponents were fierce critics 
of gold convertibility, both on general anti-'commodity money' grounds and 
because, like 'real bills' advocates, they favoured flexible, qualitative principles 
for bank lending. To the exponents of the 'national credit' doctrine, however, 
flexibility meant a more or less unrestricted approach to lending. National 
credit transformed the 'needs of trade' principle into a doctrine which held that 
economic nirvana could be achieved if the banks fully accommodated the credit 
needs of all 'credit worthy' borrowers. Credit-worthiness meant either the 
possession of adequate tangible assets as security, or the presentation of a 
proposal (whether for trade, or investment) for the productive use of the funds. 
It was deduced from this that the volume of bank credit should be related to the 
'needs' of business, the stock of tradeable commodities and real assets*, and 
even to the 'potential' wealth of the community. These various formulas were 
used in the same breath and without much precision or sense of their contrasting 
meanings. The essential theme was, however, that the supply of bank credit 
should reflect, not the restraints of gold 'backing' requirements, but the sum 
total of the credit-worthiness of citizens. It was this aggregate 
credit-worthiness which was referred to as the 'national credit'. 
* Closely-related to this was the age-old 'land banking' doctrine, according to 
which land was the appropriate asset upon which to base the money supply. 
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There was a further twist to the argument. This drew on the age-old tradition of 
hostility to 'usury' - a tradition which ran counter to the orthodox ideology of 
interest as the legitimate reward for abstinence. 49 National credit polemicists 
held not simply that the volume of bank credit should be based upon 
credit-worthiness, but also that credit was actually the embodiment of 
credit-worthiness. Concretely, this meant that credit was, by rights, the 
property of the borrower or of society as a whole. Private credit-creation by 
the banks therefore represented a misappropriation of the national credit, and 
the charging of interest on bank loans was an unjustifiable levy upon borrowers 
for the use of their own credit. 
As strange as this doctrine might seem, it can readily be understood in a 
historical context. Trade bills (bills of exchange) played a significant, if 
subordinate, role as money well into the nineteenth century. * These bills were 
debt instruments issued directly by firms to their creditors, and their 
acceptability in circulation was a reflection of the credit-worthiness of the 
issuing firm. As bank notes and cheques increasingly forced trade bills out of 
circulation, businesses found themselves under greater pressure to discount trade 
bills with a bank rather than to put them directly into circulation. 51 It was 
natural that, despite the greater convenience and negotiability of bank notes, 
some businessmen should view the banks as appropriating and overcharging for 
credit which was rightfully not theirs to lend. 
* Clapham indicates that in the 1820s trade bills formed the dominant part of 
the money supply in certain British industrial shires and that 'though they might 
not circulate so much or so fast as noteB they certainly passed through many 
hands in these typical industrial regions'. 5 
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Like other monetary radicals, national credit exponents explained depression, 
business failure and unemployment as the product of monetary deficiency, 
whether induced by the gold standard, by gold speculators or by the banks. As 
they saw it, the degree of monetary deficiency could be measured by the extent 
to which aggregate bank lending fell short of the totality of the 'national 
credit' - that is, in concrete terms, by the borrowing requirements of 
credit-worthy would-be borrowers who had either been refused loans or who 
were unable to afford current interest rates. It followed from this that, other 
things being equal, higher interest rates indicated a greater degree of monetary 
deficiency. A society with an adequate supply of money would be one in which 
no interest was charged on 'borrowed' money, other than a small service charge 
to cover the legitimate operating costs of the bank or national credit authority. 
National credit writers were also greatly concerned with the problem of debt. 
As they saw it, the charging of interest on loans led to the imposition of 
cumulative and ultimately unsustainable debt burdens upon producers. The 
heavier a producer's loan commitments, the more liable he was to bankruptcy in 
a period of deflation. This gave financial interests an incentive to bring about 
periodic sharp contractions in the money supply in order to extend their grip on 
the assets of the community through foreclosures and distress sales. 
The national credit school was a diverse one which took a variety of forms over 
its long history. It was, in origin, the ideology of the credit-dependent farmer or 
small businessman. 52 (The landed property version, which was for obvious 
reasons particularly attractive to farmers, had roots going back to John Law 
himself. 53) Ideology is, however, a fluid entity. Variations on the theme 
appeared which reflected a range of class interests and shifting political 
concerns. In both America 54 and Australia, and to a lesser extent in Britain, 
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national credit was an important ideological influence on working class politics, 
and was in many instances to be found in cross-breeds with socialist ideas. Ideas 
of a national credit type also had an influence on a number of politic al 
movements of the right, including early Nazism. 55 On the 'left' as well as the 
right, these national credit themes were often heavily laced with an 
anti-Semitism which probably had the same medieval roots as the anti-usury 
doctrine. 
National Credit: Free Banking and Anti-Banking 
There was, perhaps surprisingly, one important variant of 'national credit' - the 
free banking doctrine - which was anti-gold but not necessarily anti-bank. 
Exponents of 'free banking' concurred with all the usual criticisms of a monetary 
system based on gold. They did not, however, see private banking as a source of 
monetary manipulation. In fact, they argued for the 'freeing' of the private 
banking system from the 'shackles' of gold on the grounds that this was the best 
means of assuring the provision of an adequate supply of credit to the 
community. 
One exponent of the free banking viewpoint was Arthur Kitson, an Englishman 
who drew much of his inspiration from the American tradition. Kitson's 1894 
book, The Money Problem, was widely read through its many editions, and was 
followed by many other contributions from its author over the following forty 
years or so. Kitson regarded the state as guilty of 'monopolizing and restricting 
the supply of money' through the enforcement of gold convertibility. 56 All the 
problems of the monetary system could, in his view, be traced to this misguided 
political interference. It was, after all, the gold standard which had placed 'the 
power to paralyze industry •.. in the hands of comparatively few individuals'. 57 
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The solution to these problems, according to Kitson, lay in less rather than more 
government interference. He called for the 'repeal (of) all laws prohibiting and 
restricting banking and the issue of money' and, more particularly, of those laws 
'which make gold or silver or any other commodity or instrument compulsory 
legal tender'. 58 
The precise nature of Kitson's plan became a little vague at this point. In line 
with the laissez-faire notion of government as an umpire which impartially 
defines and enforces the 'rules of the game', Kitson urged the establishment of a 
'legally constituted money unit - for public convenience - similar to the unit 
of weight, length and capacity'. By some unspecified mechanism*, this was to 
lead to a situation where the monetary unit, 'instead of being or representing a 
certain weight or mass of a particular commodity, such as gold, ••• would 
represent a certain fraction of all exchangeable wealth at a given time'. 59 As 
an alternative way of expressing this national credit idea of wealth/security as 
the proper backing for credit, Kitson spoke of his system as one in which 'all' 
assets or durable commodities 'would be alike monetizable'. 60 He explicitly 
attacked the doctrine of abstinence as the origin of interest,61 and argued that 
the consequence of the monetary reform he proposed would be that 
* Whatever the mechanism Kitson had in mind, it did not depend upon 
quantitative management of the money supply. He argued that, under his 
proposal, 'variation in supply or demand of money could have no effect upon 
prices' (see note 60). 
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••• the supply of money would become so abundant that interest for the 
use of money would rapidly disappear. Interest is only possible with a 
restricted currency. 62 
The historical roots of the free banking tradition went back a long way, to the 
nineteenth century British writers like Weslau who had objected to the 
destruction of local banking flexibility and lending-by-repute as a result of the 
imposition by the state of the gold convertibility system. 63 In Scotland the 
requirements of the British banking legislation of 1844 were a significant 
'impediment to expansion along the lines of [the Scottish banking system's] 
earlier history•,64 and were resented by many. In nineteenth century America, 
the free banking movement was represented most notably by Henry C. Carey and 
his followers. 65 
Although Kitson was highly regarded within the general anti-commodity money 
movement, there was little broad support for the 'free banking' notion of 
laissez-faire in private banking and money creation. As we have seen, the 
Soddy-de! Mar school took a radically different view of how the banking system 
should be organised. More to the point, most of those who subscribed to the 
national credit doctrine of loan creation shared the intense hostility to private 
banking which characterised the Soddy-del Mar school. 
The anti-bank strand of national credit also had deep historical roots in the 
major English-speaking countries, and was, as we will see, especially influential 
in Australia. This school agreed with Soddy that bank manipulation of credit was 
a major source of monetary instability. It nevertheless took a national credit 
view of the principles which should guide bank lending. 
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One writer in this mould was Robert Howe, the American author of The 
Evolution of Banking: A Study of the Development of the Credit System 
(1915). 66 Howe attacked gold 'commodity' money along conventional lines,67 
and criticised the 'utter folly' of a system based on fractional gold reserves. 68 
He approvingly quoted another writer's criticism of the British Bank Act of 1844 
for 
••• making the amount of industry dependent upon the volume of the 
currency, whereas the true system is the opposite - the graduation of 
the amount of currency according to the value of the productive industry 
of the country. 69 
Howe attacked the banks for appropriating the power and profits inherent in 
money-creation. 70 'It is', he suggested 
very evident that whoever can control the bank credits can control all 
business and thereby are enabled to levy tribute on every transaction. 
They can assure success to some and drive others out of business by 
refusing credit. Such a power in the hands of a class would result in an 
Economic Monarchy from which the public could not hope to escape. 
To address this problem, Howe called upon Congress to 'expand the functions of 
the Treasury and the Postal Banks and through them issue all money and credit 
for all public purposes'. 71 
Borrowing and Debt 
When he spoke of 'public purposes', Howe clearly had in mind the replacement of 
government as well as private borrowing by public money-creation. This raised 
an issue of great concern to the whole monetary radical tradition: that of public 
borrowing and national debt. Private bank money-creation through note issues 
had from the outset been integrally connected with public borrowing. The Bank 
of England, chartered in 1694, typified this connection. The Bank was, as 
Clapham puts it, 'chartered by the government [the charter included 
monopolistic note issue rights] as a money-raising machine, and act[ed] 
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as a drawer of purchasing power out of that "fund of credit" to which 
contemporaries assigned almost magical attributes ••• '. 72 
This type of relationship between banks and governments made it inevitable that 
the campaign for public appropriation of seignorage would be closely linked with 
the notion of public money creation as a source of interest-free public finance. 
The view that the government should issue its own money rather than borrow 
can, indeed, be traced back to seventeenth century 'state credit' polemicists like 
Sir William Killigrew, who argued against the approach to public finance 
embodied in the establishment of the Bank of England. 73 As in so many other 
areas, however, the proposals put forward by monetary radicals also drew 
significantly on more limited and orthodox ideas. Ricardo, again, was an 
important inspiration. His proposal for an exclusively national note issue 
envisaged that the gradually expanding note issue required by long-term 
economic growth would be put into circulation through the purchase of public 
debt on the open market by the Note Issue Commission. Government bonds 
purchased in this way would cease to be an interest liability of government. In a 
sense, the borrowing involved in the original sale of these bonds by the 
government to the public would be transformed, retrospectively, into an 
interest-free grant to government. 74 
Ricardo also proposed a major one-off use of this repurchase technique in order 
to accomplish the substitution of government notes for private bank notes. What 
he proposed was a large issue of government notes for the repurchase from the 
privately-owned Bank of England of a substantial portion of the national debt. 
The Bank of England would then be required to use these new government notes 
to redeem its own notes as they were returned to it. The effect of this would be 
the instant cancellation of a significant chunk of the national debt, without any 
expansion of the note issue. 75 
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Ricardo made it clear that he was not suggesting a mechanism for an 
augmentation of government finances by means of interest-free loans. He saw 
no link between government funding requirements and the size of the note issue 
(which was to be strictly regulated according to gold standard/quantity theory 
principles). Indeed, he insisted that 
If Government wanted money, it should be obliged to raise it in the 
legitimate way; by taxing the people; by the issue and sale of exchequer 
bills, by funded loans, or by borrowing from any of the numerous banks 
which might exist in the country; but in no case should it be allowed to 
borrow from those, who have the power of creating money. 76 
In line with this strict injunction, he chose to describe the benefits of his note 
issue proposal not in terms of interest-free loans to government (although this 
was its effect, given that new issues of public debt would be partly financed 
from any otherwise-necessary growth in the note issue), but as the 'transfer [of] 
the profit which accrues from the interest of the money so issued from the Bank, 
to the Government'. 77 
Monetary radicals extended the principle of Ricardo's plan to far-reaching 
objectives such as the liquidation of the entire public debt burden and even to 
the 'monetization' of private debt. An early example of this type of approach 
was the 'Pendleton plan', put forward in the United States after the Civil War. 
The Pendleton plan proposed the liquidation of the large public debt accumulated 
during the war, to be accomplished by an expansion of the public note issue (the 
'greenbacks'). This body of additional notes was then to be gradually 'redeemed' 
(withdrawn from circulation) over a period of years. The Pendleton plan was a 
key issue in the 1868 presidential election, reflecting the deep popular concern 
about the greatly increased burden of public debt. Its advocates were in many 
instances also hostile to private note issues. 78 
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The Pendleton plan was a direct extension of Ricardo's Plan in all respects 
except one: the proposed gradual 'redemption' of the notes. This notion of 
redemption was a common but not universal feature of monetary radical public 
finance proposals. The idea of annual cancellation of a portion of a 
special-purpose augmentation of the note issue, until the whole special issue had 
been 'redeemed', was clearly modelled on the conventional sinking fund principle 
for the redemption of public debt. This approach was based on a confusion 
between bonds and money (see below). Reflecting the analogy with public 
borrowing, national credit advocates often spoke of special note issue expansions 
as 'interest-free loans' to government. 
The most restrained monetary radical proposals for the use of public 
money-creation were those put forward by the Soddy-del Mar quantity-theory 
school. Soddy's proposal for the implementation of a 100% reserve system 
followed precisely the lines of the Ricardo plan. The system would require the 
introduction into circulation of a great deal more government paper money, and 
this was to be accomplished by the repurchase by government of a significant 
proportion of the public debt. 79 Soddy was not, however, prepared to go beyond 
this to the advocacy of large-scale free loans for public works. 80 
'National credit' advocates had few such scruples. From the national credit point 
of view, massive monetary expansion to liquidate debt and finance new public 
expenditures found a ready rationale in the theme of 'security' and the 
wealth/money nexus. As security, the government had the whole taxable 
capacity of the nation. There could, correspondingly, be no objection to it 
creating and utilising for public purposes an equivalent share of the national 
credit. As Kitson put it: 
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So long as the amount of money issued by Governments is well within the 
maximum amount payable in taxes I fail to see why Governments should 
not take advantage of this power which they possess. 81 * 
This approach was based, in part, upon a confusion between bonds and money. 
Under the gold standard system, bank notes were, in a real sense, a debt 
instrument. This was because, in issuing notes, the government incurred a 
repayment obligation in broadly the same way that it did when it sold a bond. 
Notes could, in this sense, be viewed as a type of non-interest bearing 
government bond. If, then, paper money and government bonds were alike, was 
it not possible for the government to supplant public borrowing with note 
issuance? As Kitson again put it: 
If a Government bond is considered a valuable instrument, if the public 
debt is a fit and proper subject on which to base the currency, why 
should not the Government anticipate the debt by issuing paper money, 
agreeing to accept it in payment of taxes. 83 
Writing in the same vein, Robert Howe attacked 'the imbecility of issuing an 
interest bearing debt to supply' the nation 'with a circulating medium', and 
declared that 'with the machinery of credit in the hands of the people, no more 
interest bearing bonds need be issued and the burden of interest would be 
removed'. 84 
Once the desirability of substituting public money-creation for public borrowing 
was accepted, its applicability to public works was obvious. From the national 
credit viewpoint, printing money for public works during a depression was, in 
principle, as valid a means of utilising idle portions of the 'national credit' as was 
an easing of credit availability to business. In both cases, monetary deficiency 
would be remedied and activity restored as a result. 
* Alternative versions of the same broad idea were possible. One common 
proposal was the 'backing' of public note issues by specific public assets on the 
model of the 'assignat' issue by the French revolutionary government, which was 
in theory backed by confiscated lands. 82 
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Gesell, Douglas and Hobson 
The delineation of 'schools' within the monetary radical tradition, while 
necessary in order to bring out very real differences of analysis and values, is 
somewhat misleading. There were, as might be expected, a wide range of 
hybrids and variants which mixed the views of the schools which have been 
described here. Furthermore, notwithstanding the significant differences of 
opinion within the broad tradition, there was also a strong sense of common 
ground. Although Soddy, for example, had quite different views from Kitson on 
money supply management and on the role of the banks, he identified Kitson as 
an inspiration and fellow-thinker. Soddy's principal work, Wealth, Virtual Wealth 
and Debt, was dedicated to Kitson. This sense of solidarity was hardly 
surprising, because notwithstanding the differences in analysis which existed, all 
monetary radicals agreed on three fundamental propositions: Firstly, that 
depressions were due to shortfalls in the money supply. Secondly, that these 
shortfalls could be partly traced to the operation of the gold standard. Thirdly 
and finally, that the instability of a monetary system based on gold was greatly 
compounded by conspiratorial manipulation of money and credit by financial 
interests. 
There were, however, a range of influential writers who presented views which 
were derived from the monetary radical tradition but which went beyond it in 
certain key respects. Two important examples were Silvio Gesell and Major 
Douglas. Gesell (1862 - 1930) accepted the usual criticisms of the gold standard, 
favoured government management of a paper currency along price stabilisation 
lines, and linked his 'free money' proposal with the abolition of interest. The 
most strikingly original feature in his diagnosis was his emphasis on fluctuations 
in the velocity of circulation of money, rather than in the money supply itself, as 
the source of monetary demand disruption. Gesell believed that demand 
disruptions 
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and high interest rates resulted from the nature of money (whether gold or notes) 
as a permanent and highly durable store of value. The problem was that since 
money was far more durable than most commodities, 'the nature of our 
traditional money allows demand (the offer of money) to be delayed from one 
day, one week, one month, one year to another, whereas supply (the offer of 
wares) cannot be postponed a day without causing its possessor losses of every 
kind'. 85 Money could, in other words, be hoarded, with disastrous results. In 
particular, hoarding gave wealth holders the ability to prevent interest rates 
dropping sufficiently to sustain prosperity when slump threatened. Gesell 
proposed the introduction of 'stamped money' - that is, paper money which 
would automatically depreciate in value over time (the alternative of modern 
inflation rates perhaps did not occur to him!) - thus making money also 
'perishable' and providing a strong disincentive to hoarding. 
Like Gesell, Major Clifford Hugh Douglas (1879-1952) was a writer with deep 
roots in the monetary radical tradition, whose thinking nevertheless departed 
from that tradition in certain key respects. As the main originator of the social 
credit movement, Douglas' writings have been subject to many commentaries. 
They are, however, generally acknowledged to be particularly obscure and 
difficult to summarise adequately. 86 Douglas took it for granted that the level 
of (or, more particularly, the 'lack of') 'effective demand' reflected the 'amount 
of money available'. 'A state of industrial depression', he declared, 'arises 
primarily from financial and not from physical or psychological causes'. The 
'main cause of the increase or decrease in the amount of money available at any 
time may be found in banking policy, and notably in central bank policy'. 87 
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From this standpoint, Douglas reiterated the usual criticisms of the gold 
standard and attacked deflationary central bank policies as the source of 
worldwide depression in the 1920s. 88 He also pointed to the tendency of 
monetary contraction and depression to concentrate a growing portion of the 
industrial assets of the community 'into the control of banks and finance houses', 
resulting in a growing 'hegemony of finance'. 89 
Douglas challenged 'the claim of the banking system to the ownership of the 
financial credit extended to industry'. This claim, he suggested, would have to 
be regarded as 'wholesale counterfeiting' were it not for the fact that the State 
had openly handed over its 'sovereign rights' over money-creation to the 
banks. 90 Douglas' view of the nature of credit was, moreover, clearly derived 
from the national credit school: 
••. financial credit, therefore, may be considered as a reflection of real 
credit, which is a measure of the capacity to produce and deliver goods 
and services •.• it seems difficult to object to the statement that the real 
basis of credit is the producing and consuming capacity of the 
community, and still more difficult to justify a condition of affairs in 
which this credit is loaned to it as an act of grace, although a charge for 
its mobilisation can easily be admitted ••• a financial system which 
separates the ownership of credit from the community is 
self-destructive, since only the community has the requisite consuming 
power to maintain production at its maximum. 91 
Douglas' 'A plus B theorem' purported to show that there was a chronic gap 
between, on the one hand, the income distributed to individuals in the process of 
production (in the form of wages, rents or profits) and, on the other hand, the 
aggregate price of production as it reflected production costs. 92 In this 
situation, the creation by the banking system of fresh credit entered as a 
balancing factor to boost demand. This intervention from the banks was, 
however, 'crude' and inadequate, because it led to debt repayment obligations 
which simply exacerbated the original deficiency in demand. In fact, as a result 
of this debt, the 'main' cause of the gap between income and output was 'the 
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fact that the buyer of goods is at one and the same time paying for goods and 
repaying to the banking system, via intermediate producers, the money which the 
industrial system borrowed from it'. 93 This meant that 
••• the existing financial system increasingly mortgages the future in 
order to sell the goods existing at present, the most recent and most 
obvious form of this practice being the instalment system of 
purchase. 94 
All of this is very close to the usual monetary radical doctrine of the cumulative 
nature of debt and producer dependence upon the banks. Douglas' theory did not, 
however, explain the endemic tendency to demand deficiency solely in monetary 
terms. He deduced from his A plus B theorem a further technological 
mechanism according to which the gap between aggregate income and aggregate 
output price grew in line with 'the reduction of the ratio of direct labour costs to 
total costs'. 95 This underconsumptionist strand to his thinking was also 
manifested in the nature of the solution he proposed, which called not merely for 
the reform of the banking and monetary system, but for the application of an 
essentially fiscal technique of topping up demand through the distribution of a 
'National Dividend' to all citizens. 
Douglas' views are, then, something of a fusion between the monetary and 
underconsumptionist traditions. Although capable of hybridisation in this 
fashion, these traditions were nevertheless logically very distinct. For monetary 
heretics like Soddy, del Mar and Kitson too little demand was due to too little 
money. Underconsumptionism, on the other hand, explained demand deficiency 
solely or principally by reference to factors in the 'real' economy, such as income 
distribution or the impact of technological innovation. The former prescribed 
reform of the monetary system, while the latter proposed solutions such as 
progressive income redistribution. 
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The contrast between monetary radicalism and underconsumptionism can be seen 
in the writings of John Hobson (1858 - 1940), who was probably the most famous 
modern underconsumptionist. Hobson was a prime exponent of the income 
maldistribution doctrine, according to which the instability of capitalism arose 
principally from the fact that 'a large part of the surplus income of the rich 
is ••• excessive, even for the purposes of luxurious and wasteful consumption, and 
accumulates automatically to form an investment fund of capital which is larger 
than is required ••• '. 96 Economic stability, therefore, required an increase in 
consumption demand, to be achieved 'either by increasing the share [of national 
income] of the workers, or by the needs and uses of the enlightened State, or by 
both'. 97 Contrasting his views to those of Douglas, Hobson emphasised that the 
'explanation of the failure of this effective demand' was to be traced 'not to any 
lack of the monetary power to purchase all the com modi ties that could be 
produced, but to the refusal of those in possession of this power of purchase to 
apply enough of it to buying consumables'. 98 (This did not, of course, preclude a 
secondary monetary factor in the timing of recoveries and slumps.) 
It is, then, a major misconception to include the theorists of monetary deficiency 
under the 'underconsumptionist' umbrella. 99 Such a confusion cannot be 
justified on the grounds that demand deficiency was central to both groups' 
explanations of depression and unemployment. The notion that demand 
deficiency caused slumps was almost a truism, and its use as a lowest common 
denominator would drag in many economists (even in the pre-Keynesian era) with 
views widely different to those of either Hobson or the monetary writers 
discussed above. The real differences of opinion concerned the causes of demand 
deficiency. 100 
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Influences on Mainstream Economics 
Monetary radicals were not simply isolated quacks. They represented, rather, a 
significant undercurrent of economic doctrine - an undercurrent which in fact 
interacted with 'mainstream' economics at various stages. There was, in 
particular, a clear cross-fertilisation between monetary radicals of the 
Soddy-de! Mar quantity theory school and the stabilisationists. Both del Mar and 
Irving Fisher drew on the American monetary tradition established in the early 
nineteenth century by writers like Bollman who fused the mercantilist emphasis 
on monetary sufficiency with the classical quantity theory. 101 It was that 
fusion of mercantilism and quantity theory doctrine which transformed the 
quantity theory from an ideological weapon with which to oppose monetary 
'manipulation' by the state into something very different: a rationale for 
monetary expansion as a means of reflating prices and stimulating production in 
a depression. Fisher, in turn, passed these ideas on to Keynes. 
There were other examples of the interplay of monetary radicalism and more 
'respectable' economics. Soddy's 100% reserve idea was taken up in the wake of 
the Great Depression by some of the most prominent American economists, 
including Lauchlan Currie and the Chicago school. 102 Fisher adopted the 
proposal as his own in his 1936 book 100% Money, in which he wrote 
The essence of the 100% plan is to make money independent of loans; 
that is, to divorce the process of creating and destroying money from the 
business of banking .•• by far the most important result would be the 
prevention of the great booms and depressions ••• which have ever been 
the great economic curse of mankind and which have sprung largely from 
banking. 103 
These economists were influential New Deal policy makers and advocates of 
expansionary policy. 104 It is a striking irony that it was from the Chicago 
school that Milton Friedman - antipathetic as he is to 'New 
Dealism' - emerged. In an early (1948) article, Friedman included the 100% 
system as part of a thumbnail sketch of an 'ideal' economy. 105 
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For Irving Fisher, the 100% reserve proposal is one of a number of instances in 
which he appears to have been driven closer by the experience of the Great 
Depression to the 'quack' side of the American monetary tradition. Another 
example was his adoption of Gesell's stamped money proposal. 106 In an 
appendix to the General Theory, in which he surveys the writings of a number of 
monetary heretics, Keynes also praised the 'profoundly original strivings' of 
Gesell. Keynes' highest praise was, however, reserved for John Hobson. 107 
The Anti-Commodity Money Tradition In Australia 
A number of writers have reviewed the Australian 'literature of discontent' (as 
Butlin calls it) on monetary matters: in particular, C.D.W. Goodwin in his 
Economic Enquiry In Australia and S.J. Butlin in his Foundations of the 
Australian Monetary System, 1788-1851 (and to some extent, in his Australian 
and New Zealand Bank). The work of Goodwin and Butlin provides a 
comprehensive review for the period up to and around the first world war. 
Others, including R.A. Gollan, have added to their work, but have concentrated 
more specifically on monetary beliefs in the A.LP. - a topic we will turn to in 
Chapter Four. It is useful here, however, to review and slightly supplement 
these contributions, and to relate them to the framework which has been 
established. 
Monetary debate in Australia was closely linked to a sequence of events in the 
'real' economy: bank crashes in the 1840s and 1890s, a period of falling export 
prices from 1864 to 1894, war finance problems during the first (and, for that 
matter, second) world war, the post-war slump of the early 1920s, and the Great 
Depression itself. From as early as the 1840s, establishment opinion on 
monetary matters had become set in a highly orthodox British currency school 
mould, which remained unshaken until the 1930s. 108 There was considerable 
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support for fixed monetary rules, and great resistance to the notion that either 
the causes or cures of economic difficulties were to be found in monetary 
phenomena. 109 These attitudes were to prove highly resilient among 
businessmen and conservative politicians. Other points of view were, however, 
to be found. There were some proponents of the banking school doctrine 
(including the law of reflux), although perhaps fewer in the later nineteenth 
century than in the earlier period. llO Old anti-usury ideas were also transferred 
to the colonies: in the 1840s, there were intense and influential public 
campaigns throughout the colonies for usury legislation to force bank interest 
rates down. lll There were also, from the earliest days, many advocates of the 
mercantilist view that monetary sufficiency was the key to stability and 
prosperity. ll2 
Critiques of gold money were also influential in Australia. Many proposals for 
irredeemable note issues - permanent as well as temporary - were put 
forward during the nineteenth century. 113 Some monetary reformers even 
argued that the export of so much Australian gold was a major cause of domestic 
monetary stringency. ll4 Bimetallism also had a considerable following in the 
years around the turn of the century, although anti-commodity money ideas 
clearly had a more lasting influence. 115 
The anti-commodity money tradition in Australia was from the outset heavily 
anti-bank in character. There were a few notable exceptions, but there can be 
no mistaking the overwhelming thrust of opinion. Here is not the place to 
explore the social roots of this attitude, other than to note the obvious. As a 
developing economy, and one with a heavily rural orientation, Australia was a 
country in which the banks played a more important role in financing economic 
development than in many of the more developed, industrial countries. While the 
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internal structure of the banking sector changed over time, there was always a 
marked tendency to oligopoly. 116 The political power of the banks was, 
moreover, very substantial as early as the 1840s. 117 
Illuminating accounts are given by Butlin, Goodwin and Gollan of aspects of the 
long campaign for an exclusively 'national' note issue. This campaign culminated 
in 1910 when the Fisher government placed a prohibitive tax on private note 
issues. From the beginning, the campaign was broad based, drawing support both 
from those with orthodox monetary views and from monetary radicals. 118 The 
age-old view that money creation should be an exclusively public prerogative 
lived on in some eminently respectable quarters. The then N.S.W. Colonial 
Treasurer, Geoffrey Eager, reported to Parliament in 1866 that 'it is high time 
for the Government to interfere, and to take into its own hands that right of 
creating and regulating the currency, with which it has improperly parted'. 119 
Butlin suggests that all of the Federal governments up to and including the 
Fisher government had plans for the national control of the note issue, and that 
windfall seignorage gains (which would accrue from the replacement of private 
by public note issues) were their key motive. 120 
Referring to the period up to the foundation of the Commonwealth Bank in 1911, 
Gollan notes that 'advocates of currency reform tended to ignore or at any rate 
to underestimate the importance of instruments of credit other than bank 
notes'. 121 This was much less true in later years, as can be seen in the writings 
of Frank Anstey (see Chapter Four). The Depression pamphleteer, Gerald 
Barnes, drew on Soddy's critique of the cheque system and of the 'pyramiding of 
credit'. 122 Indeed, monetary radicals were in the 1920s and early 1930s perhaps 
more aware of the importance of deposit money than was the business and 
banking establishment 123 - if, that is, Schedvin's comment on the 
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business-dominated Board of the Commonwealth Bank (that its members were 
'unable to see that more was involved in credit than the size of the note 
issue' 124) can be taken as representative of Australian businessmen and bankers. 
Unorthodox calls for the 'socialisation of credit' were commonly directed at the 
'cheque system'. 
In examining the contributions of various early monetary reformers in Australia, 
Goodwin and Butlin quote many examples of views which have been described 
above as 'national credit': proposals for wealth-backed inconvertible note issues, 
employment-giving public works on their own security and land-backed note 
issues. 125 These proposals were often linked to John Law and 'Lawism'. 
(Goodwin quotes the derisory comment of one critic, to the effect that both Law 
and an alleged local Lawist 'confound currency with credit and security'. 126) 
There were also some monetary radical exponents of the quantity theory school. 
George W. Cotton, an early Labor member of the South Australian Parliament, 
who expressly adhered to the quantity theory and who had been influenced by 
del Mar, was one. 127 Nevertheless, national credit ideas dominated Australian 
monetary radicalism from the outset. Twentieth century monetary radicals put 
forward formalised and strikingly similar proposals for a wealth-backed 
currency. Frank Lock, for example, urged the provision of 'an ample supply of 
good money .•• which would be limited only to, say, 50 per cent of the total value 
of all private, and national assets'. 128 Gerald Barnes nominated 60% as the 
appropriate figure. In a land-backed version, W.C. Higinbotham proposed a 
'capital-based sound currency' based on 50% of the value of 'the title deeds of 
[improved] land'. Linked closely with this was the real bills theme: Barnes 
stipulated that 'speculation and travel' were 'not to be financed through the 
[Commonwealth] Bank', and Higinbotham urged the monetary authorities to stop 
issuing 'fictitious notes' on assets other than land. 129 
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Despite the dominance of national credit ideas, Australian writers frequently 
put forward eclectic mixtures of national credit and quantity theory themes. 
Even the strongest advocates of a 'wealth' backed money supply saw bank 
manipulation of the money supply in terms of a quantity theory/credit cycle 
process. That is, they emphasised monetary destabilisation of the price level as 
a major source of economic instability. This was perhaps hardly surprising given 
the wide influence of the concept of the credit cycle. 
The application of monetary reform proposals to public finance in Australia has 
already been mentioned. Concern about excessive levels of (overseas) borrowing 
and debt has been a recurrent issue throughout in Australia's economic history. 
The debates reviewed by Butlin and Goodwin testify both to the presence of 
national credit finance proposals from the earliest days, and to the influence of 
more orthodox Ricardian ideas about the windfall gains to the public purse from 
shifting to a national note issue. The Fisher government added grist to the mill 
of the easy money advocates through the use it made of its 1911 change in gold 
reserve requirements for the new government note issue. The required reserve 
for notes issued in excess of a total of £7m was varied from 100% - which had 
complied with currency school principles - to 25%. This facilitated the 
financing of a number of large public projects (to the tune of £2.5m) through an 
expansion of the note issue - a move which was viewed by conservatives as 'the 
prelude to wilder experiments with paper money'. 130 
The notion of public money creation as an alternative to borrowing (and perhaps 
. 
even to taxation) was put forward repeatedly by twentieth century monetary 
radicals. They also argued that the banks and foreign moneyed interests created 
most of the money that they lent to Australian governments on the basis of 
Australian gold. 131 Interest in monetary radical ideas seems to have 
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reached a peak in the 1930s. The 1937 Report of the Royal Commission on 
Banking and Monetary Systems became a focus of monetary radical agitation, 
because of a casual acknowledgement (in paragraph 504) that the central bank 
was able to provide governments and others with the equivalent of interest free 
loans. 132 This was misconstrued by many opponents of orthodoxy as an 
unqualified statement that the bank should freely provide such funds. The 
Commonwealth Bank found itself answering letters from bodies like the 
Commercial Apiarists' Association of N.S. W ., inquiring whether it planned to 
take heed of the .Royal Commission's Report and provide it interest-free 
loans. 133 In Parliament Menzies (at that time, Prime Minister and Treasurer) 
felt obliged to comment on this misrepresentation of paragraph 504. 134 None 
of this, however, was to any avail. As late as 1945, one prolific monetary 
pamphleteer, S.F. Allen, was citing paragraph 504 in support of his easy money 
proposals. 135 
Australian monetary radical writers drew heavily on each others' work, and upon 
that of their overseas counterparts. 136 Barnes, for example, cited del Mar, 
Soddy, Kitson, Howe and J.M. Scott in support of his arguments, and dedicated 
one of his pamphlets to Frank Lock ('who was the first to draw the writer's 
attention to the main evil of our social system'). 137 Higinbotham saw Soddy as 
an authority on monetary matters. 138 Lock referred to Kitson only once in his 
The Nationalisation of Credit, but, despite his obvious pretensions to originality, 
the book is virtually a plagiarisation of Kitson. 139 Anstey is frequently quoted 
by other Australian monetary radical pamphleteers. 140 
Stabilisationism also had some impact on Australian monetary radicals. In a 
1934 pamphlet, for example, Higinbotham refers sympathetically, if critically, to 
Gustav Cassel, Basil Blackett (see next chapter), and to the policies of the 
Roosevelt administration. He also stressed the need 'to raise our present price 
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level'. 141 Another example of the cross-fertilisation of stabilisationist and 
monetary radical ideas can be found in the work of L.C. Jauncey, whose Modern 
Banking (1949) was a defence of Labor's attempt to nationalise the banks. 
Jauncey was no mere crank, and it was significant, that, thirteen years after the 
publication of the General Theory, he could base his approach on stabilisationist 
principles with an admixture of money power rhetoric. He argued for prices 
stabilisation and accommodating exchange rate variability, drawing on the 
authority of Irving Fisher. Jauncey also made favourable mention of Fisher's 
advocacy of the 100% reserve system. 142 
The best example of the interaction of stabilisationism and monetary radicalism 
is, however, to be found in the writings of a notable radical economist, 
R.F. Irvine (foundation professor of economics at Sydney University, 1912-22). 
In his excellent essay on Irvine, Bruce McFarlane heavily stresses the influence 
upon Irvine of Hobson and the underconsumptionist tradition. 143 There is no 
doubt that these were important influences. Nevertheless, it can be argued that 
monetary radicalism and stabilisationism had an even greater impact on Irvine's 
thinking. 
This mixture of influences was apparent in Irvine's 1917 Joseph Fisher Lecture on 
War Finance: Loans, Paper Money and Taxation. Here he attacked the gold 
standard and suggested its de facto modification to a commodity standard along 
very similar lines to Irving Fisher's proposal (see Chapter One). He denounced 
the war-time 'pyramiding' of 'fictitious' war loans, and warned that as a result of 
the expanding national debt 'there is a grave danger that the distribution of 
wealth after the war will be more lopsided than ever'. His theory was that 
monetary expansion was acceptable and safe so long as it 'keeps well within the 
limits of actual values' (that is, was confined to the 'conversion of securities or 
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valid claims to marketable wealth into Bank deposits'). War finance, regrettably, 
had not only gone beyond those bounds, but had done so on the basis of private 
money creation. 144 
Irvine's most important work was The Midas Delusion, published out of 
semi-retirement in 1933 and inspired by the traumas of the Great Depression. In 
The Midas Delusion, Irvine put a view very close to Soddy's, combining the 
stabilisationist emphasis on price stability through money supply management 
with a national credit perspective on the proper determination of the money 
supply. Irvine accepted the quantity theory/credit cycle view that 'the general 
price level is largely determined by policies which affect the quantity of money', 
and that it was through this mechanism that changes in the money supply 
affected the level of activity and employment. 145 The central problem was that 
Notwithstanding the existence of laws against the private issue of 
money, it is clear that ••• the banks have quietly usurped, much to their 
own profit, a function that by right belongs to the community •••• By 
altering the volume of money they can increase or reduce the purchasi69 
power of each unit of it, and so influence the general level of prices. 14 
Irvine had too sophisticated an understanding to subscribe to the crudest 
conspiracy theories about bank motives for their 'manipulation' of the money 
supply. 147 Although he does not refer specifically to Keynes and others in this 
context, his description of the impact of post-war deflationary policies was 
along straightforward and economically-literate stabilisationist lines. 148 He 
nevertheless believed that the consequence of these processes was 'the 
subjection of governments, industry, and commerce to the control of closely-knit 
International Finance'. 149 
In The Midas Delusion, Irvine wrote warmly of Hobson, Douglas and, most 
particularly, Soddy. He spoke of 'the credit which is inherent in the saleable 
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property (or more generally capacity to produce) of individuals' as the proper 
basis for the monetary system, and concluded that 
So dangerous is the power of money creation and money destruction, 
which the banks have usurped, that I am inclined to agree with Soddy 
that, if we are to avoid a worse fate than our present it must be 
withdrawn entirely and made an exclusively State function. Isa 
Despite sympathetic references to Major Douglas, Irvine was no social 
creditor. 151 This points to a more general characteristic of Australian monetary 
heresy. Well before Major Douglas even commenced writing, Australia had a 
well developed monetary radical tradition. (It would appear that the Australian 
tradition, although not as strong as its American counterpart, was significantly 
more influential than that in Britain). Baiba Berzins has indicated that it was 
not till the 1930s that Social Credit became a major movement in its own right 
in Australia. 152 This does not, however, mean that Australian polemicists were 
unaware of Douglas. Some at least of them were, like Irvine, aware of Douglas 
and regarded him as broadly part of the same movement - without, however, 
adopting his more idiosyncratic views. 153 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ECONOMIC POLICY DEBATE IN THE 1930s 
Public Works and Monetary Policy 
The experience of the Great Depression had far-reaching ramifications .for the 
theory and practice of counter-cyclical policy. Throughout the world, increasing 
emphasis was placed upon the role of fiscal policy - and, in particular, upon 
public works - as an instrument for stimulating depressed national economies. 
This new emphasis upon fiscal policy was coupled with a loss of faith in the 
capacity of 'pure' monetary policy to regulate the state of the economy. As we 
have seen, this view differed considerably from the view of monetary policy 
which had previously dominated economics. In the 1920s, 'activist' economists 
tended to place great faith in the counter-cyclical potential of monetary 
management. This approach remained strongly influential in the early 1930s. 
What place was there in this intellectual schema for a public works policy? 
Public works had in fact received increasing attention amongst economists in the 
years before the Great Depression. This was particularly the case in Britain. l 
Economists who emphasised the role of money in the business cycle were, 
however, inclined to view public works not as an alternative to, but as a conduit 
for, an expansionary monetary policy. Keynes - who emerged in the later 1920s 
as one of the strongest British advocates of public works - exemplified this 
approach. Right up to the Depression, he vigorously argued the in principle 
effectiveness of cheap money as an instrument of counter-cyclical policy. His 
rationale for a public works policy in Britain was that the country faced a special 
problem because of its role as a major international lender. The danger was that 
extra money pumped into the economy could be simply dissipated in foreign 
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lending, with little benefit to the domestic economy. 'In such a case', Keynes 
thought, 'it is not sufficient for the Central Authority to stand ready to lend ••• it 
must also stand ready to borrow ••• the Government must itself promote a 
programme of domestic investment'. 2 In short, the earmarking of central bank 
monetary expansion to finance public works was a means of ensuring that the 
'increased volume of bank credit' would in fact be translated into a 'programme 
of home investment'. 3 
Not all economists had seen public works in such terms. Pigou, for example, 
noted that public works might increase total demand even if financed purely by 
public borrowing without any associated monetary expansion 4 - a point which 
was later to feature in the classic Keynesian distinction between fiscal and 
monetary policy. In the 1920s and 1930s, however, the view that stabilisation 
policy (including public works) was principally a matter of monetary management 
was one which had considerable influence everywhere. 
The attention paid to monetary matters is readily apparent in the increased 
influence of stabilisationist ideas in the early Depression years. In the United 
States, many of the policies implemented in the early years of Roosevelt's 
administration were directly inspired by Irving Fisher and others who had similar 
economic policy views. These policies included note issue expansion, the 
variation of the weight of the gold dollar, and legislation to remonetise silver. 5 
Fisher dedicated his 1934 book Stable Money to Roosevelt, whose 'avowed 
monetary policy represents the goal at which the stable money movement has 
aimed'. 6 In Britain, stabilisationist ideas were popularised by writers such as Sir 
Basil Blackett (a Bank of England director and former senior Treasury official). 
Blackett's Planned Money (1932) was virtually a primer on the program put 
forward by Keynes almost a decade before in the Tract. 7 The broad influence 
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of stabilisationist ideas was also shown in the British government's adoption of a 
cautious but nonetheless clear policy of cheap money aimed at raising the 'level 
of wholesale commodity prices ••• to restore equilibrium between costs and 
prices of production generally'. 8 
Despite the popularity of stabilisationist ideas, international attention soon 
began to focus increasingly on the role of counter-cyclical public works 
programs. More than anything else, the attention given to public works reflected 
the seeming inability of 'pure' monetary policy to quickly promote recovery. 
'Perhaps the most notable of all the lessons to be derived from the years of 
depression', wrote Hawtrey in 1937, 'is to be found in the prolonged failure of the 
accepted methods of credit regulation to induce revival'. 9 Business had 
apparently been struck too severe a blow to be revived by mere cheap money. 
Demand for loanable funds dropped away dramatically and banks found 
themselves awash with 'idle balances'. 
There was general agreement amongst economists that the extreme 
unresponsiveness of economic activity to monetary blandishment was atypical 
and reflected the severity of the Depression and the associated collapse of 
confidence. The Depression experience nevertheless had a profound impact on 
the attitudes of economists towards monetary policy. As Sayers puts it, 'the 
experience of the limited efficacy of the cheap money policy no doubt helped to 
give force to the swing of theoretical opinion ••• faith in interest rates as a 
quick-working weapon declined'. 10 Theoretical analysis of the failure of pure 
monetary policy highlighted the unpredictability of the relationship between the 
stock of money and the level of demand. 11 It was in this context that many 
economists started to focus upon 'fiscal' policy as a macroeconomic policy 
intrument distinct from, and at least as important as, monetary policy. 
66 
Keynes gave a particularly uncompromising exposition of these themes in the 
General Theory (1936), a book which is usually seen as the embodiment of the 
'Keynesian revolution' in economics. 'If', he warned, ' ••• we are tempted to assert 
that money is the drink which stimulates the system to activity, we must remind 
ourselves that there may be several slips between the cup and the lip'. In 
criticising reliance upon interest rate management alone as an instrument of 
short-run economic management he did not argue that the level of investment 
(or of demand as a whole) was generally insensitive to the rate of interest. He 
did, however, suggest that cheap money could not be relied upon either to 
prevent or to quickly counteract depressions, although 'later on, a decline in the 
rate of interest will be a great aid to recovery and, probably, a necessary 
condition of it'. At the same time, he strongly attacked the notion that high 
interest rates were an appropriate means of restraining booms (see below). 
Finally, while acknowledging that slumps were sometimes caused by monetary 
strictures, he suggested that 'a more typical, and often the predominant, 
explanation of the crisis is, not primarily a rise in the rate of interest, but a 
sudden collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital' (i.e. in business 
expectations about the profitability of prospective investments). 12 
As persuasive as these themes were, they were not the only plausible way of 
interpreting the Depression experience. It could be argued that, far from 
proving the impotence of monetary policy, the Depression demonstrated the 
destructive power of bad monetary management. This was the interpretation put 
forward by R.G. Hawtrey. 'Once the monetary authorities of the world can bring 
themselves to refrain from causing depressions', Hawtrey commented, 'their task 
will become relatively easy.' It was, he held, only because these authorities had 
failed to expand credit and reduce interest rates expeditiously at the outset of 
the Depression that a vicious cycle of unprecedented severity had set in. 
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Moreover, 
it is only when the vicious cycle of deflation has gained such a hold as to 
cause a credit deadlock, that the banks find themselves unable to expand 
credit. That state of things is exceptional - so exceptional that it 
probably never occurred before 1930. 13 
Hawtrey refused to follow Keynes in recognising the importance of a distinct 
fiscal policy. Rather, he held firmly to the 'monetarist' view that the velocity of 
circulation of money was stable under all except the most unusual circumstances 
and that, therefore, increases in government expenditure could only effect the 
level of demand to the extent that they were financed by money creation. It 
was, he argued, only the unprecedented Depression 'credit deadlock' that had 
temporarily opened up the theoretical possibility that demand might be increased 
through government expenditure financed not by monetary expansion but by 
public borrowing designed to soak up 'idle balances'. The attention given by 
Keynes and others to fiscal policy was, in this view, completely misplaced. Once 
the credit deadlock was surmounted, it would once again become clear that 
expenditure policy had no significance in its own right and that monetary 
management was the key to stability. 14 
Hawtrey was, as it happened, hostile to the new emphasis upon public works. (He 
placed considerable faith in the aggressive deployment of 'open market' 
monetary policies.) There were, however, other economists and influential 
figures throughout the world who combined a similar monetary perspective on 
the events of the early 1930s with support for substantial public works programs, 
which they viewed principally as conduits for monetary expansion. As one 
British commentator wrote in 1936, it was in the wake of the Depression that, in 
public debates on economic policy, 'spending on public works has come to be 
regarded as a means of monetary policy'. 15 
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The 'Keynesian Revolution' 
The growth of support for activist public works policies in the 1930s is 
sometimes attributed to the spread of 'Keynesian' ideas - that is, of the sort of 
view of the economy which Keynes articulated most fully in the General Theory. 
This is obviously misleading. Even more misleading is the myth that it was not 
until the arrival of Keynesianism that there was any serious alternative to 
restrictionist 'classical' economic orthodoxy. Controversy between 
restrictionists and activists was, as we have seen, a well-established feature of 
economic thought in the 1920s, and it was not necessary to adopt Keynesian 
analysis in order to advocate counter-cyclical public works. 
What, then, was the 'Keynesian revolution' in economic thought? The chief 
contributions of the General Theory were theoretical and conceptual. Keynes 
presented a powerful framework to explain the determination of aggregate 
demand and output, in terms of the interaction of savings and investment. He 
also launched a frontal attack on the neoclassical presumption that capitalist 
economies would, if not obstructed by wage and other 'rigidities', move naturally 
towards an equilibrium in which there was no involuntary unemployment. 
The General Theory had much less to say about policy. It is, nevertheless, 
possible to identify a number of themes which are central to mature 
Keynesianism. The distinction between fiscal and monetary policy was 
important - although, of course, the two were very closely related in practice. 
Public works were seen as one form of deficit expenditure, and the 
macroeconomic impact of deficits was no longer assessed principally in terms of 
the degree of monetary expansion involved in their financing. There was also the 
new awareness of the limitations of 'pure' monetary policy in short-run economic 
69 
management. Underpinning all this was a view of the business cycle which 
emphasised fluctuations in business fixed capital investment. 
As integral as these policy themes were to 'Keynesianism', they cannot be said to 
have originated with the General Theory or with Keynes alone. On these matters 
the General Theory endorsed and reinforced a shift of economic opinion which 
was already well underway - a shift away from primarily monetary explanations 
of capitalist economic instability and away from reliance upon monetary 
management as the principal instrument ·of counter-cyclical policy. In this 
sense, the 'Keynesian revolution' began well before 1936. 
One aspect of the change taking place in economic thinking was a move away 
from the previous widespread habit of considering the question of the limits to 
expansion in terms of the money supply. In the Keynesian framework, there was 
no determinate 'optimum' supply of money. The issue was instead one of the 
level of 'aggregate demand', taking into account the supply conditions and 
capacity constraints of the economy. Keynesianism came to be particularly 
associated with the 'full employment' or 'physical resources' doctrine, which held 
that demand could be expanded safely as long as capacity constraints were not 
exceeded. 'Inflation', Keynes wrote as early as 1929, 'only results when we 
endeavour ••• to expand our activities still further after everyone is already 
employed and our savings are being used up to the hilt'. 16 
The Keynesianism of the 1930s was, however, rather different from what came 
to be understood as 'Keynesianism' in the post-war period. Keynes' idea of what 
constituted 'full employment' was, for example, considerably more sober than the 
common post-war view which equated full employment with unemployment rates 
in the region of 2-3 percent. 17 Keynes and his contemporaries were far too 
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aware of the structural sources of unemployment and the capriciousness of 
'business confidence' to adopt such an optimistic view of the potential of demand 
management policies. 18 
Similarly, although Keynes and many of his contemporaries saw the limitations 
of pure monetary policy as a key lesson of the Depression experience, they did 
not take the view, commonly associated with post-war Keynesianism, that 
'money doesn't matter'. 'Keynes', as Harrod wrote, 'always attached the utmost 
importance to low interest rates'. 19 To understand the significance which 
Keynes and many of his contemporaries attached to cheap money, it is essential 
to distinguish between long-run and short-run economic management. 
Keynes envisaged an important role for cheap money in short-run economic 
management despite its inability to prompt quick recovery once a depression had 
set in. He was, as was mentioned above, particularly concerned to challenge the 
doctrine that increases in interest rates were a good means of controlling booms. 
Generalising from what he saw as the lesson of the Wall Street boom, he argued 
that: 
••••• a rate of interest, high enough to overcome the speculative 
excitement, would have checked, at the same time, every kind of 
reasonable new investment. Thus an increase in the rate of interest, as a 
remedy for the state of affairs arising out of a prolonged period of heavy 
new investment, belongs to the species of remedy which cures the 
disease by killing the patient. 
His blunt conclusion was that 'the remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of 
interest but a lower rate of interest', 20 This argument found ready supporters 
elsewhere. In Australia, it was taken up most seriously by the economist John 
Gifford. In 1937, Gifford wrote a vigorous piece for the Sydney Morning Herald 
attacking the 'boom-controllers', whom he labelled as economic wowsers. A year 
before, he had, in evidence before the Banking Commission, strongly 
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attacked the high interest rate doctrine and had argued that the appropriate 
policy was 'to cause even lower interest rates, when depression appears in 
over-developed industries, in order to encourage other industries to absorb the 
unemployed'. 21 
It was, however, in the context of long-run stabilisation policy that Keynes and 
others saw the role of low and relatively stable interest rates as particularly 
fundamental. As Dr H.C. Coombs noted in 1939, Keynes had revived the 
'classical' doctrine 'that there was a long-term tendency for the return on capital 
to decline'. 22 In the General Theory, Keynes suggested that the difficulties 
experienced by Britain and the United States in the 1920s and the 1930s 
constituted 'actual examples of how an accumulation of weal th, so large that its 
marginal efficiency has fallen more rapidly than the rate of interest can 
fall •.• can interfere ••• with a reasonable level of employment'. Taking a broader 
view of economic history, he argued that: 
••••• there has been a chronic tendency throughout human history for the 
propensity to save to be stronger than the inducement to invest. The 
weakness of the inducement to invest has been at all times the key to 
the economic problem. Today the explanation of the weakness of this 
inducement may chiefly lie in the extent of existing accumulations; 
whereas, formerly, risks and hazards of all kinds may have played a 
larger part. But the result is the same. 
The result was a 'chronic tendency towards the underemployment of 
resources'. 23 
This argument was similar to the 'secular stagnation' doctrine, which was 
associated particularly with the American economist Alvin Hansen. 24 The basic 
idea had many other influential exponents. Colin Clark, the notable British 
economist who had migrated to Australia in 1937, was one notable example. 
Clark presented a paper to the 1939 ANZAAS Conference which presented 
statistical evidence of the long-term decline of profits and business investment 
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in key capitalist economies. He argued that the pattern of declining investment 
opportunities was likely to continue because 'we could not look forward ••• to the 
discovery of many new fields where [private] capital could be invested'. 25 
There were a number of remedies which it was thought could be applied to 
counteract this long-run tendency towards investment stagnation, including 
income redistribution and increased public expenditure (see Chapters Six and 
Seven). Cheap money was, however, thought to be vital to long-run stability and 
full employment. As Keynes put it, 'a tolerable level of employment requires a 
rate of interest much below the average rates which ruled in the nineteenth 
century'. 26 
If, then, Keynes was by the 1930s much less exclusively concerned with monetary 
disturbances and monetary management than he had been in the early 1920s, he 
continued to see monetary policy as very important. Somewhat paradoxically, 
Keynes was still seen by some monetary radicals in Britain and Australia as 
something of a fellow traveller. A contemporary British financial journalist, 
Paul Einzig, in 1936 described Keynes as representing the 'scientific wing' of a 
'monetary reform' movement which also embraced Soddy and Douglas. 27 The 
General Theory, moreover, clearly revealed Keynes' own sympathies with some 
of the monetary 'quacks'. In it, he praised the 'profoundly original strivings' of 
Silvio Gesell (see Chapter Two) and managed even to be polite about Major 
Douglas. 28 
The themes of the General Theory were not without their superficial attractions 
from the monetary radical point of view. Keynes' emphasis on low and 
reasonably stable interest rates was appealing, as was his vision of the gradual 
'euthanasia of the rentier'. 29 A few monetary radicals were, as a result, to be 
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found in the late 1930s quoting snippets from the book in support of their 
views. 30 It cannot, however, be said that Keynesian economics had any 
substantial impact on monetary radical doctrine. The notion that investment 
fluctuations might cause depression even in a cheap money environment was, for 
example, quite foreign to monetary radicalism. There was, however, one notable 
point of interaction. As we have seen (Chapter Two), monetary radicals of the 
national credit school had traditionally argued that the only limit to monetary 
expansion should be the availability of identifiable opportunities for the 
productive use of credit by entrepreneurs. This theme had superficial 
similarities with the Keynesian full employment doctrine, and it is apparent that 
many monetary radicals believed that orthodox economics was swinging around 
to their view of the scope for expansionary action (see Chapter Five). 
The Australian Economic Policy Debate in the 1930's 31 
At the time the Great Depression struck, the notion that an activist monetary 
policy could assist in stabilising the business cycle was in Australia generally 
thought to be rather new and radical. There was considerable resistance to such 
monetary 'manipulation', particularly on the part of conservatives who did not 
accept the notion that such 'expedients' could exert any permanently favourable 
influence upon the state of the economy. The circumstances of the 1930s gave 
rise gradually to a greater acceptance of the need for a measure of policy 
activism. 'A central bank sets out upon an uncharted sea when it adventures 
forth to control credit', J.B. Brigden told the Banking Commission in 1936, 
adding that 'the depression and its disturbances have forced the adventure upon 
us'. 32 
Monetary issues dominated the stabilisation policy debate in Australia in the 
1930s. Sir Douglas Copland has, for example, spoken of 'the greater emphasis on 
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monetary policy vis-a-vis fiscal policy as a corrective to the trade cycle - an 
emphasis which was to continue well into the 1930s'. 33 The monetary focus of 
the policy debate was manifested both in the great attention given to the 
management of monetary aggregates, and in the common habit of viewing public 
. works as an instrument of monetary policy. There was particular controversy 
about the scope for expansionary action. In the immediate wake of the slump, 
all schools of opinion were agreed that the question should be asked in the form 
'how far can monetary expansion safely proceed?'. Debate focussed particularly 
on the volume of treasury bills issued by the federal government to finance 
public sector deficits.* As we have seen (Chapter One), restrictionists saw 
'artificial' monetary expansion as dangerously inflationary, and favoured 
full-blooded deflation. Others saw merit in the stabilisationist proposition that 
cautious monetary expansion, accompanied by exchange depreciation, could 
reflate the price level and thus lessen, at least in some small degree, the need 
for cuts in nominal wages and other costs. 
International considerations loomed large in this controversy. There had been an 
enormous loss of national 'spending power' as a result of the dramatic decline in 
export earnings and the drying up of overseas loan funds. Export prices and 
volumes had slumped badly. How was balance of payments equilibrium to be 
restored, and in what time frame? To what extent was it appropriate to reduce 
domestic consumption and government expenditure across the board in order to 
* Because these bills were held almost exclusively by the banks, rather than the 
public at large, they represented bank credit creation rather than public 
borrowing proper. 
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hold down import demand? Should recovery be sought principally through 
measures to improve the competitiveness of export industries? If so, to what 
extent could exchange depreciation reduce the need for direct reductions in 
wages and other industry costs? What about the role of the tariff in promoting 
import replacement? How far, finally, did internal 'adjustment' need to 
proceed: Could a substantial recovery in export prices and international 
borrowing be anticipated, or should Australia work on the premise that export 
prices and capital inflows would remain permanently at low levels near those 
prevailing in 1930-31? 
Notwithstanding the substantial currency depreciation of early 1931, economic 
opinion and public policy were strongly biased towards a deflationist solution to 
Australia's balance-of-payments problem. Great faith was placed in wage and 
cost reductions to restore international competitiveness and boost exports even 
in the face of extremely depressed world prices and export demand. 34 
The gravity of Australia's international position dominated the policy debate in 
the crucial years 1930-31. Powerfully reinforcing this was the strong pressure to 
appease 'business confidence' - and, in particular, the confidence of the London 
capital markets. Businessmen and economists joined together to oppose the 
Scullin government's proposals for monetary expansion and to urge the need for 
far-reaching deflationary adjustment to the international situation. The central 
focus of the Premiers' Plan was the restoration of balanced budgets and the 
staged elimination of the treasury-bill monetary expansion which had been used 
to finance government deficits. Although caught up in the deflationist mood of 
the times, economists with mildly stabilisationist sympathies like Copland 
managed to construe the Premiers' Plan as an endorsement of a 'fairly liberal 
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credit policy'. 35 Restrictionist saw it simply as a plan for ending artificial 
monetary expansion. Both were agreed that the scope for expansionary action 
was greatly limited not only by the danger of inflation but also by the parlous 
balance of payments position. 
The debate about the limits to 'safe' monetary expansion was characterised by 
some uncertainty about which monetary aggregate mattered most - the note 
issue, the monetary base (bank reserves plus cash) or the volume of bank credit. 
The issue of treasury bills had, potentially at least, implications for all three. As 
well as representing the provision of bank credit to governments, treasury bills 
added directly to the monetary base. Because the Commonwealth Bank 
guaranteed the liquidity of trading bank treasury bill holdings, those holdings 
could be reckonned by the banks as part of their reserves. Not only did the 
purchase of bills by the banks involve no direct reduction of their reserves, but 
reserves actually grew as the credit provided to governments gave rise to new 
deposits without, at least in the first instance, any offsetting rise in private 
sector demand for loans. 
There was, throughout the 1930s, continuing controversy about the size of the 
treasury bill issue (the 'floating debt', as it was often called). This controversy 
was triggered by the Commonwealth Bank's campaign for the gradual reduction 
· of the volume of treasury bills on issue, to be achieved by 'funding' the bills with 
the proceeds of new public loans. The Bank was particularly concerned with the 
way in which treasury bills were adding to bank reserves. Its fear was that, as 
the economy improved, these reserves could form the basis of a massive and 
highly inflationary expansion of bank lending and of the note issue. 36 The 
volume of outstanding treasury bills grew substantially from 1931 to 1934 (when 
the public sector as a whole achieved budgetary balance). Controversy on the 
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treasury bill question became particularly pronounced from 1935, when the 
recovery in private sector demand for loanable funds became evident and 
interest rates hardened. 
The Commonwealth Bank's position was one which had the broad support not only 
of the federal government, but of most of the business community. Australian 
conservatives appear in general to have been even more hostile to expansionary 
ideas than their counterparts in Britain and the USA. There was, nevertheless, a 
growing 'establishment' acceptance of the need for at least some 
counter-cyclical variation of the money supply through the use of treasury bills. 
Central bank credit expansion, wrote the Federal Assistant Treasurer Richard 
Casey in 1935, 'can be defended, so long as it roughly does no more than is 
necessary to offset the reluctance of the community to use its savings'. 37 The 
shift in business attitudes was exemplified in a statement submitted by the NSW 
Chamber of Manufactures to the Banking Commission in 1936. While 
emphasising the importance of a 'sound financial structure' and the danger of a 
'radical experimental change', the Chamber noted the serious danger which would 
arise from any attempt at 'implementing to even a moderate degree reactionary 
views similar to those held years back'. 38 
These changing attitudes reflected the way in which experience had disproven 
def lationist prognostications of wild inflation as the result of the use of treasury 
bills to finance deficits. Although the fear of inflation continued to dominate 
conservative thinking, it was now thought to be 'a matter of degree as to when it 
[the issue of treasury bills] becomes dangerous'. 39 This somewhat more 
pragmatic approach was accompanied by growing uncertainty about what 
constituted a 'safe' degree of monetary expansion or level of bank reserves. 
Although convinced that there was a 'point of prudence' in credit expansion 
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beyond which 'prices and costs are increased, and the value of money in 
circulation is diminished' 40 - and that a more expansionary policy would push 
the country beyond the point of prudence - restrictionists had considerable 
difficulty identifying the principles which determined where that point lay. This 
uncertainty was exemplified in evidence given to the Banking Commission by the 
Secretary of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, who warned that 'excessive 
use of treasury bills is a dangerous form of government borrowing, and this mode 
of finance should be subject to well defined limits'. When questioned as to the 
nature of those limits, however, he confessed that: 
This matter has been discussed very fully, and I must admit that no one 
has been able to give a definite reason for the opinions that have been 
expressed, beyond that it is felt that the volume of treasury-bills at 
present is rather more than it should be. 41 
The strongest opposition to restrictionist policies came from within the labour 
movement (see Chapters Four and Five). Expansionists in the unions and the 
ALP commonly argued that the Depression was the result of monetary 
contraction, both internationally and domestically, and 'that the crisis can be 
overcome by "release of credits"'. 42 Labor expansionism drew its inspiration 
from both stabilisationist ideas and monetary radical doctrine. The risk of 
inflation was downplayed. So, less justifiably, were international 
considerations - although there was strong advocacy of aggressive import 
replacement. 
Attacks on the allegedly restrictive policies of the banks and calls for greater 
monetary expansion were not, however, confined to Labor ranks. 'During the 
past five years', Casey noted in 1935, 'the cry of the monetary reformer has been 
insistent'. 43 There was considerable rural resentment towards the banks, some 
of which reached even into the ranks of the Country Party. 44 It was as a result 
of such political pressures that Lyons agreed during the 1934 election to 
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establish the Royal Commission on Monetary and Banking Systems. The 
Commission was appointed in 1935 and reported in 1937. 
It had not taken long for cracks to appear in the united front of economists and 
businessmen which had been formed around the Premiers' Plan. Critics thought 
that the Commonwealth Bank's proposals for treasury bill funding were 
somewhat premature and that funding would jeopardise the cheap money regime 
which was thought to be fundamental to economic recovery. Amongst the 
leading exponents of this 'moderate' view were the general manager of the Bank 
of NSW, Alfred Davidson, and the U.A.P. Premier of NSW (1932-1939), Bertram 
Stevens. They were joined by many leading economists, including Copland. 45 
(Casey lamented in 1933 that the 'majority of economists of consequence in 
Australia' fell into this camp. 46) Initially, these 'establishment' disagreements 
on monetary policy were aired in a polite and collegial fashion. As time went on, 
however, the disaffection of Stevens, Davidson and others with restrictionist 
policies grew and the conflict within conservative ranks became increasingly 
open and bitter. Symptomatic of this was the 1936 resignation from his position 
as Commonwealth 'Parliamentary Undersecretary for Employment' of Sir 
Frederick Stewart, over economic policy differences with the Government. 
Stewart was a close associate of Stevens. 47 
Stabilisationist ideas provided the initial inspiration for these more 
expansionary-minded businessmen and politicians. In a 1932 speech, for 
example, Davidson attacked the gold standard and argued that 'central bank 
action, to hold the average of prices steady at levels admitting of a revival of 
enterprise, is the most hopeful expedient of relief from the torment of 
depression in the midst of abundance'. 48 These stabilisationist ideas remained 
deeply influential throughout the decade. In line with world trends, however, 
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there was a tendency by the late 1930s to emphasise the state of the economy, 
rather than the price level, as the proper guide to counter-cyclical monetary 
policy. 'Swimming against the stream' is how Davidson described such a policy in 
1936. 49 
Keynesian ideas had some impact upon the debate about the limits to 
expansionary action. Amongst the politicians, Bertram Stevens was one of those 
most influenced by Keynes' ideas. In 1936, Stevens had gone out of his way to 
call on Keynes while on official business in England. 50 Stevens' 1940 book 
Planning for War and Peace discussed the state of the economy in terms of the 
savings/investment relationship, and embraced the Keynesian full employment 
doctrine. At the same time it contained many relics of older views of the 
relationship between the money supply, the price level, and the level of activity. 
The Keynesian impact was, however, felt most strongly amongst the economists. 
Two in particular - John Gifford and Ronald Walker - had been followers of 
Keynes from at least 1930 and had quickly embraced the conceptual framework 
of the General Theory. 51 By the end of the decade, many leading Australian 
economists had broadly accepted the Keynesian analytic framework and 
'Keynesian' policies. As part of this, there was a tendency for discussion of 
expansionary policy to move away from monetary aggregates to focus more 
directly on 'aggregate demand'. Nevertheless, the Keynesian influence did not 
lead to aggressive advocacy of a highly expansionary economic policy. If 
anything, the economists tended to be quite cautious. When W .B. Reddaway (a 
colleague of Giblin's at Melbourne University) reviewed the General Theory in 
June 1936, he welcomed Keynes' conceptual framework but charged that Keynes 
had underestimated 'the dangers of expansionism'. 52 Even Ronald Walker was a 
very guarded advocate of expansion. 53 The strongest expansionist amongst the 
academic economists was probably John Gifford. 54 
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In part, the caution of many economists reflected an acute awareness of the 
structural limits to expansionary policy. Most economists thought that Australia 
was at or close to 'full' employment by 1936-7, and that the unemployment which 
remained was largely structural. Another important factor in the economists' 
approach seems to have been a desire to make it quite clear that they did not 
subscribe to the extreme 'inflationism' being put forward by monetary radicals of 
various descriptions. 55 By the late 1930s, the monetary radical version of the 
full employment doctrine - that is, the proposition that the existence of 
unemployment and unexploited investment opportunities indicated a need for a 
corresponding expansion of the money supply - was being actively propounded 
throughout the country (see below). 
Not all economists understood, or subscribed to, Keynesian doctrine. Amongst 
those who resisted the 'new' economics was Torleiv Hytten. 56 Another was 
Brigden. In a 1939 piece in the Economic Record, Brigden attacked the 'new 
orthodoxy' in economics, which he somewhat misleadingly characterised as 
arguing 'that the continued expansion of credit does not lead to inflation until 
there is full employment'. 57 Brigden's apparent confusion of the Keynesian full 
employment doctrine with the proposition that credit expansion was appropriate 
up to full employment is an indication that other economists' fears of 
misrepresentation were not unwarranted. 
Monetary Policy and Public Works 
One point upon which there was general agreement in the aftermath of the 
Depression was the efficacy of cheap money as a means of quickly stimulating 
business activity. Few doubted the assumption of the Premiers' Plan that 'lower 
rates of interest will greatly stimulate the general demand for credit •••• (with) 
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falling costs and ample supplies of credit, industry should then recover'. 58 More 
controversial was the mechanism by which favourable credit conditions for 
industry were to be created. A basic assumption of the Premiers' Plan was that 
government deficits were the key obstacle to the provision of cheaper and more 
plentiful funds to the private sector. The extreme restrictionist view was that 
the 'borrowing of bank credit by Governments involves either the equivalent 
starvation of industry or such an expansion of deposit-currency as to lead to 
dangerous inflation'. 59 Although they believed that some measure of treasury 
bill monetary expansion was safe and desirable, 'moderates' like Copland agreed 
with their restrictionist colleagues that it would be impossible safely to create 
credit on the scale necessary to accommodate revitalised industry lending whilst 
simultaneously financing large government deficits for any sustained period of 
time. 60 Particularly in the light of Australia's international position, it was, 
they considered, simply impossible to use monetary expansion to boost and 
maintain both public expenditure and private investment at pre-depression 
levels. Something had to give. 
There was, as a result, wide consensus amongst businessmen and economists 
about the need to wind back public deficits in order to 'free money for 
investment purposes'. 61 Private sector recovery was obviously critically 
important, particularly if the trade deficit was to be redressed. By contrast, the 
diversion of credit resources into public consumption expenditure could hardly be 
justified. Neither could the maintenance of a large-scale public investment 
program. In part, public works fell victim to the perennial tendency of 
conservatives to view government investment as inherently less productive and 
useful than private investment. More significant, however, was the backlash 
against the borrowing spree of the 1920s, when governments had spent freely on 
many projects of dubious merit. It was partly because of the scale of this 
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borrowing that Australia had been so severely affected by the collapse of 
international lending at the start of the Depression. Many 
Australians - including most economists - felt strongly at this time that, 
thenceforth, public investment should be confined to projects which were clearly 
'reproductive'. 62 
These attitudes were clearly very far removed from , the notion of a 
counter-cyclical public works policy. The idea that public works expenditure 
should be increased to a level above that prevailing before the depression, in 
order to compensate for the drop in private investment, was quite alien to the 
philosophy of the Premiers' Plan. While opinions differed somewhat on the 
extent to which treasury bills could be issued to fund 'relief' works, what was at 
stake was simply the degree to which public works expenditure was to be allowed 
to fall. 
Monetary radicals and other 'inflationists' had fewer problems about advocating 
public works expenditure. This did not, however, reflect any lack of faith in 
cheap money policies. Monetary radicals were, in fact, particularly inclined to 
see the Depression as the outcome of restrictive bank policies, and to emphasise 
easy lending as the key to recovery. Believing as they did that monetary 
expansion should proceed to whatever extent was required to restore prosperity, 
they did not share orthodox fears of 'crowding out'. New 'purchasing power' (i.e. 
money) should, they thought, be provided on a scale adequate to facilitate both 
business recovery and the maintenance of public works expenditure. Public 
works were not the cutting edge of a counter-cyclical policy, but simply an 
additional means whereby the necessary increase in 'purchasing power' could be 
put into circulation. 
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Inevitably, the widespread faith in cheap money policies began to be questioned 
in some quarters. Amongst Australian economists, according to Copland, 'from 
1932 onwards there was a growing recognition that monetary policy by itself is. 
not enough'. This reflected a gradual realisation of just 'how deep and abiding' 
was the 'stagnation of investment'. 63 In consequence, there was a slow 
reassessment of the role of public works in recovery policy. Amongst the 
stronger advocates of public works policies were Ronald Walker 64 and the Labor 
Premier of Queensland, Forgan Smith. 65 Even the attitudes of the Lyons 
government thawed a little. 66 In general, however, Australian attitudes 
towards expansionary public works lagged behind international opinion. 
By the late 1930s, Australian economists had come generally to accept that 
counter-cyclical adjustments to government expenditure (particularly through 
public works) were an essential aspect of stabilisation policy. Even the 
Commonwealth Bank publicly acknowledged the importance of a 
counter-cyclical public works policy. 67 In a 1938 report, Copland urged that 
Australian governments adopt a policy of counter-cyclical expenditure based on 
long-run budgetary balance. 'The path of prudence', he argued, 'is to build up 
reserves in good times, and to defer some developmental works, so that in 
adversity there is a strong case for maintaining normal expenditure and 
expanding public works'. 68 
The changing attitude towards public works did not give rise to any lessening of 
the political focus upon 'monetary' policy. Controversy about the level of public 
works expenditure was, throughout the decade, bound up in the broader public 
debate about the proper limits to 'credit expansion'. With the collapse of public 
borrowing in the early depression years, treasury bill monetary expansion was the 
only way of funding public works. Later, when public loans started to be 
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successfully floated again, the debate over the 'funding' of treasury bills drew 
public attention to the close relation between monetary policy and the level of 
public works spending. 
Nor was there any general tendency to dismiss 'pure' monetary policy as 
irrelevant. Even Keynesians like Gifford and Walker continued to attach 
considerable importance to the role of cheap money in promoting recovery (as 
did Keynes himself). It was not, moreover, entirely obvious that cheap money 
policies had been tried and found wanting as a tool for quickly stimulating the 
economy. It was common knowledge that, when the Depression struck, interest 
rates had been allowed to fall only 'very slowly - and reluctantly.' 69 In the 
debate about treasury bill funding, moreover, it had often been argued that 
restrictionist policies were preventing interest rates falling adequately. Under 
these circumstances, non-economists might have been forgiven for failing to 
appreciate the new doctrine concerning the limitations of pure monetary policy. 
It was, then, hardly surprising that there were many non-economists - not all of 
them monetary radicals - who still believed that the 'prosperity of any 
community depends ••• on the control of credit, that is to say, the prevention of 
alternating periods of undue expansion and undue restriction of credit'. 70 It was 
to be expected that many people would adjust only slowly to the new conceptual 
framework in economics, and that some would not adjust at all. Monetary 
radicals, in particular, felt little need to alter their view of the world. 
Developments since the Depression seemed, after all, to vindicate their views. 
Monetary radicals continued to believe firmly in the efficacy of cheap money, 
and to rail at the banking system for having failed to lower dramatically lending 
charges and provide easy credit to entrepreneurs. As in the past, they saw public 
works as merely an aspect of - and certainly not as an alternative 
to - expansionary monetary policy. 
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By the late 1930s, the monetary radical clamour for the 'expansion of credit' had 
become so great as to cause considerable concern within the federal 
Government. In 1938, the Commonwealth Statistician prepared for the 
Treasurer a paper in which he attacked the 'misleading theories which are 
presented to the public by self-styled currency reformers', and commented that: 
we are now being treated to a new theory which demands that the 
central bank should extend credit as long as their are works available 
which would be reproductive either in a financial or in a wider economic 
sense. 
This doctrine, the Statistician observed, neither took into account the existence 
of capacity restraints nor recognised that fiscal stimulus did not necessarily 
require an equivalent 'expansion of central bank credit'. 71 He was wrong about 
only one thing: this was not a 'new' theory, but merely a restatement of an old 
national credit doctrine. 
Central Banking 
The 1937 report of the Royal Commission on Monetary and Banking Systems was 
an important document in the Australian stabilisation policy debate. According 
to Ronald Walker, the report 'shifted the discussion of sound monetary policy 
into a completely different field from that usually occupied'. 72 The influence 
of R.C. Mills - Professor of Economics at Sydney University and easily the most 
expert of the Commissioners - is readily apparent throughout. The report 
advocated a counter-cyclical monetary policy aimed at the 'reduction of 
fluctuations in general economic activity in Australia', and argued that domestic 
economic stability was to be preferred to the maintenance of fixed exchange 
rates. It also recognised the primacy of fiscal policy in dealing with 
depressions. 73 
87 
The most influential aspects of the Commission's report were, however, those 
concerned with the regulation of banking and the determination of monetary 
policy. There had in fact already been 'considerable development from a system 
of independent trading banks in 1929 to a system of central banking in 1936'. 74 
Notwithstanding trading bank opposition, the Commission now proposed to 
extend this development through legislative requirements for trading bank 
deposits with the central bank (what are today known as the SRO). The 
Commission also made other related proposals for the moderate extension of 
central bank powers. Most controversially of all, however, it endorsed the view 
that the will of Parliament should ultimately prevail in the conduct of monetary 
policy: 
The Federal Parliament is ultimately responsible for monetary 
policy ••• Where there is a conflict between the Government's view of 
what is best in the national interest, and the Board's view, the first 
essential is full and frank discussion between the two authorities with a 
view to exploring the whole problem •••• In cases in which it is clear 
beyond doubt that the differences are irreconcilable, the Government 
should give the Bank an assurance that it accepts full responsibility for 
the proposed policy, and is in a position to take, and will take, any action 
necessary to implement it. It is then the duty of the Bank to accept this 
assurance and to carry out the policy of the Government. 75 
The Commission's view that the Commonwealth Bank should be accountable to 
the Government for its policy direction represented a significant break from 
earlier orthodoxy, which had held that 'control of the currency' should 'be free 
from political interference'. 76 In an editorial review of the report, the Sydney 
Morning Herald commented that the notion of 'a truly independent central bank' 
had become 'something of an anachronism'. 77 The matter nevertheless 
remained controversial, even amongst economists. L.F. Giblin, for example, 
defended independent central banking in his evidence before the Commission. 78 
Debate on this question was, as we will see, to continue into the post-war period. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MONEY, BANKING AND THE A.LP. 
Monetary issues were a central concern of the Australian Labor Party from the 
time of the party's foundation. l Although non-monetary theories such as 
underconsumptionism had some marginal influence upon Labor attitudes, there 
can be no mistaking the dominance, within the parliamentary party and amongst 
the rank and file, of the view that booms and slumps were principally the 
outcome of expansions and contractions of the money supply. This focus on 
monetary issues was neither unique to Labor nor was is simply a temporary 
obsession arising from the experience of the depression of the 1890s. As we have 
seen, monetary explanations of the business cycle were commonplace even in 
orthodox circles. 
The nature of Australia's economy and the social composition of the A.L.P. did 
much to make the money supply a key issue for party activists. Labor's values 
were those of the credit consumer. This reflected in part the significant small 
business and rural elements in the party's membership. The concern with cheap 
'producer' credit is evident at every turn in the party's early policy documents, 
and was largely responsible for the party's enthusiasm for the establishment of 
government banks. The Queensland Labor Party's 1901 call for a 'State Bank and 
Loans to Settlers' typified this approach. 2 Government banks were seen as 
instruments 'which would break down the financial monopoly now exercised over 
the producer'. 3 Labor's commitment to cheap money is also evident in state 
platform calls for the introduction of usury bills. 4 
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Labor's creditor orientation and its conception of the way in which the 
macro-economy worked were, throughout, mutually reinforcing. The same 
interplay was evident in Labor attitudes to debt and borrowing. Labor's concern 
with excessive national borrowing was a direct extension of its membership's 
appreciation of the consequences of excessive personal or business debt. Party 
opinion was from the outset strongly committed to the 'restriction of public 
borrowing'. 5 
borrowing. 
Feeling ran particularly high on the question of overseas 
Labor's hostility to the private banks was a reflection of its view of the role of 
money. Banking was viewed as one of the 'great services' or public utilities like, 
say, the railways. 6 In line with the customary Australian approach, party 
opinion favoured the establishment of government banks, or even the 
nationalisation of the private banks, over the less familiar course of regulatory 
control. There was broad agreement within the party that the private 
banks - whether for conspiratorial reasons or simply in response to the 
impersonal operation of the profit motive - were responsible for profoundly 
damaging fluctuations in the money supply. There was also a broadly held belief 
that the creation of money should be a public prerogative. There was nothing 
necessarily 'quack' (as opposed to old fashioned) about this view. As we have 
seen (Chapter Two), it had the imprimatur of Ricardo himself. Labor leaders 
like Fisher and Hughes, who presided over the 1910 'abolition' of private note 
issues, were unmistakably opposed to 'wild finance' doctrines. 7 
Monetary radical doctrines - that is, ideas drawn from the 'anti-commodity 
money' schools discussed in Chapter Two - were a major undercurrent within 
the Labor monetary tradition. Monetary radicalism (particularly in its 'national 
credit' form) took the credit-consumer orientation to its logical extreme. Its 
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notion of collective prosperity through easy individual credit was an example of 
the 'fallacy of composition' writ large. It is, however, important to distinguish 
between monetary radicalism and the broader Labor tradition. Without such a 
distinction it would be too easy to conclude that the party was dominated by 
'quack' monetary ideas. That was not the case. 
The contrast between mainstream Labor values and monetary radicalism showed 
up most clearly on the issue of borrowing. Monetary radicals were committed to 
a ban on borrowing and to the use of public monetary expansion in its place. 
Most party opinion, however, viewed borrowing as an unavoidable evil, to be 
limited as much as possible but not entirely dispensed with. This contrast of 
views was made explicit in internal debate. NSW state conferences of the party 
in 1904, 1906 and 1909 rejected motions calling for an end to borrowing (the 
margin of the 1906 vote was recorded as 45:23). The votes went to motions 
favouring the restriction of borrowing to 'reproductive works'. 8 At the 1909 
Tasmanian state conference a motion was moved for the abolition of borrowing 
(except for renewals of past loans), and supported by calls for more tax funding 
and for public works finance through the establishment of a 'bank on the 
country's credit'. The view which carried the day (by 30:13) was, however, for 
the restriction of borrowing to 'reproductive works'. The majority opinion was 
encapsulated by a speaker who argued that, while restraint was highly desirable, 
'the cessation of all borrowing would be disastrous'. 9 
The same distinction between traditional Labor values and monetary radicalism 
existed on the issue of cheap credit. Monetary radicals were utterly opposed to 
interest, and favoured the provision of open-slather credit at a mere service 
charge. This was much further than most of their party colleagues were 
prepared to go, notwithstanding a universally strong desire to see as adequate 
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and cheap a supply a credit as was feasible. Neither did mainstream Labor 
opinion concur in the monetary radical's complete rejection of the gold backing 
of note issues - at least not until the 1930s, when the party was influenced by 
the stabilisationist critique of gold. 
The monetary radicals were normally in a minority even at state conferences 
(which are generally more susceptible to rank and file opinion than are federal 
conferences and the federal caucus). There were, nevertheless, exceptional 
periods (particularly at the end of the first world war and in the immediate wake 
of the Great Depression) when the monetary radicals could command majorities 
at many state conferences. 
The Labor Monetary Radicals 
The essence of the monetary radical undercurrent within the A.L.P. can be 
illustrated by a brief survey of the views of two of its most notable exponents in 
federal parliament, Frank Anstey and Hubert Lazzarini. Anstey entered 
parliament in 1910, was deputy leader between 1922 and 1927, and was a 
minister in the Scullin government. Lazzarini first entered parliament in 1919, 
and served as a minister under both Curtin and Chifley. 
Both Anstey and Lazzarini were vigorous opponents of bank money creation. By 
the time of the Great Depression, they were directing their attacks at the 
'cheque system'. 10 Under the acknowledged influence of Soddy, Lazzarini 
consistently attacked what he called the 'false, spurious and fictitious' 
cheque-money of the banks. 11 He also articulated the widely-held view that 
'the banks have no credit; they operate on the people's credit'. 12 
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Both men consistently advocated monetary expansion on the sinking fund 
principle as the alternative to public borrowing. Anstey put forward this idea as 
early as 1915. 13 Lazzarini unconsciously drew attention to the absurdity of the 
proposal when he told parliament in 1939 that he favoured a continuing £50m 
central bank 'loan' to government, a portion of the 'loan' to be cancelled and 
re-issued each year (why, one might ask, bother with the cancellation and 
re-issue?). 14 Both Anstey and Lazzarini also favoured monetary expansion to 
liquidate the public debt burden created by past government borrowing. 15 
Anstey took this principle one step further, arguing repeatedly that 'the basic 
policy of a reconstructed Australia must be the transformation of all 
interest-bearing obligations [that is, private as well as public debt] into 
non-interest bearing obligations'. 16 He envisaged that in this way 'the credit 
frozen in bonds will be "made liquid" to fertilize the fields of industry'. 17 This 
was to be achieved through the purchase by Government, financed by public 
money-creation, of all outstanding debt obligations. Private debts would then be 
transformed into non-interest bearing loans from the government bank. This 
proposal was in line with the traditional monetary radical view that the abolition 
of interest was essential to economic prosperity and stability. 
Both Anstey and Lazzarini articulated national credit principles of money supply 
determination. Credit, wrote Anstey, 'should be available to all those who have 
the necessary security ••• the limit of credit is the volume of actual weal th 
available as security'. 18 In his (1920) vision of a 'socialist' utopia, Anstey 
foresaw a society in which 
Banks will function for the people. Finance will be the handmaiden of 
industry - not its master. Security will give the right to 
currency - not the whims and will of a predatory clique. 19 
The same principle was applied, along usual national credit lines, to public 
borrowing, with prospective taxation revenues and public assets constituting the 
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government's 'security'. 20 According to this principle, any degree of public 
money creation was justified as long as the money was spent by the government 
on 'creating assets'. 21 Lazzarini put the point vividly in a 1938 exchange in 
Parliament with a Country Party member, H.L. Anthony: 
Mr Anthony - What limits would the honourable member suggest should 
be placed on the creation by the Government? 
Mr Lazzarini - My limit would be needs. The honourable member is 
hinting at inflation. Any person who says that it is inflation to create 
wealth for use in production is two ends of an economic goat. 22 
There was, however, some confusion about the relation between the money 
supply and the price level. Anstey attacked what he called the 'exploded 
Quantity Theory' 23 and expounded the law of reflux (i.e. the proposition that it 
was impossible to put into circulation more money than was actually needed). 24 
At the same time, however, he explained the destructive power of bank 
monetary manipulation by reference to the 'increase or decrease [in] values' 25 
flowing from money supply changes. This quantity theory perspective was 
common. Another prominent monetary radical, Eddie Ward, expressed it 
succinctly in a speech to Parliament in 1945: 
The Labor movement has long since learned that unless we are able to 
establish a stable currency .•• private financial interests have the power 
to depreciate the currency •.• (and) deprive the workers of the benefits 
they have won ••.• Thus, the obligation rests upon a Labour Government 
to establish a stable currency in this country. But no government can 
maintain a stable currency unless it controls the supply of money in all 
its forms. 26 
In almost the same breath, Ward propounded a version of the national credit 
'security' doctrine of monetary expansion,27 evidently seeing no contradiction. 
Ward's view exemplified a tension in Labor monetary radical thinking between 
ideas drawn from the national credit and quantity theory strands of the 
anti-commodity money tradition. 
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The influence of the monetary radical tradition was also evident in writers which 
shaped the views of these two men. Lazzarini extensively quoted Soddy's views 
in his parliamentary speeches and also drew upon Gesell (without, however, 
giving any sign of appreciating the more unique elements of Gesell's analysis). 28 
Anstey drew upon Kitson, amongst others. 29 
Anstey and Lazzarini were highly representative of the Labor monetary radical 
tradition. King O'Malley was, however, perhaps the most notable early Labor 
exponent of monetary radicalism. To O'Malley, as to Anstey and Lazzarini, 
utopia would be achieved when the money supply was 'based on the values of the 
properties, the products and the revenues of the country', and on the 
'requirements of business'. 30 Goodwin has suggested that 'the conservative and 
radical approaches to state banking were fused in O'Malley'. 31 This can be seen 
in his changing view of gold. In 1906, O'Malley was to be found attacking gold in 
uncompromisingly anti-commodity money terms. 32 In later years, however, he 
weakened this position. By 1909 he was advocating a system of gold 
convertibility with provision for the suspension of convertibility, if necessary, by 
the government. 33 At a 1919 A.LP. Special Commonwealth Conference 
O'Malley and his colleague J.H. Catts proposed a scheme for monetary expansion 
to pay off the war debt. This scheme was based on the principle of gold 
convertibility but with a variation of the gold reserve ratio from 1:4 to 1:10. 34 
During the debate Catts indicated that he had submitted the scheme to a 
professor at the Sydney University [probably Irvine], who also claimed that it was 
theoretically sound. O'Malley's views were an early indication of the 
intermingling of orthodoxy and monetary radical notions that was to characterise 
the economic attitudes of many Labor politicians over the years. 
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As was mentioned in Chapter Two, the Fisher government's 'nationalisation' of 
the note issue and variation of the gold reserve requirement, so as to permit the 
financing of a substantial spending package through note issue expansion, was 
widely seen as the prelude to a broader application of 'wild' finance. The 
expectations of Labor monetary radicals were aroused. Bertha McNamara, a 
well known NSW Labor activist, described the note issue move as the 'first 
attempt which has been made on a large scale to lay the axe upon the tree of 
usury'. She also expressed the hope that it would mark the end of borrowing and 
usher in a new monetary regime under which 'we will now only ascertain how 
much is wanted, and issue our money accordingly'. 35 The monetary radicals 
were, however, bitterly disappointed when, during the first world war, the Fisher 
government resorted to large-scale borrowing to finance the war effort. Anstey 
resisted what he saw as the enslavement of the country to debt and high finance 
by opposing the government's 1915 War Loan Bill in Parliament (he had, in fact, 
temporarily left the parliamentary party over differences with the 
Government). 36 Rising war debt seems to have prompted significant 
rank-and-file enthusiasm for monetary expansion to replace borrowing, and 
motions supporting this were passed by at least two state branches of the party 
around the end of the war. 37 The Catts motion (referred to above) at the 1919 
Commonwealth Conference failed only narrowly (by 10:13), and a motion was 
passed by the 1918 Commonwealth Conference calling on the federal Caucus to 
report 'upon the leading principles which should govern the policy of the 
Australian Labor Party with respect to national credits'. 38 The increasing 
influence of monetary radical ideas at the end of the war coincided with a shift 
to the left and with an interest in socialist doctrines which was more pronounced 
than the party had ever seen before. 
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Judged by the proceedings of state party conferences, interest in monetary 
radical ideas dropped away somewhat in the post-war period. There was, 
nevertheless, a continuing influence. At the 1924 Commonwealth Conference, 
for example, Victorian delegates unsuccessfully moved a motion urging 'the issue 
of notes on the assets within Australia for all productive works, instead of the 
present method of borrowing money for that purpose outside Australia'. 39 
Anstey continued his campaign of speeches and pamphleteering. 
The Great Depression created unprecedented party interest in monetary issues. 
This is hardly surprising, given the circumstances of the slump. The increased 
influence of monetary radical ideas was an important part of Labor's response to 
the Depression. At the May 1930 Commonwealth Conference, Frank Lock (see 
Chapter Two) was invited, although apparently not even a party member, to 
address delegates in the discussion which preceded the passage of a motion which 
called on the Scullin government to secure a £20m 'freeing' of the 'credit 
resources of the country'. 40 In caucus, monetary radicals including Lazzarini 
fruitlessly urged monetary expansion for public works and the repayment of 
maturing public debt. 41 The monetary radicals had one significant victory when 
Caucus passed, in November 1930, a motion moved by Anstey calling on the 
government to defer conversion of a £28m slice of debt due to mature the 
following month. 42 
A number of the most outspoken monetary radicals in federal caucus, including 
Lazzarini and Ward, were Langites. Lang's Depression rhetoric and his famous 
plan bore the unmistakable mark of monetary radicalism. He attacked the 'gold 
manipulators responsible for the Depression', 43 and proposed a 'goods standard' 
to replace the gold standard. 44 Alf Paddison, a former student of Irvine's who 
has been credited with a formative influence on the Lang Plan, referred in his 
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booklet defending the the Plan to the 'important contributions made' on 
monetary questions by 'thinkers like Major Douglas and Kitson'. 45 
Monetary radicalism nevertheless had strong support outside the NSW branch 
during this period. Anstey was a Victorian. George Yates, who was the most 
active monetary radical in Caucus at this time, was a South Australian. It was 
Yates who first moved the £20m proposal in caucus. 46 He had, in fact, publicly 
criticised the borrowing policies of the Scullin government only a few months 
after Labor had won off ice. 47 
Despite its close association with Langism, monetary radicalism also remained a 
strong influence in the party during the years when Lang Labor was outside the 
federal Labor fold. In 1933, for example, the party's Commonwealth Conference 
was presented with a report from its Banking, Finance and Insurance Committee 
which advocated the liquidation of the internal debt by monetary expansion, the 
creation of a 'Commonwealth Credit Board', and the basing of money supply upon 
'the value of production'. The Committee's recommendations were rejected 
after heated debate. 48 Not all monetary radicals were, moreover, pro-Lang. 
The future Labor leader, Arthur Calwell, was a monetary radical but was bitterly 
opposed to Lang. 49 
Monetary radical ideas never controlled the party in the 1930s, but their 
influence continued to be apparent in party debates. This was evident in 1936 
when the party developed a detailed statement of its monetary policy. In a 
process which was unusual for the time, Caucus formulated a policy statement 
which was then submitted to the 1936 party conference, and approved with minor 
amendments. Unhappy with the drafts, the Langite monetary radicals had moved 
in Caucus, without success, a number of amendments. The first had proposed 
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that legislation should be introduced nationalising the banks and 'prohibiting any 
private company from trading in created credit', while the second had urged that 
a future Labor government should extend the branch coverage of the 
Commonwealth Bank, and act to ensure 'when branches are established, the 
prohibition of the operations of credit expansion by cheque system by any person 
or institution other than the Commonwealth Bank'. 50 These motions indicated 
the influence of both nationalisation schemes and the 100% reserve system 
proposal (see Chapter Two). 
During the caucus debate on the 1936 policy statement, a further monetary 
radical motion - calling for 'the elimination of all borrowing from private 
sources both at home and abroad' was defeated. Many of these issues were 
fought out again - with no better results - at the conference. Monetary 
radicals had had very little success in writing their policy proposals into the 
policy statement, despite the fact that three of their number had been members 
of the seven-member committee which had produced the draft. 51 
Mainstream Labor Views 
Fully-fledged monetary radicalism was, then, a minority doctrine within the 
ALP. Inevitably, it had limited appeal for two major categories of Labor 
politicians - the conservatives who felt more comfortable with orthodox 
conventional wisdom, and the more economically literate members. 
In the 1920s, Labor leaders who rejected monetary radicalism found themselves 
in the invidious position of having no adequate conceptual alternative to 
restrictionist orthodoxy. As a result, the Scullin government had great trouble in 
formulating a policy response to the rapidly worsening economic situation in 
1929-30. All this changed dramatically with the impact of stabilisationist 
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economics. Stabilisationism provided strong reinforcement for key traditional 
Labor attitudes and values, including the importance of cheap money, and the 
focus on distributive justice between borrowers and lenders. Stabilisationist 
economics was also compatible with Labor's credit-consumer values. Most 
importantly, it had intellectual credibility. For the first time, mainstream 
economics - or at least a major strand of it - came into close interplay with 
traditional Labor values and attitudes. 
Stabilisationist economics played a crucial role in the shift of the Scullin 
government to an expansionary economic stance. The calls of the caucus 
monetary radicals during 1930 for credit expansion had little impact until, in late 
October, the famous Gibbons-Theodore motion calling for credit expansion was 
passed by caucus. 52 Theodore, temporarily out of the ministry at the time, had 
acquired a stimulatory plan which he worked doggedly to implement after his 
reinstatement as Treasurer in late January 1931. He was, of course, 
unsuccessful. First the trading banks, and then the Commonwealth Bank, 
rejected his requests for an 'expansion of credit'. Blocked on these fronts, 
Theodore turned to legislation to expand the note issue. But when his Fiduciary 
Notes Bill was defeated in the Senate in late March, all avenues to implement 
what he called the 'pivotal measure of the legislative programme ••• of the 
Government' were exhausted. 53 Left with no way of maintaining the initiative, 
the government drifted towards the Premiers' Plan (June 1931) and, with it, to 
party splits and electoral destruction. 
The 'Theodore plan' - presented in a series of variants in the first months of 
1931 - was unmistakably stabilisationist in character. Its premise was that the 
source of the crisis, both domestic and international, could be traced to the 
monetary system. Price stabilisation, through controlled monetary expansion 
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aimed at the reflation of prices to pre-Depression levels, was essential. The 
Gibbons- Theodore resolution specified that the 'ultimate amount of credit to be 
issued •.• be determined by the effect on the commodity price levels'. 54 
Repeatedly, Theodore tried to convey to the public the message that the 
government's monetary policy aimed to 'restore the pound to its own value' and 
'would not destroy it'. 55 He was convinced that 'it is possible to have inflation, 
to control it, and to stabilise it'. 56 The Theodore plan also emphasised the other 
key stabilisationist theme: sufficient exchange rate flexibility to permit 
depreciation as the price of domestic price stabilisation. 57 
Public works also figured in Theodore's plan. Part of the planned credit 
expansion was to be earmarked for 'providing employment on reproductive works' 
by government. This was not, however, a counter-cyclical public works program. 
The aim was, rather, to limit the decline in public works expenditure. The 
cutting edge of Theodore's plan to reflate the economy was not public works, but 
increased industrial lending. As he explained to Caucus, when detailing the 
proposals originally put to the banks and the Premiers' Conference 
The essence of the proposals is the creation of additional bank credit for 
use in industry, and enterprise throughout the country, concurrently with 
reductions in Government expenditure and a reduction of costs in 
industry. 58 
In line with his faith in cheap money policies, Theodore at this time shared the 
widespread contemporary view that government deficits could crowd out 
industrial recovery. Al though he thought restrictionist proposals for the 
restoration of balanced budgets to be too harsh and precipitate, he was 
nonetheless committed to the 'restoration of sound budgeting'. 59 'I have never', 
he told Parliament in March, 'denied, nor has the Government, that reductions 
must be affected in government expenditure and all possible economies insisted 
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upon'. 60 In the United States, Roosevelt displayed a similar attitude towards 
deficits, partly because of political and business resistance to deficits, and partly 
because of genuine ambivalence in his administration's economic outlook. 61 
Like others at the time, Theodore was particularly concerned with the question 
of bringing costs and prices into alignment. He made clear on a number of 
occasions his belief that but for the lack of a 'well ordered and flexible 
[economic] system' - that is, of a system which could uniformly and equitably 
reduce all incomes in proportion to the loss of national income resulting from the 
slump - a reflationary monetary policy would not have been necessary. 62 He 
was particularly concerned with the high real interest burden on industry 
resulting from the drop in prices. (There was less clarity on the politically more 
difficult question of wages.) Monetary policy was, therefore, to be partly 
targetted to reducing interest rates. Banks were to be urged to reduce their own 
loan rates, and the Commonwealth Bank was to 'make heavy purchases of 
Government securities ..• in order to get the average yield •.. back to 5%'. 63 At 
the same time, distributional injustice between creditors and debtors was to be 
partially ameliorated by an interest tax on most holders of government bonds. 
When, beaten by the banks and the Senate, Scullin and Theodore agreed to the 
Premiers' Plan, the promise of action to reduce the interest burden was 
undoubtedly critical to their agreement. 64 
Theodore had been greatly influenced by the Giblin-Copland-Dyson 'Stabilisation 
plan' (see Chapter One). He cited the Stabilisation plan in his speech to 
Parliament on the Fiduciary Notes Bill, indicating that he had become aware of 
it shortly after his restoration to the treasurership. 65 This influence was 
particularly apparent in the emphasis he placed upon 'equality of sacrifice'. The 
stabilisationist inspiration of the Theodore plan was also made clear in 
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Theodore's references to both Keynes and Cassel, whose views he claimed were 
'undoubtedly ••• an endorsement of the ideas that have actuated this Government 
in bringing forward its proposal'. 66 McFarlane has convincingly suggested that 
Irvine was an important influence on Theodore, reflecting contacts made before 
Theodore re-entered Cabinet in late January 1931. 67 Nevertheless, it should be 
stressed that there was, in Theodore's approach, no hint of quack ideas from the 
monetary radical tradition. Indeed, Theodore clashed with George Yates in 
parliament over the latter's national credit notion that monetary expansion 
should completely and indiscriminately supplant borrowing for public works. 68 
Although Theodore took little or nothing from the monetary radical tradition, he 
skillfully exploited the common ground between stabilisationism and monetary 
radicalism. The Caucus monetary radicals initially rallied around the Theodore 
proposals. Lazzarini, for example, withdrew in favour of the Gibbons- Theodore 
resolution a motion he had before Caucus calling for the Commonwealth Bank to 
take up maturing loans. 69 It was in this context, and as a reflection of the 
tension between Theodore and Lang within the NSW branch of the party, that 
Lang brought forward his own overtly monetary radical plan. Lang was, as 
Schedvin points out, determined 'to destroy the Theodore plan'. 70 
The Interplay of Stabilisationist and Monetary Radical Ideas 
Theodore's economic thinking was not seriously influenced by monetary 
radicalism. For many other Labor politicians, however, monetary radicalism had 
been an important formative influence. The impact of stabilisationist ideas 
therefore produced some interesting conceptual amalgams. The influence upon 
the ALP of stabilisationist ideas was facilitated by the departure to the U.A.P. 
of the deflationist-oriented Lyons group. Speaking in Parliament on 13 March 
1931, Lyons told members that the key reason he had left the Labor party was 
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the party's 'policy of inflation', which he believed could only provide 'employment 
of a fleeting character'. 'The only way in which to relieve unemployment', he 
affirmed, 'is to restore confidence'. 71 
In his study of Victorian trade unions in the Depression, L.J. Louis notes the 
dominance in union responses to the slump of certain ideas which we can 
recognise as unmistakably 'national credit' in character (Louis somewhat 
inaccurately labels them as 'social credit'). Louis also describes the way in which 
'economists like Cassel, and later, the MacMillan Commitee Report, were quoted 
as proof of the soundness of a program of monetary reform'. 72 Lang's plan 
included a few stabilisationist themes in an essentially monetary radical 
program. 73 A different blend of the two doctrines was to be found in a report 
on monetary policy and banking produced for the anti-Lang 'official' NSW branch 
of the A.L.P. in 1932 by a committee of four which included Theodore. The 
report's monetary policy prescriptions were clearly stabilisationist, while its 
rhetoric was close to that of monetary radicalism. 74 
Gradations in the mix of stabilisationist and monetary radical ideas can be 
illustrated by reference to the views of a number of prominent Labor politicians 
in the 1930s. One was John Curtin, who entered parliament in 1928 as member 
for Fremantle. Despite his inability to secure election to the Cabinet, Curtin 
was an authoritative figure during the Scullin years. He had been influenced by 
monetary radical ideas early in his career as a Labor activist, and had at one 
stage been closely associated with Frank Anstey. 75 However, his economic 
outlook during the Depression was overwhelmingly stabilisationist in character, 
although with a heavy dose of monetary radical rhetoric. Curtin had some 
acquaintance with the views of Cassel and with the thrust of the British 
MacMillan Report. 76 Nevertheless, as we will see, traditional Labor attitudes, 
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in the form of a deep-seated hostility to private money creation, remained 
important in Curtin's approach to monetary issues, as in that of other 
mainstream party leaders. 
Like so many of his party colleagues attempting to grapple with the economic 
holocaust in the Scullin years, Curtin ascribed the Depression principally to 
monetary causes. In particular, he stressed 'the fact that international bankers 
attempted too early in the post-war period to revert to the gold standard'. 77 
The 'world calamity which now faces civilisation', he told Parliament in March 
1931, was 'not due to any change in the relative value of one commodity to that 
of another but to the appreciation of the power of gold'. The effects of deflation 
were, he argued, particularly severe because of the massive burden of overseas 
debt. 78 
Curtin attacked the 'Money Power' and 'the malign power exercised by banking 
control of credit'. He also displayed at one point the residual influence of 
national credit ideas, observing that 'securities that represent property, 
marketable products, and national taxable wealth are the real basis of national 
credit always'. For all this, Curtin explicity rejected monetary radical formulas 
in favour of stabilisationist measures. 'The monetary policy of the nation', he 
declared, 'should be aimed at the stabilisation of the purchasing power of 
Australian currency'. 79 There was 'no hope for this Government, for the people 
of this country or, indeed, any other country', except through 'a rearrangement 
of the relationship between the prices for commodities and money'. Without a 
measure of ref lat ion, things would just get worse. 80 
Curtin clashed in parliament with Lazzarini, who attempted to move an 
amendment to the Theodore's Fiduciary Notes Bill declaring the 'cheque system' 
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illegal. 'I do not', Curtin declared, 'agree with the proposal of the honorable 
member for Werriwa (Mr Lazzarini) that every bank which issues a cheque-book 
and every client who uses one should be put in gaol'. He also repudiated Lang 
(and, implicitly, Keynes, although not either Fisher or Cassel), by refusing at this 
time to completely reject the gold standard, preferring instead to argue for a 
more flexible gold/currency nexus. 81 It was a measure of Curtin's careful 
approach that he upheld at the time what he later referred to as 'the obsolete 
theory that gold has an important role to play in connection with the internal 
currency of a nation' 82. 
Curtin's stabilisationist outlook was especially important because he was a key 
member of the committee of six which brought down at the 1930 A.L.P. 
Commonwealth Conference a report which led to the well-known Conference 
resolution calling for a £20m credit expansion (see above). The Conference 
endorsement of the £20m proposal cannot be viewed as a triumph for monetary 
radicalism. 83 The committee's report was endorsed by the overwhelming 
majority of 20:7. It was supported, in amended form, even by the Queensland 
Labor leader, Forgan Smith, who, during the discussion which followed its 
presentation, had referred disparagingly to Frank Lock, who had earlier 
addressed the conference, as a 'patent medicine vendor'. Forgan Smith also 
bluntly attacked the national credit easy money doctrine by stressing the 'in all 
cases real wealth or real security had a definite limit and advances could not be 
given beyond that limit'. 84 
Stabilisationist views had also made a deep impact upon Scullin himself in these 
years. Scullin accepted the Theodore plan wholeheartedly in early 1931 and 
maintained a basically stabilisationist outlook for virtually the rest of his 
political life. Throughout the 1930s - first as opposition leader and then as a 
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kind of party elder statesman - he continued to argue that the 'governor upon 
the engine' of monetary expansion should be 'the control of price levels'. 'We 
were', he told parliament in 1940, 'against inflation or deflation, and were in 
favour of stabilisation'. Scullin was always convinced of the importance of 
keeping the money supply 'within sound limits'. 85 His approach was far removed 
from that of the monetary radicals. 
While, however, Scullin was no monetary radical, his attitudes on a range of 
monetary questions clearly indicated the important influence of the traditional 
Labor values and attitudes. He bitterly attacked the 'money masters' and 
'oligarchies of finance'. He was also somewhat hostile to public borrowing and 
sympathetic to the use of central bank monetary expansion so that public works 
could to some extent 'be financed in a way which will not leave the country with 
a heavy burden of interest'. 86 Foreign borrowing he opposed outright, arguing 
that imports should be regulated to preserve a balanced external account.* He 
saw low interest rates as particularly important, warning that: 
Every precaution must be taken to prevent the rates of interest from 
rising. A high rate of interest is a real death blow to all enterprise, 
whether it be private or public. 87 
Like Curtin, Scullin was also deeply hostile to private money creation. 
Thus while both Scullin and Curtin shared many values with the monetary 
radicals, they differed unmistakably with them over the appropriate principles 
governing the money supply. There were others, however, whose thinking 
combined reflected a true mixture of stabilisation and monetary radical ideas. 
E.J. Holloway was a good example. Holloway was a prominent trade union leader 
* This was a common Labor view. There was little emphasis upon exchange rate 
management as a means of achieving balance of payments equilibrium. The 
general preference was for trade controls. 
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who had entered parliament by defeating Prime Minister Bruce in the seat of 
Flinders in 1929. Like Curtin, he opposed the Premiers' plan. Later, he held 
ministerial office under both Curtin and Chifley, at which time he was, 
according to Crisp, regarded as 'middle of the road' in party terms. 88 
Holloway strongly supported the Theodore plan in 1931, 89 and the stabilisationist 
ideas he acquired at that stage were strongly reinforced in the later 1930s when 
he came under the influence of Sir Basil Blackett's Planned Money (see Chapter 
Three). In a number of speeches to parliament in the years immediately 
preceding the Curtin government's accession to office, Holloway cited Blackett 
as the authority for his belief that economic stability could be achieved by 
means of a monetary policy aimed at price stability, with the exchange rate 
adjusting accordingly. He also referred in his speeches to Gustav Cassel. 90 
Holloway combined these strong stabilisationist leanings with a number of 
monetary radical views. The first was the belief in the discretionary power of 
financiers to contract the money supply and induce slumps. (This, he thought, 
was what had caused the Great Depression). The second was the national credit 
doctrine of money creation on good security, which he saw as justification for 
requiring the Commonwealth Bank, which was 'as powerful and wealthy as 
Australia itself', to 'supply this country with the financial accommodation 
required for all public purposes'. 91 
As the examples of Holloway and Scullin indicate, stabilisationist economics 
continued to have some influence within Labor ranks even in the mid and late 
1930s. By that time, however, 'advanced' expansionist opinion had in Australia 
moved beyond stabilisationism to a rather different approach to the problem of 
economic management. The following chapter discusses the impact upon Labor 
of the reshaping of economics after the Great Depression. 
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NOTES, CHAPTER FOUR 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MONEY AND BANKING AND THE A.LP., II 
Public Works and the Money Supply 
Labor's exposure to stabilisationist ideas at the height of the Depression 
represented a crucial turning point in the party's intellectual history. As we 
have seen, key Labor figures like Curtin and Theodore adopted at this time 
almost wholly stabilisationist outlooks. Some others within the party mixed 
stabilisationism and monetary radicalism in their thinking. 
Stabilisationism was, however, the expansionist economics of the 1920s. As we 
have seen, the Depression itself had a profound impact on the terms of the 
economic policy debate, both in Australia and internationally. Increasing 
attention was paid to the role of public works. Expanisionists gradually 
discarded the notion of the price level as the appropriate gauge of 
counter-cyclical policy, in favour of the direct targetting of employment and 
economic activity. Most importantly of all, the expansionist camp within the 
economics profession became increasingly influential and aggressive. 
Labor was by no means unaffected by these developments. The party was quick 
to place more emphasis upon public works. By 1932-3, Scullin (federal opposition 
leader) and Forgan Smith (Queensland Premier) had emerged as two of 
Australia's foremost advocates of a 'vigorous public works policy' as the principal 
means of promoting recovery. 1 Curtin continued this emphasis after he 
assumed the parliamentary leadership in 1935. At the same time, however, the 
party continued to emphasise the importance of low interest rates. Labor's 
program was, as Curtin put it in 1937, one of 'cheap money and public works'. 2 
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Such a policy came readily to Labor. Even at the outset of the Depression, the 
party's leaders had taken the view that 'activity in public works should be 
reduced to a minimum when other employment is abundant, and should be 
accelerated to its greatest capacity when the general industrial situation is 
stagnant'. 3 At that time, however, they conceived of public works as a means 
of unemployment relief rather than as the means to economic recovery. The 
cutting edge of recovery policy was not public works but, as Theodore put it, 'the 
creation of additional bank credit for use in industry' (see Chapter Four). The 
inadequacy of this view was, however, quickly recognised. By 1933, Scullin was 
attacking the Lyons Government for its belief that cheap money and other 
'incentives' could prompt a private sector-led recovery. 'I agree that cheap 
money is a good thing', the Labor leader told Parliament, 'but cheap money must 
be found employment, and the Government must set an example'. 4 Public works 
were the answer to this dilemma. 
The preeminent Labor policy theme during the party's decade in opposition 
(1931-41) was, however, the need for a liberal monetary policy. Labor 
parliamentarians continually emphasised that increased public works expenditure 
and more low-interest lending to business depended critically upon what Curtin 
called the 'definite exercise of inflationary credit in the Australian monetary 
system'. 5 The party's focus upon monetary policy led it from the outset to 
vigorously oppose the plans of the Commonwealth Bank for the early 'funding' of 
the treasury bill liability. 6 In campaigning for increased public works 
expenditure the party placed at least as much emphasis upon the role of central 
bank finance as it did upon the public works themselves. 
Given the circumstances of the time, this focus on monetary policy was an 
entirely natural one. Monetary expansion was, in the early 1930s, absolutely 
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essential to the financing of deficits. The Scullin Government had been forced 
by the banks to cut more deeply and quickly into public expenditure than it would 
otherwise have wished. Subsequently, under Lyons, the pressure from the 
Commonwealth Bank for the funding of treasury bills acted as a major constraint 
upon public works expenditure. If expenditure was to be increased, monetary 
policy clearly had to be liberalised. This was a fact that Australians of an 
expansionist bent could be expected to have uppermost in their minds, given the 
independent status and conservative attitudes of the Commonwealth Bank. 
Labor had a additional reason for emphasising the role of monetary expansion in 
counter-cyclical policy generally and in the financing of public works in 
particular. This was its dislike of public borrowing. The party's traditional views 
on public borrowing had been powerfully reinforced by the Depression 
experience. By the 1930s, even 'moderate' Labor politicians were completely 
opposed to new overseas borrowing. The party was determined that Australia 
should never again face 'sacrificial measures' of the Premiers' Plan variety in 
order 'to avoid default'. 7 On domestic borrowing, attitudes differed, but even 
the most cautious parliamentarians thought it essential that public borrowing not 
exceed moderate levels. When, in 1934, Scullin emphasised monetary expansion 
as the key to an active public works policy, he did so not only because he thought 
public borrowing to be an inadequate source of funds, but also because he 
believed that 'the scheme must be financed in a way which will not leave the 
country with a heavy burden of interest'. 8 Curtin took a similar view : in a 
major public statement in 1937 on public works policy, he made it clear that he 
saw monetary expansion as playing a key financing role. Labor's plan, he 
indicated, was to provide 'the instruments of exchange so that men, materials 
and machines will function and wealth will increase without the burdens of 
perpetual interest charges'. 9 
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This concern about borrowing was evident throughout the 1930s. As war loomed, 
party spokesmen called on the Government and the Commonwealth Bank to make 
full use of central bank credit in financing defence expenditure while the 
economy remained at below full employment levels of activity. The alternative, 
as Labor saw it, was a repetition of the experience of the first world war, the 
outcome of which would be that 'there will be a veritable Himalaya of debt upon 
our knecks when the war is over'. 10 
There was, however, a third fundamental reason for Labor's emphasis on the 
money supply. Labor was still greatly influenced by the notion that increases in 
the level of demand required commensurate increases in the amount of 
'purchasing power' (money) in circulation and that, consequently, the 
fundamental requirement for economic recovery was the infusion of 'new' money 
into the economy. Public works and expanded business lending, from this 
perspective, were simply alternative ways of achieving an expansion of the 
money supply. 
This view of the role of money was evident in the monetary policy statement 
approved by Caucus and the party's Commonwealth Conference in mid-1936. 
The objective of monetary reform, the statement declared, was 'the 
establishment of an efficient medium of exchange between production and 
consumption'. Cheap money and 'the financing of public works' were treated 
simply as corollaries of an adequate money supply. Monetary adequacy would 
also permit the proposed National Credit Advisory Authority to meet the needs 
of credit consumers in three vital areas : home finance, 'future agricultural 
developments with loans issued at nominal rates of interest to carry out a 
scheme of closer settlement', and 'the extension of Australian secondary 
industries to secure a maximum of industrial self-sufficiency'. 11 
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The notion that demand expansion required an equivalent expansion of 
'purchasing power' did not imply that the whole of the public works program 
should be financed by monetary expansion (al though the party's monetary 
radicals were certainly of this opinion). It did, however, suggest that any 
expenditure on public works would only have an expansionary effect 
proportionate to the amount of 'new money' which was used by the Government 
to finance that expenditure. Expansionary public works should therefore be 
financed by central bank money creation. * By contrast, the ordinary or 
non-cyclical component of the public works program should be financed by taxes 
(and, perhaps, domestic borrowing), but not by monetary expansion. 
Not all of the party's parliamentary representatives were stuck in this traditional 
mode of thought. Both Curtin and Scullin explicitly acknowledged throughout 
the 1930s that both monetary expansion and public borrowing had a role to play 
in the financing of expansionary public expenditure. 12 Amongst the 
parliamentary party as a whole, however, the old way of thinking was strikingly 
pervasive. This was true not only of monetary radicals, but of many others. 
Holloway's views on borrowing and the role of money have been mentioned in the 
previous chapter. The views of some other key figures are discussed below. 
Full Employment 
The increasing emphasis upon public works was not the only important 
development in Labor thinking in the 1930s. By the end of the decade, Labor 
politicians from Curtin down had embraced the 'full employment' or (as we have 
referred to it earlier) 'physical resources' doctrine - that is, the doctrine that the 
* or, logically, by overseas borrowings. These were, however, unacceptable on 
other grounds. 
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only limit to expansionary policy was the availability of productive resources. 
This theme was put forward particularly vigorously in relation to the financing of 
the war. As Curtin told parliament in September 1939 
••• it will be impossible for the Government to rely on orthodox banking 
and financial practice to safeguard the interests of Australia in the years 
immediately ahead of us ••• Neither the Australian public nor any other 
public will be satisfied with the statement, 'You cannot defend your 
country merely because you haven't the money'. That idea will not be 
accepted. Nations are defended with man-power, physical equipment, 
guns, munitions, material things, and their capacity cannot be limited by 
the amount of currency that they have or by any particular measure of 
credit which any expert or band of experts likes to fix. 13 
Labor's commitment to 'full' employment represented a more aggressive stance 
than the party had hitherto taken. In the early 1930s, as we have seen, party 
leaders had emphasised the stabilisationist theme that the restoration of the 
pre-Depression price level - rather than any specific employment or output 
target - should be the objective of counter-cyclical policy. By the mid-1930s, 
Labor seems to have been somewhat less sure about how to judge the appropriate 
degree of stimulus which should be applied to a depressed economy. Influential 
figures like Scullin and Holloway still thought in terms of the price level as a 
guide. By contrast, the new leader, Curtin, had apparently abandoned this 
particular stabilisationist theme. Like so many others at the time, this left him 
in the position of advocating more expansion without being able to indicate how 
much more. 14 The 'physical resources' doctrine eventually resolved this 
difficulty. 
Had Labor, in adopting the 'physical resources' doctrine, embraced the Keynesian 
revolution? In one sense, it had. Keynes and the General Theory played an 
important role in sh if ting economic opinion towards support for full employment 
as the appropriate goal of counter-cyclical policy. This was a theme that 
expansionist politicians in the A.L.P. and elsewhere took up with alacrity. 
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Viewed more closely, however, it is apparent that the 'physical resources' 
doctrine left Labor's traditional view of the role of money largely untouched. 
The Keynesian full employment doctrine held merely that aggregate demand 
should be stimulated and maintained at a level sufficient to induce full 
employment. It said nothing about the respective contributions of public 
borrowing and monetary expansion in financing government 'pump-priming' 
activity. By contrast, many Labor politicians thought of the physical resources 
doctrine as a defence of monetary expansion up to the point of full resource 
utilisation. 
Representative of this conception of the physical resources doctrine was the 
1939 statement of the monetary radical, Eddie Ward, that the proper 'limit to 
which credit can be expanded' was 'the limit imposed by the limitations of 
manpower, materials and equipment'. 15 Monetary radicals were not, however, 
the only ones to interpret the physical resources doctrine in this way. * An 
illustration of the pervasiveness of this monetary perspective on demand 
expansion can be found in the thinking of John Dedman •. Dedman was elected to 
parliament in a by-election in 1940, and subsequently became a close colleague 
of Chifley's. 17 In parliament, he quickly made clear his relatively considerable 
grasp of recent developments in economic thought. He referred in his early 
speeches to Keynes' contribution and declared himself to be an adherent of the 
'full employment theory', the essence of which was that: 
* For the monetary radicals, the physical resources doctrine had the attraction 
of being superficially similar to the traditional national credit doctrine that the 
money supply should be related to the 'needs of business' or 'potential wealth' of 
the community. In fact, despite their acquiescence in the physical resources 
doctrine, the monetary radicals had not grasped the Keynesian notion of the 'full 
employment' ceiling to demand expansion. 16 Other Labor politicians like 
Dedman did. This became relevant in post-war Government deliberations on the 
role of the Commonwealth Bank in housing finance (see Chapter Eight). 
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Money, in the old classical sense, no longer exists. The only limit to our 
ability to make goods for the use of our people is the ability of our 
manpower in its application to our raw material. 18 
From this standpoint, he attacked the 'deflationist' economics of the U.A.P. 
Government and the Commonwealth Bank, and called for a revised 1940-41 
budget with 'a deficit of from £3,000,000 to £4,000,000'. 19 
Despite this command of the 'Keynesian' policy program, Dedmari was not really 
a Keynesian. He had, in fact, superimposed Keynesian themes upon a highly 
traditional monetary framework. His interpretation of the 'full employment 
theory' was that 'to the extent that there are unemployed resources available in 
this country, the Commonwealth Bank could make available to the 
Government •.• sufficient money to utilise these unused resources to their fullest 
extent'. 20 The financing of deficits through public borrowing was pointless, 
because 'the effect of raising a loan of £50,000,000 is to deprive the people of 
purchasing power in exactly the same way as if the money were raised by 
taxation.' 21 This had particular relevance for war finance in an economy 
operating somewhat under the full employment ceiling: 
Labour for our war effort can come from two sources; first, from labour 
power now idle or wastefully employed and, secondly, by diverting labour 
from non-war production to defence activities. The correct method of 
financing the first is by the use of bank credit. To finance the second, 
we must resort either to taxation or to loans. 22 
Forced to choose between borrowing and taxation in the financing of this second 
component of war expenditure, Dedman's preference was, on traditional Labor 
grounds, for taxation. 23 
Dedman's views throw considerable light on the influence of the 'Keynesian 
revolution' upon Labor economic thinking. Dedman was much more aware than 
were most of his parliamentary colleagues of Keynes' leading role in the 
development of contemporary economic theory. He did not, however, regard 
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himself as a disciple of Keynes. Indeed, in 1941, when the U.A.P. Government 
invoked the wartime 'Keynes plan' * in its defence of public borrowing to finance 
the war, Dedman told Parliament that 
Mr Keynes is essentially a capitalist economist ••. the Keynes plan and 
the Prime Minister's statement that we must mortgage our future both 
constitute a subtle attempt on the part of anti-Labor interests to 
inveigle the public into believing that this war may be paid for by a 
future generation. 24 
Nor did Dedman have any conception that a revolution in economic thought had 
taken place in 1936. He saw the turning point as having come considerably 
earlier. The new economics, he said, had been 'advocated by the Australian 
Labor party for at least the last ten years', and had come to be 'taught and 
advocated in all the universities of Australia'. 25 
Dedman's interpretation of events makes a good deal of sense. It was not the 
'Keynesian revolution', but the impact of stabilisationism at the height of the 
Depression, which was the seminal influence upon Labor thinking in the 1930s. 
During its decade in opposition Labor had moved on, firstly, to a new view of the 
role of public works and, later, to absorb the 'full employment' or 'physical 
resources' doctrine. The party had, in other words, moved with the advancing 
tide of expansionary policy opinion. Its adoption of the 'full employment' 
doctrine no doubt reflected the indirect influence of Keynes and the General 
Theory. The impact of Keynesianism was, however, to reinforce and strengthen 
Labor expansionism rather than to provide the party with a new economic 
program. Indeed, Labor viewed the gradual expansionist drift of opinion amongst 
Australian economists and policy-makers during the 1930s as vindication of its 
own consistent support for expansion. 26 
* Keynes had published his influential How to Pay for the War early in 1940. 
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Paradoxically, Labor's responsiveness to the policy themes of 'advanced' 
economic opinion stood in contrast to the party's old-fashioned view of the way 
in which the economy worked. If by the outbreak of war Labor had adopted a 
'Keynesian' policy stance, its notion of the forces behind economic expansion and 
contraction was at least as close to the quantity theory tradition as it was to 
Keynesianism. Not only did most Labor politicians believe that the level of 
output was proportionate to the supply of money, but they saw monetary 
instability as the ultimate source of booms and depressions.. As Holloway put it 
in a speech in 1940: 
Money is merely a medium of exchange. It is a bridge between 
production and consumption. It is the means by which people are able to 
purchase the goods they need ••• Much of the trouble in the world today 
is due to the fact of the pole representing production having little 
relation to the pole representing consumption. The bridge has broken 
down. 27 
Chifley on Monetary Policy 
Chifley was to become the most influential figure on economic policy matters 
within the Labor ministries of 1941-9. His reputation within the party on 
economic matters stemmed in significant measure from his membership of the 
Royal Commission on Banking, and from the dissenting report he submitted as 
commissioner. It is, nevertheless, difficult to pin down Chifley's views as 
precisely as those of some of his colleagues. He was cautious in his public 
pronouncements and not given to statements about his broad macroeconomic 
philosophy even to the same extent as, say, Curtin. This was exemplified in his 
relative silence in Parliament during the period from his re-election in 1939 
through to his assumption of the treasurership in 1941. 
Chifley was first elected to Parliament in 1928, and the experience of the Scullin 
years made a deep impression on his economic outlook. He was a strong 
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supporter of the Theodore plan. Like others, he saw the Depression as the 
outcome of the 'restriction of credit', and believed that a measured dose of 
reflation was appropriate to promote recovery. He was, consequently, opposed 
to the gold standard, and saw easier money for industry as the principal modus 
operandi of monetary expansion. For this reason he was, like Theodore, 
somewhat ambivalent about deficits at this time. 28 It was perhaps partly for 
this reason that, unlike Curtin and so many others, he supported the Scullin 
Government over the Premiers' Plan. 
Between 1931 and 1939 Chifley was out of Parliament, although active in the 
anti-Lang official NSW branch of the ALP. His 1937 dissenting report as royal 
commissioner was a notable document, in which he presented a vigorous and 
cogent argument for bank nationalisation and other related reforms to the 
structure of the banking system. These will be discussed further below. Here, 
however, we consider Chifley's views on the aims and principles of monetary 
policy, as evident in his dissenting report and, more particularly, in exchanges 
with witnesses appearing before the Commission. 
Chifley left little doubt about his inclination to view matters from what he 
called the 'point of view of the borrower'. 29 He devoted much of his energy on 
the Commission to exposing the extent of the banking oligopoly, and to proposing 
a range of measures for breaking down that oligopoly. 30 He advocated the 
maintenance of a cheap money policy even if this required interest rate controls. 
'In my opinion', he wrote in his dissenting report, 'every effort should be made to 
keep interest rates low, even if legislation is necessary for this purpose'. 31 His 
principal concern here was distributive justice - that is, the thoroughly 
traditional belief that 'when you increase the interest rates, you give benefits to 
those who have money to lend, and impose a burden upon the producing section 
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of the community, such as primary producers'. 32 This was coupled with the 
usual concern about public borrowing, and with a particular fear of the 
consequences for government and private borrowers of high interest rates and 
debt levels during periods of deflation. 33 
Chifley took the cheap money argument one step further. In expressly rejecting 
the use of higher interest rates as a means of monetary restraint, he declared a 
preference for relying upon credit rationing. As he wrote in his dissenting 
report: 
I disagree with the contention often made that the raising of interest 
rates is a suitable or effective method of checking undesirable 
expansion. In my opinion, this end can better be achieved by restricting 
the volume of advances. 34 
This type of view was one which gained considerable international support during 
the 1930s from economists, some of whom had started to link it to notions of 
structural planning of the economy through selective credit policy. Chifley, 
however, evinced no awareness of, or interest in, such planning ideas. 
Distributive justice remained the essence of his approach: 
••• an increase in interest means that those who have money to lend, and 
who really do not take the same risks as persons actually producing 
things, have their incomes increased ••• And the man who is actually 
producing things - such as a primary producer - finds himself, perhaps, 
without any benefit, and loaded with a heavier burden of debt... It 
struck me that it would be a much more effective thing to say: 'We will 
lend no more', in an effort to check what might be regarded as undue 
expansion, than to say: 'For the purpose of checking this expansion, we 
are going to put onto the man who is actually producing things a greater 
load than he was carrying before'. 35 
Chifley's evident lack of interest in the planning potential of credit rationing did 
not preclude a strong interest in a better credit deal for the small businessman, 
farmer and would-be home owner. The existence of gaps in lending facilities in 
these areas was a topic to which he returned repeatedly in questioning witnesses. 
On this point too there was evidence of mainstream influences reinforcing 
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Chifley's traditional Labor attitudes. The MacMillan report in Britain had, 
amongst other things, focussed on structural gaps in the capital market, 
particularly in relation to finance for new and small enterprises - a point to 
which Chifley referred. 36 
Views of this kind were, of course, more a form of consumer advocacy than a 
macroeconomic philosophy. Crisp has suggested that Chi fley adopted a 
Keynesian macroeconomic philosophy as a result of his experience on the 
Commission. The message of the newly-published General Theory, he suggests, 
was conveyed to the Commission by a number of witnesses (he refers to 
G.L. Wood, E.R. Walker and Sir Herbert Gepp), and it was as a result of this 
exposure that Chifley became a 'Keynesian-of-the-first-hour'. 37 
Crisp's interpretation is, however, questionable. Only two witnesses - John 
Gifford and Ronald Walker - presented Keynesian views to the Commission. * 
Walker's evidence was fairly technical, while Gifford gave a more accessible and 
vigorously expansionist presentation. Gifford strongly attcked the doctrine of 
'boom control' through the use of high interest rates (see Chapter Four), and it 
may well be that this evidence bolstered Chifley's cheap money views. Beyond 
this, however, there is little evidence that Chifley absorbed much of the 
Keynesian conceptual framework. By contrast to either Curtin or Theodore, 
Chifley's grasp of economics appears weak and his capacity to absorb theory 
fairly limited. 38 
* Walker's colleague and collaborator, R.C. Mills, was, of course, a 
commissioner. Walker and Mills' Money (1935) drew extensively on Keynes' view 
up to that time. 
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Chifley gave the impression, in his questioning of Walker, Gifford and others, of 
taking for granted the traditional equation of money supply and demand, and the 
consequent emphasis on the assurance of an adequate money supply. His 
principal concerns appeared to be, on the one hand, to garner statements of 
support for the Depression treasury-bill monetary expansion 39 and, on the 
other, to probe the issue of the appropriate limits to monetary expansion. It was 
with the Commonwealth Bank Governor, Sir Ernest Riddle, that he first took up 
the question of at what point during the process of reflating the economy, if at 
all, there was a need for 'restriction of credit' before 'the unemployed were 
absorbed into industry'. 40 When Gifford appeared before the Commission, 
Chifley asked him about the 'necessity ••• for the issue of £30,000,000 of treasury 
bills' in 1930. He then sought to establish with Gifford the point that for the 
purposes of counteracting a Depression the 'only way' the banks could 'keep 
interest low by continuing to make advances would be by the creation of credits, 
and not by borrowing or accepting in the form of deposits the money they were 
to advance'. 41 When Ronald Walker appeared before the Commission two 
months later (in July 1936), Chifley took up the same point: 
Chifley: What I put to you is that may there not be times when such an 
issue, assuming we call it new money, is desirable in the interests of the 
community. 
Walker: Undoubtedly. 
Chifley: That is what I put to you, that if that was done in a time of 
already rising prices and in some period of boom, probably it could have 
very disastrous effects, but in a time when prices are falling and 
unemployment is growing, when there is a general depression, and it is 
necessary for some form of stimulation, it might be necessary to bring in 
some amount of new money, if you call it such, and the amount could 
only be judged on the circumstances. 
Walker: Yes. I can conceive of circumstances in which it would be 
essential to remedy the position. 42 
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Walker's evidence did not, however, entirely support the thrust of Chifley's 
questioning, because it was in this context that Walker emphasised that demand 
stimulus need not require monetary expansion. When Ch if ley asked about the 
desirability during Depressions of financing 'public works by loans from the 
Commonwealth Bank free of interest', Walker made quite clear his preference, 
on business confidence grounds, for borrowing rather than monetary expansion: 
In those circumstances, so long as private employers would regard such a 
policy as unsound, it [i.e. monetary expansion] would be unwise, because 
if, on the one hand, you are trying to carry on public works to accelerate 
consumer demand and, on the other hand, private employers generally 
think that the Government is flying off the rails, you will not ~t the 
recovery in private employment which you had hoped to produce. 43 
It would have been entirely understandable if the non-economists on the 
Commission, including Chifley, failed to get any coherent sense of Keynes' 
message from the evidence presented to them. In addition to the presentations 
from Walker and Gifford, they had Keynes and the General Theory quoted at 
them repeatedly by both Gessellite and Social Credit witnesses, in support of 
their respective doctrines. 44 Even more strikingly, G.L. Wood, at that time 
acting Professor of Commerce at Melbourne University (and later a fully-fledged 
Keynesian) gave the Commission a confused account of the General Theory 
which focussed on Keynes' argument about the need for a long-run decline in 
interest rate to match the long-run decline in the marginal efficiency of capital. 
Wood (mis)represented this argument as: 
the conclusion reached by Mr J.M. Keynes that industry will function 
quite as efficiently, that the entrepreneur will perform his part 
satisfactorily and that the necessary corrective will be effectively 
applied to the faults of the existing system by a gradually falling rate of 
interest. 
Indeed, Keynes' views were even cited by Wood in support of the proposition 
that: 
••• the productive mechanism has outstripped the distributive mechanism 
in efficiency. The design of the engineer is distorted and his productive 
purpose frustrated by inefficiency in the management of credit ••• He 
cannot see why his ability to multiply capital should not be accompanied 
134 
by a similar enlargement of human capacity to enjoy the products of 
capital. The nexus between them is the banking system. To that 
challenge there is no answer except that the community lacks the 
courage and the competence to take charge of the controls ••• The 
benefits of modern productiveness are not being passed on with 
sufficient rapidity or in sufficient volume to the consumer. 45 
Wood's evidence could have only confirmed any impression which might have 
existed that Keynes had, in the General Theory, provided support for the broad 
arguments of Gesell and Douglas. 
Chifley was, as was mentioned earlier, relatively reticent in his pronouncements 
on economic matters. There is little or no evidence of his developing views on 
macroeconomic issues in the years after the Royal Commission delivered its 
report. The most clear-cut views he expressed as a commissioner concerned, 
moreover, the organisation of the banking system and the appropriate techniques 
of monetary control. We turn now to a discussion of Labor attitudes to these 
issues. 
The Institutions of Banking and Monetary Control 
Labor's approach to the reform of the banking and monetary system was moulded 
by the two different perspectives which shaped the party's view of the objectives 
which should be encompassed by reform. On the one hand, there was the 'micro' 
focus on consumer needs. Insofar as Labor saw banking as simply another basic 
service to the producer which if left to the market would inevitably be the 
subject of oligopolistic private control, the choice of mode of public intervention 
was the same as that for other 'basic' services. Insofar, on the other hand, as 
there was a recognition that at the 'macro' level there was something special 
about the service provided by banking - something which necessitated the 
regulation and limitation of the provision of credit according to broader 
economic principles - a different perspective on the choice of mode of 
intervention was required. 
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The choice was, broadly, a threefold one: nationalisation, competitive public 
enterprise, or regulation of the terms on which the service was provided by 
private oligopolists. It was overwhelmingly from the consumer or 'micro' 
standpoint that early Labor viewed this choice. This can be seen, at one level, in 
the typical coupling of insurance with banking as suitable candidates for state 
enterprise or nationalisation. 46 It can also be seen in the great emphasis on the 
potential role of government banks in cheap lending to producers and home 
buyers. The monetary control angle did, nevertheless, figure in Labor plans, in 
terms of the widely-felt need to take control of the creation of money out of 
private hands. The initial focus here was, as we have seen, the note issue. From 
the outset, the federal platform of the party envisaged that control over the 
note issue would be exercised by the Commonwealth Bank. In the upshot, Fisher 
placed control of the 'nationalised' note issue in the hands of a separate note 
issue board, on the Ricardian model. 
Regulation of interest rates charged by private financial institutions was, from 
the earliest days, a common feature of State and federal ALP platforms. The 
principal emphasis of party policy was, however, direct public participation in 
the market, and debate was largely focussed on the relative merits of 
nationalisation and competitive public enterprise. It was more in the Australian 
tradition to seek to resolve problems of private monopoly through government 
participation in the market rather than through regulation. 47 Even apart from 
such general considerations, however, Labor's concern with a better service to 
borrowers was not really susceptible to a comprehensive regulatory solution. 
Labor believed that the banks not only charged too much on their loans, but that 
they discriminated unreasonably in decisions on loan applications. 
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Controlling interest rates through regulation was perhaps easy enough, but it was 
quite a different matter to seek to regulate to ensure that credit-worthy 
borrowers received reasonable consideration. 
The debate between the proponents of nationalisation and those of competitive 
public enterprise was a constant feature of party policy-making right up to the 
attempted bank nationalisation in 1947. Before World War One, the question 
was, at the federal party level and in most of the states, resolved in favour of 
the competitive model. Nationalisation nevertheless had a good deal of support. 
Support was, moreover, not confined to monetary radicals, although they were 
commonly the strongest advocates of nationalisation. Support for nationalisation 
was at this time strongest in the NSW branch, which passed pro-nationalisation 
resolutions in both 1905 and 1906. 48 
The radicalisation at the end of the first world war saw a major shift of rank and 
file opinion (as represented by state party conferences) away from competitive 
public enterprise towards support for nationalisation. The nationalisation of the 
banks became formal party policy at the federal level in 1919. 49 At that time 
and throughout the 1920s, discussion continued to be focussed substantially on 
the provision of a better service to borrowers, rather than on more effective 
monetary control. Labor did, nevertheless, start to think about central banking 
and monetary control issues. Monetary radicals were becoming more conscious 
of the 'cheque system'. More mainstream Labor figures were, at the same time, 
prompted to think about these matters by the legislation brought down in 1924 by 
the Hughes government, which gave the Commonwealth Bank some of its first 
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(limited) central banking powers. A few months after the passage of that 
legislation Theodore successfully moved a federal platform item calling for the 
'Commonwealth Bank to be developed on the lines of a Central Reserve Bank.150 
This was adopted by the party's Commonwealth Conference notwithstanding the 
continued commitment in the platform to nationalisation. 
Theodore's motion also called for the Bank 'to remain, in the matter of policy, 
free from association or agreement with the private banks'. This was a 
reference to the establishment in the 1924 legislation of a Board to determine 
Bank policy. Labor saw the Bank Board as representing private banking and 
other monopolistic interests. Over the next two decades, the party and its 
leaders consistently supported the abolition of the Board, and the 
reestablishment of control by the Bank's governor. The party's 1936 monetary 
policy statement, for example, called for 
1. The operations of the Commonwealth Bank to be removed from and 
made entirely independent of private banking interests and free 
from sectional influences or constraint. 
2. The abolition of the Commonwealth Bank Board, and the 
re-establishment of the original method of control as set up at the 
time the Commonwealth Bank was founded .•• 51 
The Depression placed the question of monetary control much higher on the 
agenda than before. As Treasurer, Theodore acted quickly to secure the 
extension of central bank powers so as to 'give the Commonwealth, in the 
interests of the people, a greater power and authority in the supply and control 
of public credit and in the control of interest rates'. 52 His Central Reserve 
Bank Bill was widely misrepresented as a step towards wild inflationary finance, 
and was 'killed' by reference to a Senate Cammi ttee. 
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The Depression experience greatly strengthened the belief that the private banks 
had to be stripped of their power over the price and availability of credit. Labor 
also came to believe that the monetary authorities should, at least in respect of 
the broad thrust of policy, be made accountable to parliament and the 
government. This view stemmed from the bitter confrontation which had 
occured between the Scullin Government and the Commonwealth Bank Board 
under its chairman, Sir Robert Gibson. 
The strength of Labor's commitment to strong, politically accountable control of 
the monetary system was apparent long before the 1937 Report of the Royal 
Commission on Banking. Curtin had as early as 1931 declared his commitment to 
'the control of the monetary policy by this Parliament'. 53 He maintained this 
position consistently: in 1936, for example, he launched a vigorous attack on the 
Lyons administration for allowing the Bank Board to 'usurp' the constitutional 
duty of the government to determine monetary policy. (He was referring to the 
section of the Constitution which gave the Commonwealth government explicit 
power over banking and money). 54 When serving as a royal commissioner, 
Chifley revealed a similar concern both with the lack of accountability to 
government of the Bank Board, and with the fact that 'as it stands now, the 
trading banks can expand or contract credit ••• to a fair extent without the 
Commonwealth Bank being able to control them'. 55 
The Depression also rekindled party controversy about regulation and public 
participation. Anti-bank feelings had grown to fever pitch, and rank-and-file 
support for nationalisation had intensified considerably. While many of the 
strongest supporters of nationalisation were monetary radicals, there were some 
very notable mainstream conversions to the cause of nationalisation. 
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One significant convert to the cause of nationalisation was Theodore, who in 
1933 delivered at a meeting of the N.S.W. Branch of the Economic Society of 
Australia and New Zealand a paper entitled 'Nationalisation of Credit'. Starting 
from the premise that monetary policy was central to stabilisation policy, and 
that 'much of the disastrous phenomenon spoken of as the business cycle is the 
direct outcome of the bankers' muddleheaded and defective system', Theodore 
argued that the implementation of a 'long range purposeful monetary policy rests 
absolutely upon central unitary control of currency and banking'. 'In existing 
circumstances', he suggested, 'there can be no possibility of disinterested 
leadership and no effective co-ordination in the interests of the public'. 
Nationalisation was 'the only practicable solution'. The co-ordination demanded 
by monetary policy meant that the banking industry had to be run on a 
monopolistic basis even under an ideal institutional arrangement. 56 Banking 
could therefore best be considered as one of the 'essential public services' which, 
because of its importance to the community and natural monopoly 
characteristics, could not be left to be 'exploited for profit-making by private 
enterprise'. 
Theodore proposed that a 'National Credit Commission' should be created to 
regulate the money supply and interest rates within the context of a nationalised 
banking system. Commissioners would be appointed 'for a term concurrent with 
the life of Parliament, in order to leave untrammelled an incoming Government 
whose mandate may necessitate a change in monetary policy'. 57 This proposal 
(which was an extension of the Ricardo's proposal for the control of the note 
issue) was not original. The 1933 Commonwealth Conference of the party had 
been presented by its Banking, Finance and Insurance Committee with a similar 
proposal for the establishment of a 'Commonwealth Credit Board', which would 
control 'the creation of credit'. The proposal had been rejected by the 
Conference. 58 Three years later, as we have seen, party policy was amended to 
140 
call for the establishment of a 'National Credit Advisory Authority' which would 
'collaborate with the Government and the [Commonwealth] Bank to plan the 
investment of national credit and thus utilise to the fullest extent the real 
wealth of Australia'. 59 This was a policy which Curtin, as party leader, took 
seriously, and emphasised during the election campaigns of 1937 and 1940. 
Theodore's views may have had a significant impact on Chifley. According to 
Crisp, Chifley maintained close contact with Theodore in the years following the 
fall of the Scullin government (both were important figures in the anti-Lang 
official NSW branch of the ALP, although Theodore ceased to play an active role 
after a time). 60 Chifley's dissenting remarks as royal commissioner were 
strikingly reminiscent of Theodore's earlier contribution. 'Any action - good or 
bad - by a banking system', he wrote, 'affects almost every phase of national 
life': 
Private banking systems make the community the victim of every wave 
of optimism or pessimism that surges through the minds of financial 
speculators. 
Like Theodore, Chifley saw the problem as flowing not so much from 
conspiratorial manipulation by the banks, as from the profit imperative itself. 
Because private banks 'cannot for long continue a policy adversely affecting 
their profits', their behaviour was inherently destabilising. As 
'semi-monopolistic public utilities', the private banks had to be nationalised. If 
they were not nationalised, it was at least essential that 'the trading section of 
the Commonwealth Banking ••• be extended, with the ultimate aim of providing 
the whole of the services now rendered by private trading banks'. 61 
Notwithstanding this type of forceful support, the supporters of nationalisation 
did not command the numbers either within Caucus or at federal conferences at 
any stage during the 1930s. At the 1933 Conference, a motion to alter policy 
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to make bank nationalisation the first 'principle of action' in Labor's banking 
policy was withdrawn before the vote. 62 Although lip service was paid to the 
formal policy of nationalisation in the parliamentary party's draft monetary 
policy statement of 1936, the real focus of that document was unmistakably upon 
regulation and competitive public enterprise. When Curtin presented the draft 
to the party Conference that year, he argued for its adoption on the grounds 
that nationalisation would be too costly and that 'the alternative now to 
nationalisation was expansion of the Commonwealth Bank'. He then accepted an 
amendment which removed any mention of nationalisation from the statement. 
Although the Conference also defeated (by 20 votes to 14) a proposal to remove 
bank nationalisation altogether from the party platform itself, this had little 
practical meaning. Curtin was one of these who voted for retention of the 
plank. 63 
During the 1930s party leaders called repeatedly for the Commonwealth Bank to 
compete as vigorously as possible with the private banks, in order to provide an 
alternative source of funds to those dealt with unfairly by the private banks. 
The Commonwealth Bank had in the 1920s evolved a policy of non-competition 
with the private banks, aimed at gaining the latter's confidence in the 
disinterested stance of the Commonwealth Bank as a central bank. Labor 
strenuously objected to this policy. Typical of its strong feelings on the matter 
was the call in the 1936 monetary policy statement for the 'expansion of the 
[Commonwealth] Bank's business as a trading bank, with branches in all centres, 
in vigorous competition with private banking establishments'. Chifley grilled 
Commonwealth Bank witnesses before the Royal Commission on this matter, and 
demanded a complete reversal of the Bank's policy. 64 
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The report of the Royal Commission was of considerable value to those who 
favoured regulation over nationalisation. The Commission's report not only 
supported strengthened central banking and ultimate political control, but drew 
public attention to a range of central bank techniques which were hitherto rather 
unfamiliar. Prime amongst these techniques was the 'special deposit' (what later 
came to be called the SRO). As a royal commissioner, Chifley took a 
considerable interest in issues such as the respective merits of fixed and variable 
special deposit requirements. 65 During the late 1930s Curtin and other senior 
Labor figures made considerable use of the Commission report in their calls for 
tougher central bank regulation of the monetary system. 66 
The gap between the supporters of nationalisation and the supporters of 
regulation was not, however, as enormous as might superficially have appeared. 
Even Lazzarini described the Royal Commission's proposals as 'a beginning' 
(while stressing, of course, their inadequacy). 67 * Labor continued to see the 
issue of monetary control in terms of the limitation or abolition of private 
money creation. In the early years of the 1939-45 war, Labor greatly feared 
that there would be a repetition of the World War I experience of large-scale 
private bank money creation for war loans. The party therefore argued not only 
that the 'national credit' should be used to the optimal degree to finance the war, 
but that this monetary expansion should be carried out exclusively by the 
government bank. The concern here was the long-time Labor fear of monetary 
'pyramiding'. In the absence of government action, Commonwealth Bank 
monetary expansion would increase the deposits and cash reserves of the private 
banks, and form the basis of a 'secondary' credit expansion by the banks. 
* A number of caucus monetary radicals participated in the widespread 
misinterpretation (see Chapter Two) of S.504 of the report as an invitation to 
government to make free use of central bank 'loans'. See Clark in CPD, vol.158, 
25 November 1938, p.2147, and Eddie Ward in vol.183, 21 June 1945, p.3491. 
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It was from this perspective that Labor viewed the special accounts 
recommendations of the Royal Commission. If special account requirements 
were set to match and absorb completely the growth in the reserves of the 
private banks, 'secondary' credit expansion would, it was thought, be avoided 
altogether. Such an approach was tantamount to the incremental application of 
the 100% reserve principle. Labor apparently believed that this was precisely 
what the Royal Commission had advocated, despite the fact that special 
accounts requirements would normally be much less than 100 percent. 
Scullin was a prime advocate of this approach. He repeatedly stressed in 
1939-40 the view that monetary expansion should be carried out 'by the 
Commonwealth Bank .•• to the exclusion of the private banks'. 68 'The private 
banks have too much freedom in the creation of money', he told Parliament in 
June 1939: 
We must ensure that the credit the Commonwealth Bank creates will not 
be used by the private banks to create more credits and more profits for 
themselves... Credit belongs not to the banks, but to the individual or 
the community. 69 
Scullin attributed this approach specifically to the Royal Commission: 
The [Royal] commission recommended that the trading banks should be 
obliged by law to maintain with the central bank a fixed percentage of 
their liabilities to the public. This, as the commission pointed out, would 
strengthen the Commonwealth Bank's control of the trading bank's credit 
policy. It would stop this business of the private banks taking advantage 
of a regulated measure of credit expansion by the Commonwealth Bank 
and turning it to their own profit by building a superstructure of credit 
upon it .•• 70 
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Scullin's view was representative of Labor's leadership. Throughout 1941, Labor 
maintained pressure on the Government for action on the monetary front, both 
to ensure the full utilisation of the 'national credit', and to freeze out the private 
banks through the use of deposit requirements with the central bank. These 
proposals were raised both in parliament and in the Advisory War Council (a 
consultative body with senior representation from both government and 
opposition). 71 It is indicative of the intensity of Labor advocacy that the 
Commonwealth Bank even prepared a series of answers to 'Possible Questions by 
the Advisory War Council', which included specific and detailed rebuttals of the 
propositions, firstly, that credit expansion could be reserved exclusively for the 
Commonwealth Bank and, secondly, that deposit requirements could be increased 
to prevent 'secondary' credit inflation. 72 
In the budget speech in September 1941, Fadden (Prime Minister and Treasurer 
at the time) succumbed to Labor pressure and announced an agreement with the 
banks. The agreement provided for special deposits with the central bank, as 
well as controls over the banks' profits and advance and investment policies. 73 
Attacking the agreement and calling for firm legislative controls during the 
parliamentary debate which brought down the UAP government, Curtin strongly 
reiterated the theme Scullin had put forward earlier: 
••• one fundamental objection which we take to this budget is that it 
places the national credit at the disposal of the Commonwealth 
Government in such a way as to permit a third party [i.e. the banks] to 
make a profit out of it. We submit that nothing requires doing in respect 
of the management of national credit which the Commonwealth Bank 
itself is not entirely competent to do. 74 
Following his leader in the debate and reiterating Curtin's arguments, Labor's 
deputy leader, Frank Forde, told Parliament that 'only a Labor Government will 
implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Monetary and 
Banking Systems in order to control the operations of the private banks.' 75 
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This is precisely what Labor did. Within a few weeks of taking office after the 
defeat of the Fadden government, Chifley brought down Labor's revised budget 
and announced that: 
The Government intends to implement immediately certain 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Monetary and Banking 
System for the purpose of bringing the operations of the trading banks 
under effective control ••• These powers will be exercised to prevent 
expansion of credit b~ trading banks, arising out of the increased funds 
due to war activities. 76 
Responding to the Opposition's attacks on the Government's proposal, Chifley 
attacked the record of UAP administration: 
All that the previous governments did was to expand credit to some 
degree. The expanded credit flowed out to the public and it came back 
over the counter to the private banks ••• [the banks] loaned back to the 
Government a substantial amount of the money which the Government 
itself had created out of the resources of the community, charging a 
certain rate of interest. The Government had to pay the same rate of 
interest for the loan of money created by itself as it paid to ordinary 
private investors ••• The Government, led by the leader of the 
Opposition said: 'Let us see what we can do to stop this scandal'. I point 
out that it did not act until this matter became a public scandal. 77 
In November 1941, the new Labor government enacted regulations giving force 
to its budget commitment. 
Other Influences: Underconsumptionism and Social Credit 
The monetary preoccupations of the ALP did not preclude the marginal influence 
of other economic ideas and doctrines. One such was underconsumptionism. The 
underconsumptionist theme most frequently raised in party forums was the 
notion that technological innovation was a major cause of unemployment. The 
view that 'owing to the improved methods generally in production, the world's 
capacity to produce ••• [has] outpaced the present powers of consumption of the 
general community' (as Forgan Smith put it to the 1930 Commonwealth 
Conference of the party) was one which both Scullin and Curtin endorsed during 
their respective terms as party leader. 78 
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Underconsumptionist arguments had their most notable impact, however, in 
discussions about wages. There was intense pressure from business, economists 
and others at the height of the Depression for wage reductions - pressure which 
culminated in the Commonwealth Arbitration Court's decision in January 1931 to 
reduce the basic wage by 10 percent. Scullin and his ministers attacked this 
wage reduction on the Hobsonian grounds that wage cuts would simply worsen 
the position by reducing consumer purchasing power. Theodore specifically 
referred to Hobson in making this point, and Scullin told the 1930 party 
conference that 'reduction of wages, from the economic viewpoint, was 
unsound'. 79 Monetary radicals also employed this argument. * 
The underconsumptionist theme was even carried through into positive policy 
proposals on occasions. Scullin, for example, argued in October 1934 in favour of 
productivity adjustment of wages to ensure that any gap between production and 
purchasing power was closed. He also advocated redistributive tax and social 
security policies. 'We could definitely stimulate industry and increase the 
purchasing power of the people by at once restoring the pensions and social 
services that were previously provided in Australia', he argued. This was because 
'there will be a raising of the standards of people who, through economic 
circumstances, must spend every penny that they receive'. 80 
As interesting as these themes may be, their influence within the ALP was 
distinctly secondary. Few of those who employed the Hobsonian argument 
against wage cuts doubted that monetary strictures were the most important 
* Frank Lock, the monetary radical who was invited to address the 
1930 Conference, told delegates that the 'lowering of wages ••• was not the cure, 
because if wages were lowered the buying power of the community was lowered 
also'. ALP Official Report ... , 1930, p.27. 
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source of periodic demand deficiency and depression within capitalist economies. 
Labor argued against wage cuts on the grounds that they would exacerbate the 
monetary crisis. (This was, as we have seen, the line of argument presented by 
R.F. Irvine.) Scullin, in the speech just referred to, focussed on the 'money 
masters' as the source of the slump, and give pride of place to credit expansion 
in the three-part policy proposal. 81 
What about the influence of Douglasite Social Credit ideas on the ALP? Baiba 
Berzins has described the rise of Social Credit in Australia from obscurity in the 
1920s to a brief period of significant popular support in the period 1930-4. 
According to Berzins, a significant fringe of the ALP flirted with Social Credit 
in the 1930s, particularly in Tasmania. Nevertheless, she concludes, 'few 
members of the ALP were convinced of the soundness of the Douglas Credit 
scheme; those who were became Douglas Crediters'. 82 
Berzins also points to the similarity of the rhetoric and themes of the ALP and 
Douglas Credit. As we have seen, this similarity reflected the derivation of 
many Social Credit themes from the much older anti-commodity money tradition 
which particularly dominated the 'monetary radical' wing of the party. The 
common ground here included a commitment to the abolition of interest, support 
for the provision of interest-free public and private loans on good security, and a 
commitment to the public control of money creation. This common ground is 
sufficient to explain the initial sympathy felt by some within the ALP for the 
Social Credit movement. 
There is, however, no evidence that more specifically Douglasite themes (such as 
the 'Just Price' and the 'National Dividend') were ever a significant influence on 
the ALP. 83 Peter Love has suggested that Labor's adoption of the proposal for 
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a National Credit Advisory Authority at its 1936 Commonwealth Conference was 
a 'gesture' to the Douglasites 84, but this appears dubious. Douglasite calls for a 
National Credit Authority were, as we have seen, not in the least original. There 
was a· long anti-commodity money tradition of proposing such authorities to 
control money creation. Typical of this was Frank Lock's 1919 call for a Board 
of Commissioners with power to control the note issue and to 'lend legal tender 
to any amount of approved security'. 85 The notion of an authority to control 
credit was simply an extension of this theme to cover deposit money as well as 
notes. None of the national Labor debate in the early 1930s on the establishment 
of a national credit authority embraced the merest hint of the Douglas concept 
that such an authority should be charged also with the distribution of the 
National Dividend. 
Viewed from this perspective, the pattern identified by Berzins in Labor's 
response to Social Credit in the early 1930s gains greater coherence. Initially, 
according to Berzins, many of Labor's monetary radicals focussed on the 
'common ground' with Douglas Credit. Later, however, the Douglas Crediters 
were represented 'as making opportunistic use of traditional Labor Party 
ideas'. 86 It is probable, indeed, that at a senior level at least, Labor monetary 
radicals not only had little time for any of the more idiosyncratic Douglasite 
themes, but were by the late 1930s positively hostile to Social Credit. Labor 
reacted angrily to the formation of a Douglas Credit party in 1934. At an 
ideological level, moreover, there were features of Douglas Credit which would 
have been repugnant to Labor monetary radicals - in particular, the 
anti-collectivist, right-wing tone of Douglas' writings. 
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PART TWO 
Cl-IAPTER SIX 
THE POST-WAR ECONOMIC POLICY DEBATE 
Planning for Peace? 
Towards the end of the second world war, there was a rising tide of 
international opinion favouring a highly interventionist approach to economic 
policy and a vigorous reforming drive in social policy. The war experience 
was critically important in creating this interventionist mood. In Australia, 
as in Britain and a number of other countries, state intervention during the 
war had extended into virtually every aspect of economic life. 'We have', 
wrote the British economist Lionel Robbins at the end of the war, 'lived 
through a period in which the operation of price and the price system has 
been, to a large extent, 1 suspended.' Reform-minded politicians and 
economists saw war-time economic planning as resoundingly successful, in 
social as well as military terms. In consequence, state intervention received 
an unprecedented legitimation. Even in Australia, where government had 
historically played a particularly extensive role in the economic process (at 
least by contrast to other English-speaking democracies), there was a 
pronounced growth in interventionist sentiment. 
As the war drew to a close, there were calls for the application of war-time 
planning principles to the peace-time economy. The issue, as many saw it, 
was whether the clear potential of planning for social improvement was to 
be exploited: 
In the fires of the war we have fashioned a system of economic 
regulation by which we have built and maintained a gigantic 
machine and at the same time protected our people from want 
and insecurity... ~e we to plan for peace as we have planned 
for victory in war? 
The call for peacetime planning was controversial. Debate about planning 
was, moreover, inevitably intertwined with the issue of full employment 
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policy. What was at stake was nothing less than the principles which would 
govern relations between business and government in the post-war world. 
Market Forces and Planning 
The pre-eminent policy concern of economists at the end of the war was 
macroeconomic stability. Economists' views about macroeconomic policy 
were, however, related to their views about the economic behaviour of firms 
and individuals at a disaggregated level. Macroeconomic and microeconomic 
problems were, in other words, inevitably linked. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, orthodox economics had 
painstakingly constructed an elaborate model of pure competition based on 
the 'rational economic man'. This model was viewed both as a reasonable 
approximation of the workings of capitalism and as a touchstone to guide 
policy-makers in identifying and dealing with 'imperfections'. Economists 
generally believed that competitive capitalism could, with only limited state 
intervention, be relied upon to efficiently produce what people wanted most, 
and to do so on the basis of voluntary and non-coercive market transactions 
between economic agents. 
The relevance of this model began to be seriously questioned in the 1930s. A 
number of economists, including Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson, 
developed new theoretical models of oligopolistic behaviour and 'monopolistic 
competition'. By the 1940s, the competitive model was under unprecedented 
challenge. In Australia, most prominent economists had come to believe that 
'with the growing instability of the economic system and the increasing 
power of monopolistic influences,' the 'implicit assumptions' of the classical 
competitive model had 'ceased to be valid'.3 As G.L. Wood wrote in 1943, 
'concentration of economic power has compelled economists to re-examine 
the evolution of the modern industrial economy, and to consider critically the 
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disappearance of economic freedom, of what is loosely known as perfect 
competition.A A natural corollary of this new view of the structure of the 
economy was a heightened awareness of the ingrained inequalities of 
bargaining power in market systems. 5 
The traditional model was also coming under fire on other grounds. 
Keynesians argued that it had failed to recognise that the world was an 
inherently uncertain place, in which economic agents were called upon 
continually to make choices on the basis of limited and inadequate 
information. Uncertainty, the Keynesians contended, made speculation 
pervasive, particularly in financial markets. Uncertainty was also one of the 
key reasons that business investment decisions were so strongly influenced by 
the state of confidence and business psychology in general. 
'Market failures' of these sorts created interrelated microeconomic and 
macroeconomic problems. Speculation and uncertainty was, for example, a 
fundamental source of both macroeconomic instability and of sectoral 
over-investment during booms. Monopoly aggravated income maldistribution 
while weakening the market pressures for efficiency, growth and innovation. 
Monopolistic wage and price setting raised special difficulties for the 
maintenance of full employment. 6 
In part, these problems had to be tackled at the microeconomic level. There 
was wide agreement on the importance of government action to restrain 
monopolistic power. Few economists thought, however, in terms of a 
'restoration' of the competitive model. Most viewed such a venture as 
impracticable, and perhaps even undesirable. 7 It was thought that government 
would need to play a continuing role in the market-place to counterbalance, 
rather than eliminate, monopolistic power. This would be achieved 
principally through regulatory mechanisms. Public enterprise would, however, 
also play a role. There was for this reason a good deal of support amongst 
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Australian economists for the public takeover of further 'natural monopolies' 
and for the participation of 'competitive public enterprise' in oligopolistic 
industries. 
Suspicion of 'market forces' was, then, pervasive amongst economists in 
Australia and elsewhere, and can be seen as the defining characteristic of a 
broad 'interventionist' school of opinion which included even many economists 
who were not 'planners'. There were considerable differences of opinion 
within this broad 'interventionist' camp about how far allocative action by 
the state should go. There was, however, general agreement that the world 
had moved a long way from the traditional competitive model, and that it 
could no longer be assumed that government action aimed at influencing 
what businesses produced was generally undesirable. 
Social Priorities and Planning 
The war planning model was a distinctive one. It was, first and foremost, 
aimed at changing the composition of production. The scope of this 
allocative planning was virtually unprecedented. 8 It is useful here to 
distinguish between allocative policies which are 12uq~osive in the sense of 
being motivated by the belief that society (or some section of it) will 
benefit through a changed pattern of consumption of final goods and services, 
and those which are instrumental in the sense of being directed to some 
other end. Governments commonly intervene to adjust consumption patterns 
purposively through the public supply of a range of 'social wage' goods (parks, 
hospitals, public housing, etc.) and, to a lesser extent, through policies 
designed to alter consumption of some privately-marketed goods (anti-drug 
laws, tobacco taxes, subsidies for private health insurance, etc.). A wide 
range of other allocative policies are, like tariff protection and the provision 
of economic infrastructure, aimed at other goals (such as the promotion of 
economic activity and the reduction of economic risk9 rather than at 
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changing consumption patterns per se.10 
In countries like Australia and Britain, purposive allocative intervention was 
in the pre-war period considerably more limited than it was to become in 
the post-war era. During the war, however, governments exercised an 
unprecedented degree of influence over the types of the final goods and 
services which were produced. Private decision-making was overridden by 
centrally-determined 'social priorities'. Production was directed away from 
civilian needs to war 'consumption', and the remaining civilian production was 
focussed upon the essential needs of the community. 'Consumer sovereignty' 
was extensively modified and constrained through the use of subsidies, 
rationing and other techniques. The results were striking. As Copland put it 
Despite the diversion of about half of the nation's total 
economic effort to war needs, the standard of living of the 
masses of the people has, for the most part, been higher, and 
there is a greater sense oJi social security than ever before in 
the history of the country. 
War planning was remarkable not only for its aims and scope, but for its 
techniques. At least in the English-speaking capitalist world, governments 
had in the past pursued allocative objectives vis-a-vis the private sector 
largely by means of what might be called market modification.12 (Taxation 
and expenditure policies were, in other words, used to modify market signals 
so that firms found it profitable to act as government wished.) The other 
means by which government could influence private decision-making was 
constraint - that is, the use of authoritative controls or of various forms of 
13 
coercive leverage. War planning relied heavily on both market modification 
and constraint.14 Controls were applied not only to define the sorts of things 
firms might produce, but also to enforce greater efficiency in production. 
Again, the results were striking.15 
For the most enthusiastic planners, the lesson of war planning was that the 
'regulating force' of the peacetime economy should increasingly be found in 
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th I 1 f th" h . h t" f • h • I 16 e rea m o e 1cs rat er than m t e opera 10ns o a price mec amsm • 
Just as war production had been guided by purposive goals, so there was a 
need to 'find in the period after the war some dominant social purpose, 
which can provide the principles to guide the transformation of war 
controls1• 17 The most important 'social priority' was the adequate provision of 
a range of basic goods and services which were crucial to the living 
standards of the people. For many planners this meant not only items such 
as health services and housing, but also a wide range of other products such 
as food, furniture, clothing and energy. All of these were marketable goods 
and services of the sort that economists had traditionally assumed to be 
generally best left to the market. Planners believed, however, that the 
market was deficient and that there was a consequential need for 
government to play a major role in determining the supply and prices of 
basic commodities through the use of subsidies, controls, production targets 
and even government production. What they envisaged was not a system of 
Soviet-style central planning, but rather a blend of planning and the market 
mechanism. Planning would, for example, 'leave for the field of individual 
choice those parts of consumption where variety and individual taste are 
• 'f' t f I 18 more s1gm 1can actors. • 
There was a further, slightly different rationale for planning. The war-time 
success of planned rationalisation and standardised mass production led many 
planners to believe that government could directly intervene in the 
production decisions of firms to promote greater efficiency. Imperfect 
competition theory powerfully reinforced this view. Monopoly, it was 
thought, had given rise to a tendency for firms to engage in superficial 
product differentiation, with the consequence that consumers were denied the 
benefits potentially available through a full exploitation of standardised mass 
d . 19 pro uct1on. From this perspective, efficiency demanded not simply 
constraints upon uncompetitive behaviour, but continual pressure from 
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government aimed at bringing about defined changes in production technique 
and industry structure. 
How was this influence to be achieved? Prominent amongst the policy 
options were outright controls and government production. As Heinz Arndt 
suggested in 1944, 
The war-time device of utility goods may show the way towards 
economy of resources by greater standardisation, which would 
not only do away with the evil of deliberate product 
differentiation but also with the production of an excessive and 
unnecessary variety of types of the same commodity where it is 
simply as relic of small-scale production. By compulsory utility 
specification or the production of standard types in 
Government-operated plants, sold at or near cost, the state can 
reintroduce the element of price competition and thus force 
private firms to reduce selling costs ••• war-time experience 
suggests that in various spheres there is still ample scope, in 
peace conditions, for impr~tiements of efficiency by 
concentration and rationalisation. 
Another means of applying pressure to business to improve its performance 
was suggested by the war-time practice of bulk government orders for 
standard consumer items. Internationally, the influential British economist 
William Beveridge was one of the strongest advocates of the use of 
government purchasing leverage, which he referred to as 'joint consumption 
outlay'. Beveridge envisaged that, starting with an initial role in the 
provision of 'essential goods' such as food and fuel, the role of government in 
this area would expand so that 'it may, in due course, be extended over a 
wider field, with the state taking more and more of the general business of 
wholesaling'. Not all of the goods purchased in bulk by the state were, 
however, to be distributed on a free or subsidised basis. Some would simply 
be retailed on normal commercial terms. The argument was that, even 
without subsidies, the state would be able to secure through bulk contracts 
21 
more of the sorts of goods consumers wanted at prices they could afford. 
This was because, as a bulk purchaser, the state would acquire a 
22 
'counterveiling power' which would enable it to counterbalance monopoly 
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and other sources of inefficiency. Joint consumption outlay was, as 
Beveridge put it, a 'valuable method of controlling prices and monopoly 
f . ' 23 Th h . l ld b bl pro its. roug its ro e as a major purchaser, government wou e a e 
not only to modify market signals, but to exercise direct leverage over the 
private sector. 
Australian Economists and Planning 
As we have seen, Australian economists tended towards broadly 
'interventionist' views at this time. It was for this reason that Australian 
business leaders and conservative politicians indulged so often in outbursts 
against 'theorists' and 'bureaucrats'. 24 Not all Australian economists were, 
however, 'planners'. A number were conservative and hostile to planning. Not 
even all those with broadly 'interventionist' views could, moreover, be 
considered to be 'planners'. 
Post-war Australian economics had a distinctive character, which reflected 
the interplay of overseas influences and more traditionally Australian 
attitudes. Australian governments had from early times intervened actively 
to support business by modifying the market environment. Initially, they did 
so principally through the provision of economic services (infrastructure, 
etc.). Later, instruments such as the tariff also became important. The 
overall themes of state intervention in the economy were economic 
development, greater economic security and the reduction of conflict over 
income distribution. These themes reflected values which evidently 
commanded considerable broad-based community support (sufficient, in fact, 
to withstand attacks such as the Bruce Government's attempt to dismantle 
the federal arbitration system). 25 
As early as the 1920s, this outlook had had a significant impact on the 
thinking of economists, many of whom were prepared to accept the social 
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and economic value of quite substantial adjustments of market outcomes. 
Distinctively, however, these economists tended to take strong exception to 
intervention based on liaison between the state and 'sectional interests'. 
State intervention, they insisted, had to be justified by a 'careful calculation 
of costs and benefits•,26 and not simply by reference to the direct benefits 
accruing to particular sectional interests. This approach was epitomised by 
the 1929 Brigden Report which, while rejecting 'extreme applications of the 
tariff', supported moderate protection as a means to greater economic 
stability, a better distributional outcome, and the employment of the larger 
population.27 Implicit in this was a somewhat mixed and pragmatic attitude 
to market forces (and attitude which, needless to say, not all Australian 
economists shared). 
It was probably as a reflection of these sorts of attitudes that the influences 
of imperfect competition economics in the 1930s, and war planning in the 
early 1940s, fell on fertile ground in Australian economics. Support for 
arbitration, rural stabilisation schemes and moderate protectionism was 
particularly strong amongst Australian economists at the end of the war. 
There was also a pronounced awareness of the extent of private economic 
power and of the significance of inequalities in the distribution of that 
power. Government action was seen as necessary to prevent the 
'exploitation' of primary producers, workers and others when their bargaining 
power in the market was weak. It was the role of the state to prevent 
abuses of private economic power. 'The modern community', Copland wrote, 
'has no option but to seek to curb the powers of its economic barons in 
whatever class of society they may be found'. 28 This emphasis upon what 
Walker called 'the primacy of the public interest as distinct from the 
. f . 1 d t" 1 . d . •29 d"d t h interests o sect10na groups an par icu ar m ustr1es 1 no , owever, 
imply an anti-business stance. Even the more enthusiastic 'planners' 
emphasised the need for government-business cooperation and accepted that 
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much state intervention would take a supportive form. Support would, 
however, follow lines defined by the state's conception of the 'national 
interest', rather than the demands of business. 
If, then, traditionally Australian notions of the role of the state were 
compatible with the 'new' interventionism, what was the distinctive 
contribution of the latter? The greatest impact was to be seen in the 
increased emphasis placed upon the role of the state in the supply of basic 
goods to people gua consumers. By the end of the war, most economic 
commentators in Australia placed as much emphasis upon major government 
programs in areas like public housing as they did upon the need for economic 
. f 3o T . d . h.f . . .. In rastructure. his amounte to a ma1or s i t In pr1or1t1es. Planners took 
this theme even further, and canvassed the possibility that the state should 
apply social criteria to privately-marketable production. Walker, for 
example, suggested the establishment of 'production targets' for a range of 
basic necessities, and argued that consumer subsidies should have a 
l . . h d' . 31 permanent ro e In assurmg access to sue comma it1es. Coombs was 
sympathetic to the 'establishment of ••• minimum standards which would form 
the basis of production and import goals in fields of consumption essential to 
h . f h l h d ff' . I 32 Th l d t e mamtenance o ea t an e iciency • ere was a so some a vocacy 
from sections of the public service of the use of competitive public 
. d h . . . l h . 33 enterprise an t e JOint consumpt10n out ay tee mque. 
These more far-reaching proposals for planning commanded significant (albeit 
minority) support within the Australian economics profession. Implicit in 
them was the notion that the state should be prepared to deploy constraints 
of various kinds to override in some degree the traditional 'freedom' of 
business to make production decisions as it saw fit in the light of market 
circumstances. Coombs made this point explicitly when he spoke of a new 
post-war economic order in which 'decisions as to how labour, materials, 
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equipment are to be used will be made or influenced increasingly by public 
authorities rather than by individuals even though those resources and 
equipment may continue to be owned and operated by private enterprise•.34 
The suggestion that business 'freedom' should be overridden in the interests 
of allocative policy was a highly controversial one. It went well beyond the 
pre-war Australian practice of what Butlin et al have referred to as 
'intervention to alter the composition of industry by enhancing prospects in 
the domestic market and not ••• in the detailed conduct of business•. 35 It was 
at this point that more planning-oriented economists like Coombs parted 
company with those of their more mainstream (if still broadly 
'interventionist') colleagues like Copland who firmly resisted the permanent 
deployment of techniques of 'detailed control1• 36 This difference of opinion 
did not concern the relevance of planning and controls during the transition 
period. Most contemporary economists (including many conservative 
economists) strongly endorsed the extensive use of controls during the 
37 
reconstruction phase. It was largely for this reason that, in Australia, the 
somewhat anti-planning Treasury was ·strongly in accord with the more 
interventionist-minded Commonwealth Bank and the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction about the need for new constitutional powers to facilitate 
. . l l . 38 proper trans1 t10na p annmg. 
The success of detailed war-time planning in directly modifying industry 
structures and production techniques to improve efficiency nevertheless 
influenced the thinking even of economists who were not prepared to accept 
full-blown peacetime planning. There was at the end of the war intense 
concern amongst Australian economists about the need to improve industrial 
efficiency and productivity. Great emphasis was placed upon both the 
development of efficient new industries and the expansion of manufactured 
exports. There was, as a result, considerable support for increased provision 
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of technical and management assistance to business, for government 
enterprise to fill 'gaps' in the industry structure which the private sector was 
unwilling to fill, and for the development of a tariff structure consistent 
with rational, selective industry development.39 
Keynesian Economics and Planning 
In Australia, as in Britain and America, Keynesianism had by the end of the 
war firmly asserted its dominance within the economics profession. As 
elsewhere, 'one of the most important results of the Second World War for 
economics lay in the recruitment of economists into the machinery of 
40 government'. Douglas Copland's case exemplified the conversion of the 
older generation of economists to the 'new economics'. As economic advisor 
to Curtin from 1941, Copland made a strongly Keynesian contribution to 
official reconstruction planning. His 1944-45 Harvard lectures, published as 
The Road To Full Employment, were an explicit statement of Keynesian 
analysis and policy. Another significant convert was Leslie Melville. In two 
important articles on 'The Theory of Interest', published in 1938, Melville 
announced his critic al acceptance of central themes of Keynesian analysis. 
Further articles in the Economic Record in 1942 and 1946 attested to a 
more fully-fledged conversion to a Keynesian policy stance.41 
Melville's conversion was representative of a general change of outlook 
amongst Commonwealth Bank officials. Other key economic policy 
institutions were also affected. The Department of Post-War Reconstruction, 
headed by H.C. Coombs, was both impeccably Keynesian and pro-planning. 42 
Even the Treasury fell in with the times. While there was room for doubt 
about the extent to which the then Secretary of the Department, Stuart 
McF arlane, understood or cared for the 'new economics', those who provided 
the effective leadership in formulating the Treasury's position on 
macroeconomic issues (Frederick Wheeler was the most notable during this 
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period) were unmistakable Keynesians. 
Keynesians viewed the preservation of high and stable levels of employment 
and output as the central challenge of economic policy. Inflationary dangers 
did receive considerable attention, particularly in the context of wages and 
prices policy. The threat of inflation was, nevertheless, commonly regarded 
as more easily amenable to policy redress than the threat of unemployment. 
The view of J.M. Garland, one of Melville's colleagues at the Commonwealth 
Bank, was representative here: 
New policies, like old houses, often harbour bogies. Of these, 
inflation is the most fearsome •••• It was the same kind of fear, 
it may be observed, which so long prevented the mediaeval 
mariners from venturing across the oceans. The danger in this 
case, of course, may not be altogether imaginary; but it could 
be avoided without any breathless feats of navigation. 
Moreover, inflation does not begin until unemployment ends. 
And the task of achieving full employment, in its final stages, 
might very well prove to be not unlike that of Sisyphus, who 
ceaselessly pushed43he stone to the top of the hill only to see 
it roll back again. · 
There were major debates amongst economists about the appropriate content 
of a Keynesian stabilisation program. Debate focussed, in particular, on the 
extent and form of the state intervention which would be required to 
underpin stabilisation policy. Planning-minded economists favoured an 
aggressive stabilisation policy. They believed that government should aim not 
merely to dampen the cyclical oscillations of the economy, but to eliminate 
these oscillations altogether. They defined 'full' employment in terms which 
appeared at the time to be very bold indeed, and argued that slight excess 
demand pressure on the economy was desirable. 
stipulated 3% as the maximum tolerance level 
Beveridge, for example, 
44 for unemployment. In 
Australia, Coombs spoke of a 'slight but persistent shortage of labour1, 45 
while Melville thought that the economy should be kept in a 'constant state 
of mild inflation1• 46 This strategy was, of course, designed to minimise 
'frictional' unemployment. It would, however, also place additional pressure 
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on wages and prices, and increase the need for government controls to keep 
the lid on inflation. 
There was an additional and even more important link between the debates 
on planning and macroeconomic policy. This stemmed from the connection 
between investment planning and 'Keynesian' monetary policy. Economic 
opinion had, in the 1930s, come to favour a policy of low and stable interest 
rates, and to reject the previously influential notion that interest rate 
variations should be used as a counter-cyclical weapon (see Chapter Three). 
But this created a problem. If interest rate policy was to be passive, how 
would it be possible for the authorities to prevent private investment 
expanding too far in a boom? More generally, what means could be 
employed to manage the pace at which various credit-dependent activities 
proceeded? Clearly, general fiscal contraction was too blunt an instrument. 
What, then, was the alternative? 
Many economists thought that the answer lay in a selective credit policy -
that is, in selective credit rationing designed to encourage or discourage 
particular activities. As the British monetary economist R.S. Sayers wrote in 
1948, 
•.• the decline in the importance of quantitative [monetary] 
control has been paralleled by a rise (perhaps I should say, a 
revival) of the notion of qualitative control or selective control 
of credit. The basic argument for a selective credit policy is 
that while a low stable interest rate provides a favourable 
working background for capital development, the economy is still 
liable to run off the rails more easily in some directions than in 
others, and that the central bank should use financial controls 
t~ c~eck 47 the unhealthy developments in these particular 
d1rect1ons. 
There was considerable debate amongst economists about the extent to which 
selective credit controls would be needed. Planners, as might be expected, 
placed particular emphasis upon these or other forms of investment controls. 
They believed, firstly, that macroeconomic stability could be enhanced by 
measures designed to directly promote better sectoral balance in the 
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economy. The reasoning was that sectoral over-investment in booms was a 
major factor leading to slumps. 
There was also a second and related macroeconomic rationale for the active 
deployment of investment 'planning'. This was closely related to the 
commitment of planners to the maintenance of a particularly high and stable 
level of employment. Although there was wide agreement amongst 
economists that 'compensatory' fiscal policy adjustments were an essential 
feature of macroeconomic policy, there was also an awareness of the 
limitations of such a policy. Even with the best information base, it seemed 
unlikely that government would be able to detect slumps in volatile 
categories of private demand and adjust its fiscal stance sufficiently quickly 
to altogether forestall the contractionary effects on the economy of such 
'exogenous' volatility. Policy makers therefore had either to accept the 
inevitability of some measure of economic instability, or search for further 
means by which this residual instability could be conquered. Some planners 
believed that one of the means by which fluctuations could be effectively 
eliminated was a suppressed-inflation strategy. Government could, through 
cheap money and other policies, encourage private investment to the point 
where investment plans were usually somewhat in excess of the level which 
the economy could accommodate. Controls would then be used to weed out 
less worthwhile investment proposals and limit actual investment expenditure 
(private and public) to acceptable levels. As Melville put it: 
Under this stimulus, private 
authorities, and public utility 
planning a greater volume of 
resources would make possible. 
limited to deciding w.llich of 
greatest social priority. 
investors, governments, local 
undertakings, might always be 
investment than the available 
The problem would therefore be 
the various proposals had the 
This strategy would, it was thought, provide a buffer so that any drop-off in 
investment enthusiasm would not be immediately translated into a decline in 
investment expenditure (see Chapters Seven and Eight). 
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These arguments were controversial. There was, at the end of the war, 
considerable uncertainty amongst economists about just how far 
macroeconomic policy would in normal times rely upon controls. Giblin 
observed that 'it is probable that there will always be some control over 
investment, but just how much will remain cannot be decided now, but after 
we have had some experience in peace•.49 The macroeconomic rationale for 
planning was, however, important because it drew support for planning from 
many economists who were apparently not greatly interested in planning an 
allocative grounds. Melville was a good case in point. 
At the other end of the spectrum were conservative economists who believed 
that the planners were setting overly ambitious goals for macroeconomic 
policy, and that the economic and social cost of the controls which would be 
required was too high. As we will see, these objections were shared even by 
some economists who were broadly 'interventionist' in their attitudes. 
The Threat of Stagnation 
Volatility in investment and other components of demand was not the only 
issue exercising the minds of economists at this time. Concern about the 
underlying investment impetus - that is the stagnation issue - remained 
almost as pronounced as it had been in the 1930s (see Chapter Three). 
Throughout the world, many economists believed that, in the absence of state 
intervention, the medium-term prognosis for private investment was 
unfavourable. The prospect was one of chronic unemployment due to a 
secular trend for investment plans to fall below the level which would be 
required to absorb the savings generated at full employment. Early drafts of 
the Australian White Paper of Full Employment, for example, identified as 
one of the key macroeconomic problems the 'persistent tendency for private 
investment to fall short of the level necessary to ensure maximum 
d . '50 pro uct10n. 
- 171 -
This implied a need for state action to counter the threat of stagnation. 
More than anything else, it was this which provided the stabilisation policy 
rationale for the widely accepted policy of more vigorous income 
redistribution aimed at permanently raising the propensity to consume (and 
thus at reducing the volume of savings which would need to find investment 
outlets). As the moderately interventionist economist Garland put it: 
The argument must be conceded that, as [capital] accumulations 
continue, and marginal net products decrease, the case for 
present consumption becomes stronger. Possibly, indeed, general 
approval would be given to the maxim that an economy, in the 
course of its development, should steadily increase the relative 
amount of its consumption, changirs<1 if necessary from a 
high-savings to a low-savings economy. 
It was to this theme that Beveridge was referring when he wrote that in 'the 
newer teachings of the economists, as exemplified by J.M. Keynes, moral and 
technical considerations unite in favour of substantially greater equality of 
52 
wealth [and income] than has obtained ••• in the past'. 
Redistribution was not the only policy which might be adopted in the face of 
declining private investment. Cheap money policies were also inspired partly 
by a desire to provide a long-run stimulus to investment. This rationale for 
cheap money influenced thinking within the Commonwealth Bank at this time 
(see Chapter Eight). An increasing level of public expenditure was another 
means of offsetting the deterioration of private investment. There was in 
Australia considerable support for the view that (as Melville put it) 'if we 
are to eliminate unemployment, we must expect the range of government 
activities to extend steadily at the expense of private enterprise•.53 Copland 
developed this theme in The Road To Full Employment, where he expressly 
attacked the view that 'private enterprise can give long-term full 
employment of resources': 
Briefly, the argument is ••• that the goods in which investment 
will return dividends to private enterprise are becoming a 
smaller and smaller proportion of total goods that can be 
produced with the modern technical equipment ••• The reduction 
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in the frontier of investment has been accompanied by a 
complementary movement in the level of savings ••• the volume 
of savings is increasing ••• The rate of investment must in these 
circumstances be increased; this has not been done by private 
enterprise and must be ~fidertaken by the state for the benefit 
of the whole community. 
Here again we see the strong link between stabilisation policy and calls for 
more active allocative intervention by the state. 
There were, however, differing views about the likely severity of the 
stagnation problem. At the gloomy end of the spectrum, there were those 
who (following Alvin Hansen and others) feared that stagnation would set in 
quickly and severely after an initial short post-war boom. Some of these 
'pessimists' even held doubts about whether the measures necessary to combat 
stagnation would be compatible with the continuation of a capitalist 
55 0 h . t h t l . . t· 56 I 1943 economy. t er econom1s s were somew a ess pess1m1s 1c. n a 
internal Treasury memorandum, for example, Keynes forecast an initial 
post-war phase of bouyant investment lasting up to five years, to be followed 
by a transitional phase lasting perhaps five or ten years and then by a period 
'when investment demand is so far saturated that it cannot be brought up to 
the indicated level of savings without embarking upon wasteful and 
· I 57 unnecessary enterprises. 
In Australia, the milder form of the stagnation thesis exercised a 
considerable influence. It also had its critics. 
Conservatism and the Interventionist Threat 
It was, unmistakably, the interventionists who took the initiative in the 
public debate in Britain and Australia on the shape of the post-war economic 
order. Interventionist analyses and policy prescriptions triggered sharp 
reactions in a number of quarters. Traditionally-minded economists saw 
'planning' as a profound threat to the welfare and efficiency maximising 
functions of markets. 
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The reaction from business and the conservative political parties was 
particularly strong. Conservatives were worried about the extent to which 
redistributive measures might be taken in the post-war world. They objected 
to the imposition of far-reaching controls and other 'artificial' restrictions on 
business 'freedom'. They were fearful that the private sector would be 
'crowded out' by government both in the capital markets and in the 
competition for labour and materials. They were also apprehensive about 
socialisation and 'unfair' competition from new public enterprises. 
At a more general level, conservatives feared the redistribution of power 
which could follow from the changed macroeconomic environment. Full 
employment itself ran 'the risk of destroying labour discipline' because it 
removed 'the fear of dismissal1• 58 The ultra-full employment envisaged by the 
planners was, therefore, almost certain to result in a decided shift of power 
from management to labour. Full employment also threatened to redistribute 
power from business to the state. Business power, as Michal Kalecki pointed 
out, had traditionally been founded partly on the doctrine of business 
confidence, according to which the 'confidence' and 'initiative' of businessmen 
were the prime determinants of prosperity. The idea that the state could 
manage demand so as to ensure full employment, even in the face of 
flagging business confidence, represented a challenge to that doctrine.59 The 
unease which this inspired is exemplified by Menzies' vigorous attack on 'the 
belief that employment and unemployment can be created by 
governments •.• that all that a government has to do is to turn the handle of 
the monetary machine, or something of the kind, and employment will 
result'. The reality, according to the opposition leader, was that the 'driving 
force' of activity 'will be the man of business, not the learned clerk in the 
reconstruction department'. 60 
This pointed to another, closely-related conservative preoccupation. Whose 
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interests was the state to serve? More precisely, what weighting was it to 
give to the interests of various classes and groups? Conservatives feared 
that the interventionist definition of 'national interest' was one which would 
severely undermine the close historical liaison between business and 
government. The state was, in short, seen as potentially becoming far too 
autonomous and threatening. 
Conservative ideologists responded to the interventionist threat with a range 
of themes drawn from classical liberal ideology and laissez-faire doctrine. It 
was argued that, because it threatened 'freedom of enterprise' and 'consumer 
sovereignty', planning was a threat to political freedom itself. The model of 
government as a neutral 'umpire' presiding over the economy was invoked. It 
was also argued that an 'excessive' degree of equality and social security 
would destroy economic growth and erode living standards. 
These themes were powerful ideological weapons in the debate about the 
appropriate shape of the emerging post-war order, and they quickly became 
the stock-in-trade of conservative political rhetoric in Australia and 
elsewhere. Not all conservatives saw them, however, as a sufficient response 
to the interventionist challenge. Classical liberal rhetoric provided no 
acknowledgement of the rising tide of social reform. Nor did it come to 
grips with interventionist claims that macroeconomic stability could only be 
achieved through policies which included planning and controls. These 
interventionist claims represented a profound challenge to conservatism. 
Were interventionist arguments to prevail, a new conventional wisdom would 
be established based on the presumption of incompatibility between the 
national interest (including the enlightened interests of business itself) and 
the narrowly-conceived 'class' interest of business. Capital faced the 
prospect of finding itself tarred with the sort of ideological illegitimacy 
which had traditionally been reserved for organised labour. 61 
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There were, understandably, many conservatives who were inclined to throw 
out the baby with the bath water, and to assert that the price of social 
reform and full employment was simply too high. For others, the task was 
one of, firstly, moderating expectations of reform and, secondly, arguing 
against the adoption of certain instruments and strategies of economic 
management which they believed would unacceptably compromise market 
efficiency or business freedom. This problem could not be resolved simply 
by embracing Keynesianism, because there was at this time no cut and dried 
'Keynesian' policy model. Conservative economists and business spokesmen 
were faced with the task of defining a palatable Keynesian strategy which 
was as free as possible of interventionist excesses. Without such a strategy 
conservative politics would continue to find itself caught in an intractable 
ideological dilemma. 
Economists and the Defence of the Market 
The economists whose views had most impact upon the thinking of Australian 
conservatives were mainly British rather than Australian. Hayek (not British, 
but certainly an Anglophile) was the most prominent of them. Others 
included John Jewkes, Lionel Robbins and R.G. Hawtrey, each of whom 
penned during the forties strong and widely read attacks on the 
interventionist position. 
Fundamental to these critiques of interventionism was a highly traditional 
defence of consumer sovereignty and of the allocative role of 'free' 
markets. Jewkes' view is representative: 
the principle of social priorities carries with it the most 
dangerous implications ••• By and large, the best person to 
decide th?w his income can best be spent is that person 
himself. 
This defence of market forces was, however, no crude apologia for business 
interests. Market-oriented economists tended to condemn not only 
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interference with consumer choice, but also protection and similar devices. 
Hayek, for example, vigorously attacked policies which were aimed at 
insulating industries from the impact of unfavourable market readjustments. 63 
'Free market' economists took a quite different view of the nature of 
capitalism than did their interventionist counterparts. They regarded 
interventionist views about the pervasiveness and inevitability of monopoly as 
wildly exaggerated.64 By contrast, they believed firmly in the viability of 
capitalism as a 'competitive order'. They also stressed the importance of 
active government measures to remove 'imperfections' and enforce 
competitive norms. 
Although they were uncompromising in their insistence upon consumer 
sovereignty and the role of the market in the supply of private goods, 
conservative economists were somewhat uncertain about the appropriate role 
of government in the provision of public goods. The traditional presumption 
that private choice was inherently superior to politically-mediated collective 
choice was still evident. There was, however, some recognition that (to 
quote Robbins) 'at the present time there is considerably more need for 
public goods than it has been customary to assume in the past1• 65 With the 
exception of Hayek, moreover, the critics of planning were unambiguous in 
their acceptance of moderate income redistribution. Indeed, it was often 
argued that an appropriate measure of redistribution would obviate the need 
for the sorts of consumer subsidies on basic goods which interventionists 
tended to favour. 66 
Jewkes, Robbins and most other vocal market-oriented economists were 
professed Keynesians. The prime focus of their critiques of planning was, in 
fact, the assertion that Keynesian demand management was compatible with 
the 'competitive order'. Jewkes, for example, argued that the 'principle of 
social priorities .•• is not directly relevant to the task of keeping people in 
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work'. He accused the planners of attempting to 'ignore Keynes or 
misinterpret him for their own ends'. 
Jewkes and others also thought that the objectives which the planners set- for 
macroeconomic policy (see above) were too ambitious and that their 
achievement would require the imposition of extensive controls which would 
threaten economic freedom. 67 This was a view that was shared even by some 
economists who were broadly interventionist in their views. Douglas Copland, 
for example, regarded Beveridge's 3% target for unemployment as 
'perfectionist', and commented that 
There is, I am convinced, no escape from the conclusion that 
the degree of control over wages, profits, and prices required by 
this search after perfection will impose much more far-reaching 
government regulation of ifHrustry than is compatible with the 
workings of free enterprise. 
Conservative economists tended also to ignore or dismiss the secular 
stagnation doctrine. Internationally, the stagnationist position was subject to 
telling criticism in the immediate post-war years. 69 Colin Clark was one of 
the earliest critics. Clark had be.en a strong exponent of the stagnation 
doctrine in the 1930s (see Chapter Three). He did not, however, take the 
view that stagnation would be a problem in the post-war period. Writing in 
1942, he suggested that 'from the later 1940s onwards the world's capital 
hunger will again be paramount'. The 'world would then be free, at any rate 
until the next capital-sated period is reached, of "chronic" unemployment in 
the sense that it has known it recently'. Clark envisaged a period of strong 
growth impetus lasting till the sixties or seventies. 70 This was a strikingly 
prescient view. 
The conservative economists we have been discussing shared a strong sense 
of common purpose and a common rhetoric, focussed upon the defence of 
'competition' against 'collectivism'. Hayek, whose Road To Serfdom was 
published in 1944, was a catalytic influence. Jewkes acknowledged Hayek as 
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his main source of . . . 71 msp1rat1on. Important differences of philosophy 
nevertheless underlay this unity of purpose. Hayek was a reactionary in the 
literal sense of the word, believing that there was no 'Middle Way' between 
'competition' and 'central d. . '72 1rect10n. Other anti-planners, while largely 
sharing Hayek's view of what was at stake in the battle between 'planning' 
and market forces, took a much less stark view. Most acknowledged the 
need for an expanded state role in altering market outcomes in certain 
fields. Hawtrey's view was typical: if 'competivism' was to triumph over 
'collectivism', the former had to be associated with the increased 'exercise of 
Government interference wherever positively desirable'. 73 Hayek was also one 
of a small band of economists who rejected Keynesian demand management 
prescriptions and who worked to keep alive the quantity theory tradition 
which was later to produce monetarism. 74 
Australian Conservatism and the State 
Australian conservatism drew heavily upon the ideas and rhetoric developed 
by Hayek, Jewkes and other British economists. The emphasis placed upon 
market efficiency by these economists was not, however, fully shared by 
their local admirers. The private sector was in Australia even more 
dependent upon the state for infrastructure support and market security than 
it was in Britain and the United States. This fact was reflected in a 
somewhat greater business recognition of the important role of the state in 
supporting business and economic development (see Chapter Seven). This did 
not, however, prevent continued tension between different sectors of business 
(most notably between rural and urban capital) on the appropriate form and 
scale of such state support. Nor did it eliminate ideological tension between 
laissez-faire themes of business self-reliance and more relevant notions of 
'partnership' between state and capital. 75 In addition to these tensions there 
was, moreover, conflict on the question of just how far concessions should be 
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made to the rising political demands for a 'new social order'. 
These tensions gave rise to pronounced uncertainty and publicly-exhibited 
divisions of opinion within conservative ranks in the final years of the war. 
This was exemplified in the public discussion leading up to the Curtin 
Government's 'fourteen powers' referendum of 1944. Many Country Party 
members and even a few rebel UAP politicians (like Percy Spender) were, at 
76 least initially, openly supportive of Labor's proposals. Even Menzies 
exhibited a striking ambivalence about the in principle case for extended 
Commonwealth 77 powers. These and similar conflicts were resolved by 
invoking the Labor 'socialist' threat. Despite the attention paid by many to 
the development of a more relevant form of conservatism, conservative unity 
and sense of purpose was restored in the early post-war years more around 
negative than positive themes. 
It was in consequence of these tensions that the rhetoric of Australian 
conservatism tended to somewhat downplay market efficiency themes, and to 
place particular emphasis upon the importance of initiative and enterprise for 
economic development and rising living standards. This 'initiative' theme was 
also an important element in the reassertion of the legitimacy of business 
needs and interest~ 
There was far more ambivalence about Keynesian demand management 
amongst Australian businessmen than amongst conservative economists. This 
reflected quantity theory influences (see next chapter), fears of planning and, 
more generally, the lagged assimilation of new ideas. Keynesianism had, 
however, come to stay, and there was increasing acceptance in leading 
business and conservative political circles of the need for government to 
adopt some sort of counter-cyclical demand management policy. Some 
business organisations, like the Victorian I.P .A., openly embraced 
Keynesianism and worked hard to define an acceptable counter-cyclical 
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strategy. Politicians did not, generally, take the lead in this process. 
Menzies, for example, displayed little understanding of the issues involved, 
and considerable uncertainty about the degree of 'direction and control178 
which stabilisation would require. There was, however, general conservative 
agreement on the need to dampen popular expectations about what 'full' 
employment would mean. Menzies spoke of the provision 'in substance' of 
full employment, and of 'the reduction or elimination of sharp variations in 
h l l l f l d d · · r 79 t e genera eve o emp oyment an tra e act1v1ty. 
Labor and Planning 
What, then, was the Labor attitude to the new interventionism in 
economics? As the war drew to a close, senior Labor ministers loudly 
extolled the virtues of 'planning for peace'. What did they understand by 
such planning? Given the presence of so many local economists within 
government at the end of the war, it was inevitable that controversies about 
the desirability and meaning of 'planning' would be translated into policy 
debates within the public service, some of which would demand ministerial 
intervention. How far did ministers comprehend the issues at stake? 
Alternatively, to what extent was their reaction determined by more 
traditional Labor attitudes? 
It is useful here briefly to review the pre-war Labor outlook. Traditionally, 
Labor had been committed to strong government support for farming and 
manufacturing. The 'new protection' nexus between tariff protection and 
arbitration-determined wage levels was an important Labor theme. Labor 
shared the Australian development ethos, and the accompanying emphasis 
upon the role of public investment in economic development. The party was 
committed to diversified industrial development and to increased economic 
security for both workers and producers. Efficiency was not a prime 
consideration, and the focus was on the immediate sectoral benefits of 
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supportive actions rather than upon any more sophisticated 'calculus' of costs 
and benefits. The goal of 'a maximum of industrial self-sufficiency•80 was 
one which had considerable party support. In relation to stabilisation policy, 
the emphasis was upon cheap money and public works. Finally, there was 
strong support for redistributive social security provision, and for government 
action to improve housing, health and similar services. 
Although Labor was strongly committed to government support for business, 
there were three key areas where it saw a need for greater constraints upon 
capital. Monopoly was one, although it will be remembered that the party 
tended to be rather more interested in public ownership than in regulatory 
solutions to the problem of monopoly control of the 'great services'. The 
'money power' (really a specific case of the problem of monopoly) was 
another. The third area was industrial relations, where Labor had a natural 
interest in bringing about improvements in the economic security of workers 
and the bargaining position of trade unions. 
The mainstream Labor tradition was not an anti-business one. It is true 
that, particularly on the left, anti-capitalist ideologies exerted a degree of 
influence. However, the party's radical wing often appeared schizophrenic 
about whether it was opposed to 'production for profit' or whether it stood 
for a particularly aggressive attack on monopolistic abuses. Being principally 
interested in the elimination of certain monopolistic abuses, the mainstream 
Labor tradition lacked the sort of ideological predisposition which might have 
made it naturally sympathetic to the deployment of extensive constraints 
upon business in general. Those within the party who were hostile to 
business per se were, moreover, little interested in regulatory solutions to 
the problems of capitalism. 
These 'traditional' Labor attitudes were, naturally, an important influence 
upon the approach of the Curtin and Chifley ministries to post-war economic 
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management. The twin themes of development and full employment led 
Labor to emphasise the importance of a vigorous post-war public investment 
program. Labor remained committed to 'the physical development of our 
country, linked with expanded production and increased population'. 81 It was 
in this context that Evatt and Chifley placed particular emphasis on the 
employment power in the 1944 'fourteen powers' referendum, so that the 
Commonwealth would not be dependent upon cooperation with the States as 
'the foundation for such a flexible public works policy as would effectively 
82 prevent mass unemployment'. Notwithstanding the failure of the 1944 
referendum, Labor tried again in 1946 to win this power at a further 
referendum, again unsuccessfully. 
Labor's continued concern for economic security was also clearly evident. 
Ministers attached considerable importance to rural stabilisation schemes, and 
the 1944 'powers' referendum contained an item which would have removed 
certain constitutional obstacles to the establishment of more comprehensive 
stabilisation schemes. On the industrial front, the Government pledged itself 
to use the proposed employment power to 'modify the unlimited right of 
arbitrary dismissal that hangs like the Sword of Damocles over nearly every 
worker throughout his industrial life'. 83 
The symbiotic relationship between the Labor ministries of the 1940s and the 
public service reflected the existence of considerable common ground on 
values and policies. The emphasis placed by interventionist economists upon 
goals such as full employment, social provision and the constraint of 
monopoly was attractive to Labor. Labor's affinity with interventionist 
economics stood in complete contrast to the ambivalence which afflicted 
conservatism. In some ways, however, this affinity was superficial. For all 
the common ground between interventionist economists and Labor politicians 
on values and policies, uniquely Labor views of the nature of the economic 
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problem remained and were manifested in a number of government actions 
which were not part of the agenda of interventionist economics. The 
attempted nationalisation of the banks in 1947 was, as we will see (Chapter 
Eight), the most spectacular example. 
Where, then, did the party stand on the question of 'planning'? There can be 
little doubt that Labor ministers were deeply impressed by the success of 
war-time economic management. Equally clearly, most had little 
compunction about 'interference' with market forces or even with the more 
systematic constraint of business freedom. Chifley, for example, told 
Parliament in 1944 that if 'regimentation' were necessary for the 
achievement of basic social goals, he would prefer it to the 'economic 
individualism that we had under the old order'. 84 It was in this vein that 
Labor pursued so vigorously the expanded constitutional powers which its 
economic advisers urged were necessary. In the banking sector, where Labor 
ideology provided a ready rationale for constraint, the controls which were 
instituted were indeed very comprehensive. Similarly, Labor ministers clearly 
understood the special need for rationing and related controls in the 
transitional period, and vigorously defended the maintenance of these 
controls. Nevertheless, these sorts of views did not necessarily imply a 
commitment to planning. The real question was whether Labor shared the 
belief of more planning-oriented economists that the state should, as a part 
of normal peacetime economic management, seek to directly and 
systematically constrain private decision-making about what was to be 
produced and how it should be produced. This sort of 'planning' had little in 
common with pre-war Labor thinking. Had Labor attitudes changed? 
There is some evidence which might superficially suggest an interest on the 
part of some Labor ministers in allocative planning. Most notably, there was 
an important set of articles on post-war reconstruction published in the 
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newspapers under Chifley's name in late 1943. These articles contrasted the 
traditional 'indirect controls' (i.e. market modification techniques) with the 
'more direct and positive controls' which would have to be used after the 
war. 'Relative profits', the article declared, 'were never a socially 
t . f t b . f h f . . . I 85 It t d l sa is ac ory as1s or a sc eme o pr10r1t1es. was no ma e c ear, 
however, whether these new techniques of control were to be a permanent 
part of economic management, or simply a feature of the reconstruction 
phase. In any event, the articles were written not by Chifley, but by the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction. It needs to be remembered that the 
detailed policy rationales put forward by ministers in public statements 
prepared by their advisers often say more about the views of those advisers 
than about ministers' own thinking. Curtin's public speeches on economic 
policy at this time bore the unmistakable imprint of his economic adviser, 
Copland, and took a quite different attitude to the question of controls -
namely that the retention of 'certain minimum controls' is 'an unfortunate 
•t I 86 necess1 y. 
During the public debate in the run-up to the 1944 'powers' referendum, 
Labor ministers were at pains to emphasise the temporary nature of most 
controls, including those which impinged upon business freedom. Investment 
controls, Evatt declared, would 'in the reconstruction period ••• probably be 
essential'.87 Dedman (who had taken over from Chifley as Minister for 
Post-War Reconstruction) looked forward to the time when 'almost every 
restrictive regulation which has been necessary in time of war will be 
relaxed or removed entirely'. The 'system of priorities' applied to industries 
such as the construction industry was, he indicated, only temporary, and 
would 'not by any means constitute the central theme of the Government's 
operations'. 88 These disclaimers were no doubt good politics. They may, 
nonetheless, also have been entirely sincere. 
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The question of detailed allocative planning arose directly in the context of 
the housing program. Officers of the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction (which had responsibility for the newly-established 
Commonwealth Housing Commission) argued strongly for a 'leading 
Commonwealth role in post-war . l. . ,89 rat10na 1Sat1on of the industry, aimed 
particularly at greater efficiency through the realisation of economies of 
scale. To this end, they urged the use of 'long-range ordering and bulk 
purchase of materials', together with large scale contracts, as a means of 
'generating irresistible pressure for rationalisation•.90 This was pure 
Beveridge. There appears, however, to have been little interest in these 
proposals on the part of Chifley or other ministers, and 'on the whole, the 
emerging Commonwealth role was likely to mean assistance rather than 
91 
regulation for the private sector'. 
There is room for doubt about the real priority attached by ministers to 
measures designed to improve the efficiency of Australian industry. Speeches 
delivered at the time by Curtin, Chifley, Dedman and other ministers were 
full of the themes so dear to the hearts of moderate protectionists of the 
'economiser' tradition. The emphasis of these statements was upon 'the 
major task of increasing competitive efficiency•,92 and upon 'creating an 
export sense'. 93 There was 'no suggestion of self-sufficiency', and 
protection was to be conditional upon industry efficiency (to be gauged in 
regular Tariff Board . ) 94 reviews • It is not possible to attempt here an 
evaluation of the extent to which these principles actually guided industry 
policy under the Labor administrations. The history of the establishment of 
complete car manufacture is, however, revealing. Labor ministers and the 
Government's Secondary Industries Commission were presented with clear 
warnings from expert advisers to the effect that adequate economies of scale 
in car production could only be achieved through 'careful planning' of range 
d l d . . 95 d h h f I l. t• f and mo e ec1s10ns, an t at t ere was a need or the centra 1sa 10n o 
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certain phases of manufacture and limitation of the number of manufacturers 
engaged therein'. 96 The Department of Trade and Customs even argued, 
principally on efficiency and local control grounds, for the establishment of a 
monopoly chassis producer as a joint venture between the Commonwealth 
(51 %) and a British manufacturer (49%).97 In the event, the Government 
completely ignored this advice. Dedman, the responsible minister, indicated 
in July 1944, that 
the Government had no intention of dictating to any company 
how it should go about its business. The motor industry was 
best qualified to decide the type of car which it should 
manufacture having regard to the market available. The 
Government's only concern was that Australian resources of 
manufacturing capacity, manpo~r and material should be used 
to the greatest extent possible. 
After the agreement with General Motors-Holden for complete car 
production, Cabinet vigorously encouraged the entry of other producers (in 
the first instance, Ford). It did so because 'under the arrangement whereby 
General Motors-Holden's Ltd alone is in the field, there is no certainty that 
the plan for local production may not be modified, thus defeating the 
Government's aim to have engines and chassis produced in Australia1• 99 
Fragmentation of the industry was, in other words, deliberately fostered as 
an indirect means of ensuring that complete car production went ahead. 
Did ministers see a role for detailed allocative planning and control as an 
instrument for the maintenance of economic stability? Had Chifley or any 
of his colleagues embraced the arguments put forward by Mel ville and others 
for selective investment controls as a technique of demand management? 
The subsequent chapters seek to cast some light on these questions. It is 
worth reiterating, however, that the closest Labor had come in the pre-war 
period to the idea of planning as an instrument of stabilisation policy was 
Chifley's acknowledgement (see Chapter Five) that monetary restraint, under 
the regime of controlled interest rates which he favoured, would require 
greater reliance upon loan rationing within the banking system. He had not, 
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apparently, seen this as an opportunity to implement a broader planning 
vision. 
All of this suggests a parallel with the experience of the post-war British 
Labour government. Writing of planning in a somewhat different context, 
Andrew Shonfield has remarked on the paradoxical failure of British Labour 
to develop out of the reconstruction planning machinery a system of 
permanent peacetime planning. 'The truth', Shonfield notes, 'is that the 
whole operation of Labor planning, when it worked at all, was directed to 
strictly short-term objectives': 
What is significant is that as soon as the pressure of particular 
shortages was removed, so the overall view of national economic 
objectives was discarded. The shortages were not, as Labour's 
political opponents angrily averred, an occasion which the 
Government had seized in order to carry out its policy of 
economic planning; they were its sole rationale and purpose. 
There is no evidence that as the controls over the distribution 
of scarce goods were progressively removed, the Government 
cast around for other means of makincq_0'01e economy move in 
the direction of its long-term objectives. 
Shonfield's words appear strikingly applicable to Australian Labor. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FISCAL POLICY FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT 
In pre-war Australia, 'expansionary' policy meant cheap money and public 
works. Public works policy was almost universally understood to refer to 
compensatory increases in works activity to maintain demand in the face of 
any fall in private demand. At the end of the war, this tendency to think 
of fiscal stimulus solely in terms of compensatory public works remained 
characteristic of the popular debate. Compensatory public works were the 
centrepiece of government preparations against the threat of a post-war 
depression. Plans were drawn up on an intergovernmental basis for a £200m 
'reservoir of works completely planned in detail which will give sufficient 
flexibility in magnitude, diversity of character and location to facilitate the 
stabilisation of early post-war economic conditions'. These contingency plans 
were approved by the National Works Council in August, and their importance 
was constantly and publicly emphasised by leading government . . 1 ministers. 
There was considerable business support for the National Works Council and, 
more generally, for a policy under which 'the state prepares in advance and 
grades its public works to enable the volume of public investment to be 
adjusted dexterously to fluctuations in private investment1• 2 
Notwithstanding this measure of consensus, there was vigorous debate at the 
end of the war about the principles of fiscal policy. Even amongst those 
who supported a compensatory public works strategy, there were major 
differences of opinion about the way in which such a strategy should be 
formulated. In addition, some sections of the economics profession expressed 
serious reservations about reliance upon a compensatory policy, and proposed 
alternative approaches. The debates which arose on these matters were 
highly ideological, in that the protagonists were concerned not only about the 
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best means to full employment, but also about the broader social implications 
of the various strategies which presented themselves. 
There was, in this debate, general agreement that the principal threats to 
short-run stability lay in the volatility of private investment expenditure and 
export demand. Some economists also suggested, as we have seen (Chapter 
Six), that there was a further, long-term problem with private investment. 
The stagnationist diagnosis did not, however, have any impact on the wider 
popular debate, which was focussed firmly on short-term stabilisation issues. 
At both a technical and a popular level, a great and perhaps disproportionate 
degree of attention was focussed on investment volatility. This was perhaps 
because, while fluctuating export demand was a more serious problem for 
Australia, there was somewhat less controversy about the sorts of policy 
measures which could be taken to deal directly with export instability.3 
Fiscal policy proper was only part of the response of governments to the 
problem of maintaining demand and activity. Monetary policy also was to 
play a role in stabilisation policy, albeit a passive one. Although interest 
rates were to be kept broadly stable, the volume of credit would be adjusted 
so as to exert some stabilising influence upon private investment. The role 
of monetary policy is discussed in the next chapter. As has already been 
mentioned, the possible use of selective monetary policy as a planning 
instrument was a matter of particular controversy. 
In addition to monetary policy, a variety of other non-fiscal policy 
instruments assumed. considerable importance. Strong emphasis was, for 
example, placed upon the stabilisation of export income flows. Rural 
stabilisation schemes played a role here. The desire to reduce destabilising 
export fluctuations also led the Australian Government to press vigorously at 
a diplomatic level for an international agreement on full employment, under 
which signatories (particularly the Americans) would be duty bound to prevent 
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slumps in their domestic economies which could destabilise their trading 
partners. At the same time, the Government placed considerable emphasis 
on building up Australia's foreign exchange reserves so that, if there were an 
international recession, Australia would be able to maintain a high level of 
domestic activity with less fear of the balance of payments deficit which a 
stimulatory fiscal policy would imply.4 
It was in this framework that fiscal stabilisation policy was debated at the 
end of the war. Australian economists drew heavily on British thinking in 
discussing fiscal policy, as they did on other issues. The influence of British 
ideas was particularly marked amongst those most sympathetic to planning. 
The terms in which the fiscal policy debate was conducted were in some 
ways rather crude by contrast to the more refined fiscal policy models which 
were developed in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Fiscal Policy and the Balance between Public and Private Expenditure 
The proposed use of public expenditure for demand management inevitably 
resurrected, in a new form, debate about the proper balance between public 
and private sectors. The notion of a temporary increase in public investment 
to fill a short-run gap in private demand was relatively uncontroversial. The 
expansion of the public sector would be temporary and compensatory, so that 
no question of 'crowding out' could arise. What, however, would happen when 
private investment plans were on the upswing? How far should and would 
the government be prepared to reduce its own activity to provide greater 
scope for private investment activity? 
The issue here was how far a counter-cyclical public works policy should be 
accommodatory as well as compensatory. This was a question of degree. At 
one end of the spectrum of opinion was the extreme accommodatory position, 
as exemplified in an address given by an employer's spokesman, Richard 
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Thompson, at a 1945 Economics Society Conference on full employment 
policy. Thompson distinguished between the 'normal' range of public 
activities and the counter-cyclical 'reserve' and argued that the normal or 
base level of public expenditure should be determined by the small 
government principles of traditional liberalism, namely that 
Employment by the government must be restricted to absolutely 
necessary administration, and to the relatively few services and 
other activities that might c~nservatively be regarded as the 
proper function of government. 
Another statement of the accommodatory position is to be found in the 
Victorian Institute of Public Affairs' Investment in the Changeover from War 
to Peace - Public or Private? (1945). The I.P.A. urged that fiscal policy 
embrace what it referred to as the 'classic' theory of counter-cyclical public 
works, which was 
based broadly on the conception that when private investment is 
low, public investment should be high, and conversely, when 
private investment is high, public investment should be low. 
This stance directly reflected the I.P.A.'s fear of crowding out. The 
implication of the Government's investment plans was, it suggested, that 'free 
enterprise, from being a central fact of the Australian economy in the 
pre-war years, will be reduced after the war to a position of secondary 
importance'. The I.P.A. view was, nevertheless, less extreme than 
Thompson's. 'This doctrine,' it declared, 'does not necessarily exclude the 
desirability of a basic minimum below which public investment should not be 
allowed to go ••• 16 
Internationally, this 'classic' theory of a highly accommodatory 
counter-cyclical public works strategy had many critics. In Britain, for 
example, some influential conservatives were of the view that it would be 
best to avoid or minimise reliance upon counter-cyclical public works 
expenditure, and instead to make use of counter-cyclical investment subsidies 
(through means such as special low-interest loans, tax concessions and the 
- 199 -
like). Michal Kalecki commented on these proposals at the time: 
That such a scheme should be attractive to 'business' is not 
surprising. The businessman remains the medium through which 
the intervention is conducted. If he does not feel confidence in 
the political situation he will not be bribed into investment. 
And the intervention does not involve the Government either in 
'playing with' (public~ investment or 'wasting money' on 
subsidising consumption. 
Similarly, in America some conservative Keynesians urged that 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy be limited to the operation of the automatic 
stabilisers built into the tax and social security system, without discretionary 
8 
expenditure increases or tax cuts. There would, nevertheless, appear to have 
been very little of this sort of resistance to an active counter-cyclical public 
works strategy amongst Australian conservatives, and little interest in 
schemes for the direct stabilisation of private business investment. 
It was, in fact, in the interventionist camp that the strongest critics of a 
highly accommodatory public investment strategy were to be found. 
Interventionist-minded economists viewed public investment as far too 
important to be accorded a purely balancing role. As Beveridge put it, 
'public outlay should be looked on as a weapon against giant social evils, not 
9 
as a gap-filling device to take up the slack of private outlay'. 
In Australia, Douglas Copland was one of the more vigorous critics of the 
accommodatory approach: 
I have advanced strong arguments in favour of the view that in 
all modern communities with a rising standard of living, the 
volume of public investment should in any event be maintained 
at a relatively high level ••• To assume as some do that 'public 
works' are to be considered only as a means of offsetting the 
deficiency in expenditure on other accounts is to ignore the 
fundamental position of public investment in a modern economy 
and to overlook the serious administrative difficulties of making 
big changes in the volume of public investment ••• With this 
base and the machinery available for developing and 
administering public expenditure, it would be easy to have some 
short-term plans in arrears which could be drawn upon to fill up 
the deflationary gap. In these circumstances, moreover, the gap 
itself would be smaller and the economy would be kept in 
bal_anc~ in . part _by the preve.f\)ion of an unduly strong upward 
swing in private investment ••• 
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Copland saw a large public sector as operating to directly stabilise the 
economy (a point to which we shall return). He nevertheless still saw an 
important role for compensatory public works. His approach was founded on 
the same distinction between a 'base' level of public activity and 'reserve' 
projects which underlay the views of those who favoured a highly 
accommodatory public works strategy. In rejecting the accommodatory 
approach, Copland simply favoured a high 'base' level of public expenditure 
and public investment activity. 
More planning-oriented economists took a quite different view of this 
matter. On the one hand, they strongly agreed that public investment should 
not play a purely balancing role in the economy. On the other hand, 
however, they saw little merit in the concept of a 'base' level of public 
investment. What justification was there, they asked, for allowing any 
private investment project, regardless of its social merit, priority over all 
public projects other than those which formed part of the 'base' public 
investment program. More generally, if total investment plans exceeded 
available resources, why should unsatisfactory market processes alone be 
permitted to determine which of the competing prospective private projects 
should proceed? Having asked this question, many planners concluded that 
what was needed was a process according to which the merit of all 
prospective investment projects, whether public or private, could be judged 
according to their 'social priority'. 
Beveridge was probably the most notable exponent of this 'social priorities' 
view. He proposed the creation in Britain of a National Investment Board 
(N.I.B.) which would 'plan investment, both public and private, as a whole', 'in 
accordance with the scale of priorities in a single national plan'. This it 
would do partly through the exercise of a power to 'stop or reduce by order 
11 
a proposed private investment plan'. The influence of war-time planning 
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was obvious here. In Australia, the experience of the war-time priority 
ranking of public investment projects through the National Works Council 
12 provided something of a model for the planners. • There were, in principle, 
a variety of means by which private investment projects which were deemed 
to be of low priority might be restrained or blocked - including selective 
monetary policy, capital issues controls and an investment approval system. 
In Australia, such planning raised constitutional as well as economic issues, 
particularly after the defeat of the 1944 'powers' referendum. 
This 'social priorities' approach to the restraint of excessive investment was 
clearly not one which could be expected to appeal to conservative-minded 
economists or to business. In relation to crowding out, such a policy would 
provide no guarantees about the degree of accommodation which business 
might expect. The enforcement of social priorities would, moreover, rely 
upon the extensive use of direct controls to replace market forces, with a 
corresponding reduction of business 'freedom1• 13 
Compensatory Policies: Problems and Alternatives 
Although compensatory expenditure policies dominated the popular debate, and 
still had the support of many economists, there was by this time a growing 
recognition within the profession of the practical difficulties associated with 
the counter-cyclical adjustment of public works expenditure. Would 
governments be able to recognise impending fluctuations in private demand 
quickly enough to set in train appropriate expenditure adjustments? How 
flexible was public works expenditure in practice? Was it not true that 
stop-go adjustments to the public works program would be both cumbersome 
and wasteful of resources? What about the difficulty of a counter-cyclical 
public works program based narrowly on, say, the construction sector? 
Wasn't it likely that the attempt to impart a substantial fiscal stimulus to 
the whole economy from such a narrow expenditure base would be obstructed 
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by the danger of sectoral 'overheating'? 
The validity of these concerns was amply borne out in the decades which 
followed, as a consequence of which fiscal policy was throughout the world 
progressively recast to emphasise the role of variations in tax rates rather 
than public expenditure.14 This tax-based approach to fiscal policy implied 
that aggregate demand would be maintained by compensatory changes in 
private consumption rather than public expenditure. 
Referring to the United States, Herbert Stein has noted that 'it was probably 
still true in 1945 that "compensatory fiscal policy" or fiscal policy for high 
l t l d t d t f t d•t 1. I 15 H. emp oymen was common y un ers oo o re er o expen I ure po Icy. IS 
comment probably has world-wide applicability. There were, nevertheless, a 
few economists who urged at this time that some use be made of 
compensatory tax and social security adjustments as fiscal policy 
instruments. In the drafting of the British White Paper on employment 
policy, for example, James Meade advocated that the rate of social security 
contributions should be varied counter-cyclically as a supplement (rather than 
an alternative) to expenditure policy. After some debate, Meade managed to 
win over even a reluctant Keynes to this suggestion, which was incorporated 
16 into the final version of the White Paper. In America, while 'for many of 
the leading advocates of an active fiscal policy, revenue variation remained a 
barely recognised stepsister of spending', there were exceptions. One was 
the conservative Keynesian economist Beardsley Ruml. Ruml's success in 
winning business support for a tax-oriented compensatory policy undoubtedly 
reflected the attraction of a fiscal policy strategy which did not give rise to 
h d f d. t 17 t e anger o crow mg ou • 
In Australia, however, there would seem to have been even less interest in 
the compensatory adjustment of private consumption through tax-based fiscal 
policy than there was in Britain and America. The option is scarcely 
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mentioned in the public pronouncements of economists on post-war full 
employment policy. It is particularly significant that there was at this time 
no sign of an emerging conservative lobby favouring tax-based fiscal policy 
over public works on ideological grounds. The most notable contemporary 
business statement on fiscal policy - the Victorian I.P .A.'s Looking Forward -
not only strongly emphasised compensatory public works, but in fact made no 
. f 1. l . . 18 ment10n whatsoever o counter-eye tea tax var1at1on. While the N.S. W. 
!.P.A. did make favourable reference to the tax-based proposals of the British 
White Paper in its statement Stability and Progress, it too placed prime 
emphasis upon 'contra-cyclical public construction schemes and public 
purchases of industrial equipment1• 19 
Interventionist economists were instinctively opposed to tax-based fiscal 
policy. The notion of compensatory boosts to private consumption had little 
appeal to economists for whom the promotion of public sector expenditure 
was a fundamental article of faith. Beveridge, for example, explicitly 
considered and rejected the tax-based policy option, on the grounds that it 
would 'leave giant social evils entrenched' and that, more generally, 'planned 
20 
outlay is to be preferred to unplanned outlay'. 
Interventionist economists were by no means unaware of the potential 
difficulties of a compensatory public works strategy. Unlike more 
conservative Keynesians, however, they sought to develop public sector 
solutions to these difficulties. Two broad themes were put forward. The 
first emphasised the role of a large public sector as what would today be 
called an 'automatic stabiliser'. The incorporation into the public sector of a 
substantial portion of total demand would, it was suggested, reduce the 
adverse 'multiplier' repercussions upon the rest of the economy of an initial 
drop in export demand or in private investment. As a result, the economy 
as a whole would become intrinsically more stable. The second theme, 
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stressed at least by interventionists who believed that there was some merit 
in compensatory policies, was that the more diverse and broad-based were 
the expenditures (particularly capital expenditures) of government and its 
agencies, the more it would be possible to target compensatory expenditure 
increases directly at those regions and capital goods industries most directly 
and immediately affected by fall-offs in private investment. 
Closely related to these themes, which concerned the problem of short-run 
demand fluctuations, was the influential view that a large and growing public 
expenditure sector was essential if long-term stagnation was to be staved 
off. This latter view, as we have seen (Chapter Six), enjoyed wide currency 
in interventionist circles. 21 
It was from these perspectives that moderate interventionists stressed the 
importance for stability of substantial, growing and diverse collective goods 
expenditure. Public 'investment' on social and economic infrastructure, 
current expenditure on health and other public services, and perhaps even 
'joint consumption outlay' assumed importance in this context. As has been 
mentioned above, Copland was one who emphasised the role of a 'high level' 
of public investment as a means of directly promoting stability and reducing 
the 'gaps' in demand which compensatory expenditure would be required to 
fill. The same theme was developed by Keynes himself in a 1943 
memorandum: 
If two-thirds or three-quarters of total investment is carried out 
or can be influenced by public or semi-public bodies, a long 
term programme of a stable character should be capable of 
reducing the potential range of fluctuations to much narrower 
limits than formerly, when a smaller volume of investment was 
under public control and when even this part tended to follow, 
rather than correct, fluctuations of investment in the strictly 
private sector of the economy ••• The main task should be to 
prevent large fluctuations by a stable long-term programme. If 
this is successful it should not be too difficult to offset small 
fluctuations by expe:fiting or retarding some items in this 
long-term programme. 
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A different, although related, position was put by Beveridge. Beveridge and 
many of his followers did not seek merely to reduce reliance upon 
compensatory policies. Rather, they sought to obviate al together the need 
for compensatory public works as a response to instability in private 
investment. 'The view that public works should be kept on tap to be 
expanded or contracted to meet fluctuations which are allowed to continue in 
private investment at home is', Beveridge declared, 'rejected'. This rejection 
of compensatory policies was based partly on practical considerations relating 
to the usual problems of flexibility and the like, and partly on rather vaguer 
ideological grounds. Beveridge would seem to have regarded 'public works 
policy' as inherently accommodatory. In any event, he dismissed 
accommodatory and compensatory approaches in the same breath. 23 
The alternative to public works was, in Beveridge's view, action to directly 
stabilise volatile types of private business investment. This was to be 
achieved partly through the restraint of excessive investment plans through 
the National Investment Board controls to which reference has already been 
made. Two other instruments of direct stabilisation were proposed as means 
of preventing slumps in business investment. One was the 'expansion of the 
public sector of business, so as to enlarge the area within which investment 
can. be stabilised directly'. The other was ·the use by the N.I.B. of low 
interest loans (or loan guarantees) and tax incentives as instruments for the 
selective stimulation of flagging private investment. 24 
The distinctiveness of this theme of direct business investment stabilisation 
was somewhat obscured in the semantics of the contemporary debate. 
Because public expenditure on durable items was referred to by convention as 
public 'investment', compensatory public works were of ten referred to as a 
policy of 'stabilising aggregate investment'. As we shall see, terminology of 
this sort did not promote clarity about the divergent strategies which were 
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being proposed for the 'stabilisation' of investment. 
In line with their emphasis on direct business investment stabilisation, 
Beveridge and his many followers in Britain and Australia saw the fiscal 
policy debate principally as a clash between two schools - the 'compensators' 
and the 'planners'. This clash was described by Gerald Firth, one of Coomb's 
subordinates at the Department of Post-War Reconstruction, at a 1945 
conference on full employment policy: 
The 'Planners' suggest that so far as possible we should attempt 
to stabilise the previously variable parts of expenditure ••• it is 
with the stability of private capital expenditure at home that 
they are particularly concerned, and it is that kind of 
expenditure which they would try to bring into the framework 
of a national plan for total investment ••• the 'Compensators' 
suggest that a more conservative approach should be followed ••• 
they lay more emphasis on the need for flexibility in pu~~c 
capital expenditure so as to offset the remaining fluctuations. 
The contrast between these schools was not, however, as great as many 
'planners' represented it to be. Both Firth and Beveridge himself 
acknowledged that compensatory expenditure policies would be required to 
deal with fluctuations in export demand, which would be hard to stabilise. 26 
The indistinctness of the dividing line between compensatory policies and the 
direct stabilisation of business investment was underlined further in the work 
of the contemporary British economist and historian, G.D.H. Cole. Cole 
argued 'the case for socialising, in one form or another, the industries and 
services which are the principal users of capital goods', so as to harness 'the 
direct power which such socialisation will give to regulate the volume of 
activity in these fields'. This would enable the state to 'constitute itself the 
arbiter of the level, and of the timing, of investment policies in these 
sectors', and would put it in a position where the private sector would be 
unable to use the veto of 'business confidence' to block stimulatory policies. 
Cole pointed to housing construction and transport as examples of industries 
suitable, on this criteria, for socialisation.27 
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Cole's approach could be viewed semantically either as one of direct 
investment stabilisation, or as a strategy of compensatory adjustments in 
public business investment. It was also significant in that it illustrated the 
cross-fertilisation of Keynesianism and socialist ideas. Cole's nationalisation 
proposals - which might be seen as the literal application of Keynes' famous 
reference to a 'somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment•28 - stood 
in marked contrast to Beveridge's reticence about socialisation. 29 
The White Paper on Full Employment 
The most extensive discussion of post-war fiscal policy options in Australia 
took place not in the public arena, but within the public service. The 
occasion was the drafting of the Australian White Paper on full employment. 
The White Paper, Full Employment in Australia, was tabled in Parliament on 
30 May 1945, by the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, John Dedman. It 
has attracted much·· attention as a statement of government policy. 
L.F. Crisp, for example, wrote , that 'the White Paper represented the 
authentic, forward-looking reformist tradition of the A.L.P.130 Others have 
d . ·1 . d t 31 passe s1m1 ar JU gemen • 
The White Paper was not, however, a statement of the views of Cabinet or 
of Labor ministers individually in any sense beyond the fact that it had been 
discussed by Cabinet and had Cabinet authorization. It was much more a 
public service document than a ministerial one, in that its principal policy 
content was the outcome of debate within the public service. (This is true 
despite the fact that there was some significant ministerial intervention, 
most importantly from Chifley himself.) The White Paper received much less 
attention in Caucus, Cabinet and Parliament than did, say, the banking 
legislation. There was no parliamentary debate at all, beyond a short tabling 
speech by Dedman. Ministers appear generally to have found the White Paper 
difficult to understand, and to have viewed it largely as a technical 
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statement of matters of detail flowing from the general principle of full 
employment. 
The drafting of the White Paper reveals a great deal about the policy 
attitudes and general dispositions of departments and individual public 
servants. In a less direct way, moreover, it reveals much about ministerial 
understanding (or lack of understanding) of the 'new economics'. On the 
public service side, the main institutional actors in the drafting process were 
Treasury and the Department of Post-War Reconstruction.* These 
departments were separated both in philosophy and in bureaucratic 
self-interest. Their officers were joined in drafting discussions by many 
others, including many of Australia's top economists. (Many economists were, 
of course, public servants at the time.) Douglas Copland, economic 
consultant to the Prime Minister, and his assistant, Richard Downing, were 
closely involved in the drafting discussions. Melville and other 
Commonwealth Bank economists were consulted at various stages. So was 
L.F. Giblin. 
Initial drafting work on the White Paper started late in 1944. In the months 
up to its tabling, it went through eight drafts (A-H). The drafting process 
involved not only interdepartmental discussions and consultations with 
economists within and outside the public service, but some direct involvement 
from ministers (especially Chifley).32 
* On the D.P.W.R. side, the principal participants in the drafting 
process were Coombs, Gerald Firth and James Nimmo (and, in 
close association, Trevor Swan). On the Treasury side, it was 
Frederick Wheeler and Stuart McF arlane. 
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Early Drafts: The Department of Post-War Reconstruction View 
The first three drafts of the White Paper were prepared exclusively within 
the Department of Post-War Reconstruction under the close direction of 
Coombs, the Department's Director-General. The D.P. W.R. drafts emphasised 
compensatory fiscal policy as the appropriate response to cyclical drops in 
private expenditure. The emphasis was upon expenditure rather than tax 
policy, and was upon compensatory public investment in particular. 'The 
Government,' D.P.W.R. declared, 'believes that public investment must be the 
33 prime instrument of expenditure policy designed to maintain employment'. 
Fiscal policy instruments aimed at bringing about counter-cyclical adjustments 
in private consumption were dismissed rather perfunctorily, on the grounds 
that taxation levels should be determined 'on long term principles' and that 
'social policy' (that is, social security payment levels) 'should not be subject 
fl t • b f h . . . t I 34 to uctua 10ns ecause o c angmg economic c1rcums ances. 
While favouring compensatory public works to stave off threatened slumps, 
the D.P.W.R. drafts were unambiguously hostile to the notion of an 
accommodatory public expenditure policy. Public investment was 'too 
important to be determined to any great extent by fluctuations in private 
investment1• 35 This view in itself placed D.P.W.R. on the interventionist side 
of the contemporary economic policy debate. The drafts went beyond this, 
however, to take up a number of planning themes, displaying at this point 
the clear influence of Beveridge. The establishment of a National Investment 
Board, with responsibility to 'recommend to the Government an appropriate 
level and balance of investment from time to time', was proposed. A 
'Cabinet Planning Office' was to be created. In addition, there were to be 
'special facilities for the provision of capital to new or expanding 
36 industrial enterprises, in accordance with the chosen investment program'. 
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There was, nevertheless, a degree of equivocation here. Draft A, prepared 
by Gerald Firth, contained an explicit declaration of the 'social priorities' 
approach to investment planning, suggesting that there was 'no clear basis for 
discrimination between public and private investment' and that 
In principle, the composition of an investment programme should 
depend upon ••. the rel a ti '37 urgency of the purposes which the 
various projects will serve. 
For whatever reason, Coombs redrafted this section in a way which weakened 
the social priorities theme. In the place of Firth's assertion of 'relative 
urgency' as the criteria for judging all investment, Coombs wrote of a public 
investment programme according to which the government would 'select first 
projects which it judges to be of greater or equal importance to those of 
. t t . ' 38 Th" . d pr1va e en erpr1se. 1s was a ma1or amen ment. The outcome of the 
initial D.P. W.R. drafting was, then, a draft which was bound to leave both 
planners and anti-planners dissatisfied. This was the case notwithstanding the 
fact that, reflecting the personal views of Coombs and other D.P. W.R. 
officers, the drafts leaned unmistakably towards the planning camp. 
Alternatives to Compensatory Public Works? 
The compensatory thrust of these early drafts was, at the outset, the subject 
of comment both within and outside the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction. One D.P.W.R. officer, Arthur Tange, commented that, while 
Coombs' approach was not accommodatory, 'the reader is left with the 
impression that this is to a large extent a public works policy after all - not 
so far from the U.K. White Paper ••• •39 
The emphasis upon compensatory public works in the D.P. W.R. drafts 
prompted some discussion of alternatives and supplementary strategies. 
There was, firstly, the option which D.P. W.R. had so hastily dismissed: that 
of compensatory tax rate adjustments. T ange made passing reference to this 
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option in his comments. Richard Downing was another who expressed 
concern at the blanket dismissal of such policies in the D.P. W.R. drafting.40 
Coombs' blunt wording was, indeed, softened marginally during later 
drafting. Draft E, for example, observed that 'private consumption 
expenditure therefore offers little scope for deliberate variation to offset 
temporary fluctuations in other types of expenditure,' but qualified this with 
a reference to the U.K. White Paper proposals and a statement that, while 
the government 'does not at present favour' such policies, they had not been 
finally rejected.41 This qualification was removed by Cabinet when it came 
42 to consider draft F of the White Paper. It would, however, appear that 
there was little disagreement, amongst those involved in the drafting 
deliberations, with the conclusion of the final document that 'private 
consumption expenditure cannot easily be varied to offset temporary 
fl . . f d" I 43 Th h . f uctuat1ons in other types o spen mg. e emp as1s o compensatory 
fiscal policy remained upon public works. 
The possibility of action to directly stabilise business investment in such a 
way as to prevent major falls in investment expenditure occurring also 
received some attention from planning-minded economists. Early in the 
drafting process, D.P. W.R. officers raised the possible role of public 
ownership. Tange referred to the problem of the 'unreliable private investor' 
and suggested that 
Perhaps the Government should participate in 44industrial 
development with a share in management - and so on. 
Another D.P.W.R. officer, L.F. Crisp, was far blunter, commenting that 
Coombs' early draft was 'very far from convincing (especially where it refers 
to appropriate limitation or stimulation of private investment ••• )'. Referring 
to G.D.H. Cole's proposals, Crisp posed a significant question: 
Should the Governments (and in particular the Commonwealth 
Government ••• ) assume more or less direct ownership over wider 
and mor45 strategic sectors of investment and enterprise than at 
present? 
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It was clear that, in his opinion, this question should be answered in the 
affirmative. 
Coombs had, in fact, made favourable mention of the potential investment 
stabilisation role of public ownership (possibly in the form of joint venture 
agreements with private interests) in his 1944 Joseph Fisher lecture.46 
Despite this, the comments of Tange and Crisp had no impact on the course 
of drafting work on the White Paper. The concept involved was, it would 
seem, even more marginal to the Australian stabilisation policy debate than 
it was to the British debate. 
The desirability of some type of action to directly stabilise business 
investment was raised subsequently by Trevor Swan at an interdepartmental 
meeting called to discuss the early D.P. W.R. draft (draft C). 47 Perhaps in 
response to Swan's comment, the next draft of the White Paper included the 
observation that 'a full employment policy must therefore include measures 
to stabilise private investment as far as possible1• 48 Nevertheless, neither this 
draft nor subsequent drafts offered any concrete suggestions as to means by 
which direct action could be taken to prevent downward fluctuations in 
private investment levels, beyond fleeting references to the possible use of 
special credit facilities49 and to the more general regulation of 'the flow of 
credit from the banking system ••• to promote stability in capital spending1• 50 
The notion of special credit facilities, which had (as we have seen) been put 
forward by Beveridge, received somewhat more attention subsequently in 
public service discussion of the establishment of an industrial bank (see 
Chapter Eight). In the White Paper, these themes were no more than 
footnotes to what remained an unmistakably compensatory approach to 
fluctuations in demand. 
On a number of occasions during the discussion of the White Paper, 
Frederick Wheeler of the Treasury drew attention to the failure of the 
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D.P. W.R. drafts to discuss some of the practical difficulties of a 
compensatory public works strategy, including the difficulty 'of forecasting 
the trend of future business activity and planning in advance the exact 
amount of public investment required1• 51 Wheeler was hostile to planning and 
fearful of crowding out of the private sector (see below). Despite this, 
neither he nor other conservative-minded Treasury officers ever sought to 
downplay the role of compensatory public works by reference to alternative 
strategies such as counter-cyclical tax adjustment. The conservatives in the 
Treasury were, however, not alone in this respect. As we have seen, leading 
sections of Australian business strongly supported compensatory public works. 
So also did the Labor Cabinet. 
Stability and a Large Public Sector 
In his early comments on the draft White Paper, Arthur T ange suggested that 
the document should contain explicit recognition of the role of a large and 
diverse public (expenditure) sector as a force for stability. This, he 
suggested, would be accomplished, firstly, by noting that it was 'all to the 
good' that in Australia 'the field of spending through Government and 
semi-Government channels, whether called "public works" or not, is wider 
than in most countries' and, secondly, through an undertaking that 'the 
Government will examine with the States the possibilities of diversifying 
public expenditures even further•. 52 The D.P. W.R. drafters responded to this 
suggestion by including in draft D the comment that 
Australia is fortunate in that the great range and diversity of 
the fields in which public investment in capital equipment and 
development is required, covering many sectors of industry and 
types of labour all over Australia, increases the ease with which 
public investment may be thrown into any gap left between 
other types of spending and the maximum production in 
conditions of full employment. Moreover, it may well be that 
the sphere of p_51~lic enterprise will increase in the future, as it 
has in the past. 
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This paragraph was modified further in draft E with the deletion of the final 
sentence. The basic theme was, however, strengthened rather than weakened 
in this draft. Under the influence of Downing, Swan and Copland, the view 
that a large and growing public sector was important for stability was put 
even more explicitly. Swan seems to have been the one who was principally 
responsible for the more interventionist tone of draft E on this matter. 54 
The draft clearly envisaged an important contribution to stability coming 
from growing public spending both on current services and on capital works. 
With reference to the role of current services such as health and education, 
it asserted that 'the stability of a gradually growing section of total 
expenditure will contribute to the stability of employment and expenditure'. 
(This formula was, incidently, maintained through to the final printed version 
of the White Paper.) Turning to public investment, the draft noted that 'the 
expansion of public capital expenditure, and its maintenance at new levels, 
will contribute significantly to the stability of total expenditure and 
55 
employment'. 
One of those who gave strong support to this line of argument was Copland, 
who put forward his own redraft, based on his dual view of public investment 
policy as embracing both compensatory variations and the stabilising influence 
of a substantial base level of expenditure: 
The long-term tendency, therefore, in all countries is for public 
investment to increase relatively to national expenditure ••• In 
the past it has too frequently been allowed to fluctuate with 
fluctuations in •.• private investment ••• the object should be to 
maintain a stable level of public investment, except where it 
may be desirable to expand it to make good deficiencies in 
other components of national expenditure, particularly in private 
investment. 
And again, more explicitly: 
••• if both public expenditure and public investment are held at 
a basic minimum, they will impart some stability to total 
expenditure and will check the influences ~6 instability in 
private investment and net overseas expenditure. 
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Stagnationist doctrine also made an appearance in relation to the role of a 
large public sector. The stagnationist view was clearly implicit in Copland's 
redraft. Firth's initial draft (draft A) of the White Paper had referred to 
the 'persistent tendency for private investment to fall short of the level 
necessary to ensure maximum production', and had emphasised the importance 
of 'developmental works to achieve maximum production despite a persistent 
tendency to under-investment1• 57 At a meeting of economists called to 
discuss draft C, Colin Clark strongly criticised this argument. 58 Despite this, 
the theme was developed even further in draft D. 59 Although explicit 
mention of the stagnation problem was finally removed (after attracting 
criticism from L.F. Giblin), it is clear that many of these associated with 
the drafting regarded the threat of stagnation as an important reason for the 
. t f l . 60 main enance o a arge private sector. 
The interventionist emphasis on a large public sector met with considerable 
opposition from Treasury officials who were concerned about crowding out 
and who, consequently, favoured an accommodatory approach to public works 
expenditure. Commenting on draft D, the Treasury representative at the 
Defence Department, W.E.(Bill) Dunk urged the need for the White Paper to 
provide 'some indication that public investment will not dominate the money 
market to the detriment of sound commercial investment'. 61 At around the 
same time, Frederick Wheeler penned a memorandum to Chifley suggesting 
that in the White Paper 'too little emphasis is placed on the role of private 
investment, and by contrast, too much on the role of public investment'. 
Wheeler also referred to likely public 'opposition' to a policy of stability 
based on high levels of public investment - opposition stemming from 'the 
public's idea of what is a proper field for public expenditure1• 62 
This issue was the subject of serious controversy, with Wheeler making 
considerable efforts to render the draft less hostile to the accommodatory 
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position he so clearly favoured. In doing so, he apparently secured a 
measure of support from Chifley himself. Referring to this controversy, 
Firth told Coombs in a memo dated 17 April 1945: 
Downing tells me that Wheeler saw the Treasurer last night, and 
told you the results of his conversation. I understand the 
Treasurer favours a purely 'compensating' approach to public 
spending poJ;~Y· Swan and I agree this should be resisted as far 
as possible. 
That the matter was indeed being hotly debated was confirmed by Swan's 
statement in a telegram to Firth the following day (18 April): 'I am all 
against compensatory approach. 
forced to'. 64 
do not think we should give way until 
Some support for the suggestion that Wheeler had won Chifley's support on 
this point is provided by the outcome of Cabinet's subsequent review of draft 
F. In this review, Swan's reference to the contribution to stability of an 
'expansion of public capital expenditure, and its maintenance at new levels' 
was deleted. This was a major alteration. A residue nevertheless remained 
of the the interventionist view: the reference to the stabilising role of 
growing expenditure on public services survived, as did the favourable 
. f h I d d" . I f bl" . . A l" 65 mention o t e great range an ivers1ty o pu 1c investment m ustra 1a. 
Despite Swan's reference to being 'against' a compensatory approach, the 
controversy with the Treasury had not really been about whether or not 
compensatory public works should form part of the government's fiscal 
stabilisation strategy. 66 The idea of direct business investment stabilisation 
as an alternative to compensatory policies had, as we have seen, received 
little support even amongst the interventionist economists involved in the 
drafting process. In any event, the notion that compensatory policies 
(whether expenditure or tax based) were dispensable would have been 
particularly untenable in a country as heavily dependent upon export demand 
(for volatile primary products) as Australia. The real issue at stake was the 
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degree of reliance upon compensatory public works. The interventionist 
argument was that sole reliance upon compensatory policies could and should 
be avoided by building up and maintaining a large public expenditure sector. 
This theme, as we have seen, was largely exorcised from the final document 
which, in consequence, had a strongly compensatory flavour. In one sense, 
however, the outcome on this matter was more of a draw than a Treasury 
victory: Wheeler and his colleagues were not able to write into the White 
Paper the accommodatory position which they so clearly would have 
preferred. 
Social Priorities and Planning 
As has already been mentioned, the issue of social priorities in investment 
was canvassed in the initial drafting within D.P. W.R. Firth's original draft 
had contained an explicit 'social priorites' statement on the question of 
investment planning. This statement had been weakened in Coombs' 
redrafting. The equivocation of the D.P. W.R. formulation was noticed 
immediately at the economists' meetings. At a meeting of 'junior' economists 
held in early March (1945), Trevor Swan and Donald Badger (of the 
Commonwealth Bank) both argued for a clear statement of the social 
priori ties approach. 'Investment policy', Badger was noted to have said, 
'should be determined entirely by social priorities - no [preference] to 
· t · t t as such1• 67 pr1va e inves men The point was taken up with evident 
enthusiasm by Firth and Nimmo, who noted in their resume of the meeting 
that in the next draft 
It should be made clear that, if expenditure on capital goods is 
to be reduced to avoid excess expenditure, restriction should not 
be concentrated on public capital expenditure. The amount and 
direction of total capital expenditure 68should be determined 
solely with reference to social priorities. 
This approach was clearly not uncongenial to Coombs. When at the 'senior' 
economists' meeting the following day Melville suggested that there should be 
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some statement about the balance between public and private sectors, 
Coombs is recorded to have "come back on 'social priorities"' in opposing the 
suggestion. 69 Draft D, accordingly, put a more explicitly 'social priorities' 
position (s.50): 
If the total investment which public authorities and private 
firms and individuals wish to undertake is greater than that for 
which resources are available in conditions of full employment, 
the Commonwealth and State Governments must, of course, 
accept the responsibility for determining which investment 
proJects,. public 75d private, are to be accorded priority in the 
nat10nal Interest. 
This immediately raised important questions about the constitutional status of 
the controls which would be necessary to implement a policy of planned 
investment priorities in peacetime. 
The redrafting of this passage became the occasion for criticism from a 
number of influential sources. It rapidly became clear that part of what lay 
behind this criticism was the conviction that the 'social priorities' formulation 
meant in practice, or would at any rate be interpreted by business as 
meaning, an 'excessive' encroachment on the private sector. On 29 March 
1945, Copland spelt out this concern in a friendly letter to Coombs in which 
he urged that the paper provide explicit assurances on the 'place of private 
enterprise in the economy'. To this end it would be necessary to 'determine 
a minimum basic level of public investment', the implication being that 
government would be willing to flexibly contract public investment down to 
that level to provide lebensraum for expanding private investment when 
necessary. 'There is,' Copland wrote, 
obviously no intention to impair the prospects of private 
enterprise seriously and this might as well be said, in fact it is 
necessa7~ for the Government to make its position clear on this 
matter. 
Copland's comments were particularly significant because they came from a 
person who, as we have seen, believed in the importance of a large and 
growing public sector for economic stability. Copland had in fact prefaced 
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his comments by telling Coombs that 'in our approach to the problem of 
employment and to the administrative questions involved, you and I are in 
closer agreement than most other people'. Notwithstanding his views on the 
public sector, Copland had always believed firmly in consensus politics and, 
in particular, in the importance of securing business support for 'sensible' 
policies. Melville took a similar view on the matter, urging in his written 
comments on draft D that the White Paper should be presented 'in such a 
way as to secure considerable support from private enterprise' (which he did 
not consider to be the case at that stage of drafting). 72 Melville's support on 
macroeconomic grounds for a degree of 'social priorities' planning was on 
record in practice and in print. 
The issues came to a head at the meeting in early April of the 'expert 
committee' to revise draft D. L.F. Giblin opened discussion on this matter 
by urging 'more stress on private investment' in the White Paper. This gave 
Wheeler, who was strongly anti-planning and committed to restraining undue 
public encroachment on the private sector, the opportunity to suggest that 
there should be a statement early iri the document on the 'government role -
private vs public spending'. A little later in the meeting, Copland reiterated 
his view (stated earlier in his letter to Coombs) that the appropriate policy 
approach was the determination of a minimum level of public investment, 
such that if this and private investment plans threatened to produce an 
excessive aggregate level of investment, private investment would be 
restricted. Subsequently, Wheeler specifically questioned the practicability of 
the priorities policy outlined in paragraph 50 of draft D (quoted above), 
prompting a discussion of capital issues and other controls (the details of 
which were, unfortunately, not recorded). 73 
The outcome of these discussions was the transformation, in the next draft, 
of the off ending paragraph into the following: 
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If private spending seems likely 
level where it may prevent the 
public capital projects, the 
Governments should seek means 
which capital projects, public 
imp_ortanj4 to the community, 
projects. 
at any time to expand to a 
completion of urgently needed 
Commonwealth and State 
by which they can determine 
and private, are the more 
and accord priority to those 
This formulation survived unchanged into the published version of the White 
75 Paper. It was, of course, a compromise. In proposing that priorities 
decisions should only be made in the event that 'urgently needed' public 
investment was threatened, it re-established the notion of a base level of 
public investment. The words 'urgently needed' implied that under normal 
peacetime circumstances any boom in private investment would be 
substantially accommodated through reductions in public investment before 
any question of priorities controls on private activity arose. 
The idea of investment planning naturally impinged not only on the relative 
size and scope of public and private sectors, but also on the scope of private 
capital to invest where it chose in pursuit of maximum profit. This was the 
nub of the controversy about 'planning' versus 'market forces', and it was 
inevitable that these issues should arise in the drafting of the White Paper. 
Even in the discussions of draft C there was some criticism of the 'planning' 
tone of the draft.76 The subsequent attack on planning came particularly 
from Treasury representatives, and was launched with vigour in the 
discussions on draft D, at a time when the D.P. W.R. 'social priorities' 
formulation had left it open to the criticism which has been discussed 
above. At the experts' meeting to revise draft D, Treasury pressed this 
more general attack on planning on two further fronts. 77 There was, firstly, 
the tone of the document. 'F .H. W. anti-planning', was the laconic note on 
part of these discussion, and it was recorded that Coombs 'agrees to avoid 
impression of overall detailed planning'. Wheeler had particularly criticised 
paragraph 53(a) of draft D as 'implying over-detailed control'. The paragraph 
was indeed very reminiscent of Beveridge: 
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The basic feature of full employment policy will be the planning 
and implementation of a general Australian programme of rising 
living standards, social security, defence and development, 
conceived on such a scale that total spending will be continually 
pressing against the physical limits of production. In this 
programme, there will be full opportunities for private and 
public enterprise ••• 
Secondly, and more concretely, Wheeler criticised the proposals for a 
National Investment Board and a Central Planning Office. He had already, in 
his memorandum to Chifley on 20 March, criticised the title C.P.O. as 
implying 'controls and regimentation'. At the experts' meeting, his 'line' was, 
however, more subtle. He pointed out that a review of departmental 
functions was underway at the time, and suggested that consideration of 
concrete administrative arrangements should be left to the more expert 
judgement of that review. Coombs backed down, insisting only that if the 
specific proposals were to be dropped there should at least be included an 
outline of the administrative rationale underlying the suggestion. Draft E, 
accordingly, contained a paragraph committing the government to make 
'appropriate arrangements ••• for this function to be carried out ... in order 
to ensure that Cabinet will continue to receive advice based on a 
comprehensive review of all aspects of the economic . . '78 s1tuat10n. 
Unfortunately for Coombs, however, this paragraph was removed by Cabinet 
when it reviewed draft F.79 (Part of the paragraph - a reference to U.K. 
thinking in this area - was removed even earlier, at Chifley's instigation, 
during the Cabinet sub-committee scrutiny of draft E. 80) 
Treasury had had a significant measure of success in toning down the 
plarining emphasis of the D.P. W.R. drafts. Its attitude here was consistent 
with that displayed elsewhere - one of ambivalence and suspicion towards 
what it saw as excessive interventionism. This is not to say that Treasury 
did not thoroughly accept the case for planning and investment controls in 
the transition from war to peace. The common denominator of Treasury 
opinion seems to have been the belief that, however much selective controls 
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might be needed at certain times for reasons of stabilisation policy, they 
should not be allowed to become the basis for any 'grand' vision of planning 
aimed at significantly supplanting the market with planned 'social priorities'. 
The White Paper and Fiscal Policy: An Overview 
The document which emerged from this complex drafting process was 
unmistakably compensatory in tone. Little remained of the twin themes of 
priorities planning and stability through a large public sector. Ronald 
Walker's 194,7 claim that the White Paper's 'main thesis most closely 
resembles that of Beveridge's Full Employment In A Free Society•81 was, 
consequently, not well grounded. Somewhat closer to the truth was Tange's 
early comment (quoted above) that the strategy proposed was 'to a large 
extent a public works policy after all - not so far from the U.K. White 
Paper'. 
The Australian document was not, however, simply a carbon-copy of its 
rather cautious, conservative British counterpart. A leading American 
Keynesian, Seymour Harris, accurately described it as the 'strongest 
statement of the Keynesian position' amongst the official government policy 
statements of the time. 82 The White Paper was clearly activist in tone. 
Moreover, despite the substantial elimination of planning themes, it had an 
unmistakable, if mild, interventionist tone. Full employment was defined in 
interventionist terms as 'a tendency towards a shortage of men instead of a 
shortage of jobs'. 83 Most notably, the White Paper's stance on public capital 
expenditure was far from accommodatory. The Paper stressed the 'urgent 
need for improving public capital assets'. 84 Business fears of crowding out 
were, moreover, hardly likely to be mollified by the declaration that 'when 
private spending is tending to expand, some reduction may be made in public 
capital spending•.85 Even though the proposition that stability depended upon 
a large public sector had largely disappeared from the text, the 
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interventionist emphasis on the social and developmental importance of high 
levels of public expenditure remained. 
The White Paper's flavour clearly owed a good deal to that fact that it was 
written for a government drawn from a party which was not only strongly 
committed to the maintenance of full employment, but which had a record 
of advocacy of counter-cyclical public works stretching back for well over a 
decade. 86 The broader climate of public opinion in Australia was, however, 
also relevant. As we have seen, not even business allowed its fears of 
crowding out to prevent it from supporting a compensatory public works 
policy. 'This approach', as two contemporary commentators put it, 'has as its 
background the historic development of the Australian economy, in which 
public capital expenditure has al ways taken an important place'. 87 
The role of conservatively-inclined Treasury officers in the drafting process 
was clearly an important one. While the ultimate document was no doubt 
not as they would have pref erred, Wheeler and McF arlane were entitled to 
consider themselves partly responsible for the fact that the White Paper did 
not adopt a more strongly interventionist tone. The Treasury's role was, 
however, essentially negative and defensive. For whatever reason, neither 
Wheeler nor any of his colleagues made any contribution towards resolving 
the problems inherent in an excessive reliance upon compensatory public 
works. 
The critical factor in the effective elimination of planning themes from the 
White Paper was, however, the intervention of ministers. It was, as we have 
seen, Cabinet which removed the references to Beveridge-style planning 
structures. Even before this, Curtin had indicated his personal opposition to 
the proposals for a National Investment Board and a Central Planning 
Office. 88 This response needs to be understood in a political context. The 
White Paper was being drafted in the immediate aftermath of the defeat of 
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the fourteen powers referendum, at a time when the conservative parties 
were having some success in their campaign against planning and 
'regimentation'. In the absence of a strong commitment to planning, the 
Government had good reason to tone down sections of the draft which could 
have been used as political ammunition by Menzies and his colleagues. 
Apparently not even the 'radicals' in the Ministry cared enough about 
'planning' to be concerned that it should appear in the White Paper: Calwell, 
for example, was responsible for the deletion of certain references to 
planning which he saw as 'propaganda for opposition'. 89 
The deletion by Cabinet (apparently with Chifley's direct involvement) of 
Swan's reference to the stabilising function of 'the expansion of public capital 
expenditure, and its maintenance at new levels', also deserves some 
comment. Labor's commitment to a high level of capital works expenditure 
was clear cut. In terms of full employment policy, however, the party had 
long thought in terms of compensatory adjustments to the level of public 
works activity. From this point of view, a reference to the further 
expansion of the public sector may well have appeared unnecessarily 
politically provocative. It is significant that when Wheeler raised with 
Chifley his objections to the emphasis placed in D.P.W.R. drafts upon a large 
public sector, he referred particularly to the political opposition which the 
D P W R h . h . k 90 • • • • approac m1g t mvo e. 
In general, ministers appear to have been more interested in politically 
vetting the White Paper than in participating in theoretical debate about 
fiscal policy. In addition to deleting sensitive references to planning, they 
removed or toned down other politically objectionable or controversial 
material (including comments on labour discipline under full employment 
conditions, which would have created irritation within the trade union 
91 
movement). There was, moreover, little Cabinet controversy over the 
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document. The issues which divided the economists were not ones which 
aroused fervour or controversy amongst the politicians. This was borne out 
strikingly in Hubert Lazzarini's comment on the (rather interventionist) draft 
D, that 'it has no colour at all' and that 'the contents could have been culled 
with slight alteration from some of those dry as dust economic works we 
grappled with so heroically in our 92 youth'. The only sections of the White 
Paper which were singled out for enthusiastic comment by ministers were 
those referring to income redistribution and, more particularly, to the reform 
of the banking and monetary system. (Calwell and Holloway praised the 
latter sections as 'good propaganda1.)93 This is, however, hardly surprising. 
Labor's real enthusiasm was reserved for banking reform, which it saw as the 
fundamental prerequisite of the sorts of cheap 
public works policies which could guarantee 
money and compensatory 
94 full employment. The 
'technical' details of public works policy were, by contrast, of relatively little 
. t 95 mteres • 
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Labor and Banking 
Cl-IAPTER EIGHT 
MONETARY POLICY AND BANKING 
There were few, if any, economic matters to which Labor ministers attached 
greater significance during the 1940s than banking and monetary policy. 
Labor preoccupations had resulted, almost immediately upon the party's 
gaining office, in the banking regulations of 1941. When peace seemed 
imminent, banking legislation was one of the first major enactments of the 
Government. In March 1945, Treasurer Chifley introduced into Parliament two 
major bills designed to recast Australia's banking and monetary system. The 
controls embodied in the Commonwealth Bank Bill 1945 and the Banking Bill 
1945 were tough by contemporary world standards. Indeed, the 
N.S. W. Institute of Public Affairs complained after their enactment that 
government power over banking was now greater 'than any government 
outside the totalitarian countries ever enjoyed1• 1 
The Commonwealth Bank Act established for the first time ultimate 
government control over central bank policy. Amongst its other major 
provisions were the restructuring of the Bank's management, the 
establishment of an Industrial Finance Department and a legislative injunction 
to the Bank to carry out 'active competition with the private banks'. The 
Bank was given a charter of aims, which enjoined it to facilitate the 
'stability of the currency', 'the maintenance of full employment' and the 
'economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia'. The new Act 
also abolished the note issue reserve. 
The Banking Act established the framework for control of the private banks. 
The special accounts procedure for controlling the level of banks' liquid 
reserves was enshrined in this legislation. So were controls over interest 
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rates and the assets and advance policies (i.e. the direction of lending) of 
the banks. Exchange controls and exchange mobilisation powers were 
formalised. While these powers had all existed in war-time regulations, their 
permanent extension was a significant indication of the determination of the 
Labor government to maintain firm control over the Australian monetary 
system. 
In Parliament, Menzies described the banking legislation as 'probably the most 
important domestic measures which will be introduced to this Parliament 
during its currency'. 2 On this, if on nothing much else, there was bipartisan 
agreement. Indeed, if the importance attached by Labor Ministers to banking 
control could ever have been in doubt, the reaction of the Government to 
subsequent legal challenges to the Banking Act put the matter beyond 
question. Under the conviction that the special accounts provisions 
(s.18-s.22) of the Act were at legal risk after the High Court had ruled s.48 
ultra vires, Chifley and his Government took quick action in 1947 to 
nationalise the private banks. In doing so, the Government sparked off one 
of the most bitter legal and political rows in Australian history. 
The 1945 banking legislation was not merely the outcome of traditional Labor 
concerns. Firm monetary policy powers were clearly a priority as the war 
drew to an end. The enormous build-up of liquidity during the war was a 
source of great potential danger from the standpoint of almost any monetary 
theory. For the Labor Government, however, the assertion of public control 
over the monetary and banking system was particularly important because of 
the supreme significance that ministers, and indeed the movement as a 
whole, attached to the supply of money. In the 1940s, as in the 1930s, the 
party was dominated by a monetary view of the business cycle. Booms and 
slumps were generally seen as, ultimately, the outcome of excessive 
monetary expansions and contractions. Strict public control over the money 
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supply was, therefore, regarded as important to prevent the private banks 
from inducing dangerous fluctuations in the money supply. It would also 
enable government, when faced with depression or unemployment, to 
stimulate the economy by creating 'new' money for public works or lending 
to business. 
The official statements of Curtin and Chifley on 'post-war reconstruction' 
give the impression of a government which had embraced not only the 
Keynesian policy message, but also the Keynesian view of the way the 
economic mechanism operated.3 This is, however, misleading. As has 
previously been mentioned, formal ministerial statements are not necessarily 
a good guide to ministerial thinking in anything other than the most general 
sense. These statements were drafted by advisors like Copland, Downing and 
Coombs. The personal attitudes of ministers can be more effectively gauged 
from unscripted and off-the-cuff comments, and from statements on 
non-portfolio matters. 
The parliamentary debates on banking legislation in 1945 and 1947 clearly 
illustrate the continuing strength of the monetary view of the business 
cycle. Ministers spoke of 'the dictatorial power of the private banking 
monopoly' (Riordan), 'the recurring weakness in the private banking system' 
(Pollard) and the 'money power' (Calwell) as the root cause of capitalist 
. b·1· 4 msta 1 1ty. The Great Depression, Holloway told Parliament, had been 
'caused by the bad handling and distribution of credit, the economic 
life-blood that means the life or death of industries and the people who live 
on them'. 'Nothing else of which I can conceive', he dee-Jared, 'plays such an 
important part in the economic or social security of the people as control of 
the releasing or withholding of currency or credit1• 5 
A classic exposition of this view came from John Dedman during the debate 
on the 1947 nationalisation bill: 
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••• the volume of money is as crucial a factor as is the supply 
of water in a modern community. Just as a shortage of water 
will restrict growth so an insufficient supply of money will 
prevent that full employment of resources without which 
maximum production cannot be effected. Just as superfluous 
water will retard growth so a too plentiful supply of money will 
generate forces inimical to maximum production ••• In the years 
between the two world wars an insufficient supply of money 
condemned thousands to almost perpetual unemployment ••• but 
as soon as the Labor government took office and took steps to 
ensure the availability of a sufficiency of money, maximum 
production automatically followed. On the other hand, the 
danger of inflation caused by too plentiful a supply of money is 
too potent to require exemplification. The power to control the 
volume of money in the community is therefore a power the 
exercise of6 which can cause untold misery and unhappiness to 
the people. 
Hard-line monetary radicals like Ward and Lazzarini were, as might be 
expected, amongst the most vehement critics of private bank power. The 
views they put forward on monetary questions had not changed from the 
pre-war period. As in the past, they advocated virtually unrestricted use of 
the 'national credit' to supplant public borrowing and to progressively redeem 
existing public debt. 7 They also continued to call for the complete abolition 
of private money creation. Lazzarini, for example, published in 1944 a short 
pamphlet entitled The 'How' In Post-War Planning, in which he reiterated 
Soddy's critique of bank money creation: 
The banker inflates and deflates as his interests dictate 
without let or hindrances. He creates bouyancy or depression at 
his will. Obviously, the only way to prevent the banker from 
counterfeit coinirw is to deprive him of the power of operating 
a cheque system. 
Ward and Lazzarini remained consistent and forthright advocates of bank 
nationalisation.9 They were, moreover, at the forefront of the later campaign 
within the A.L.P. against Australian membership of the newly-created 
International Monetary Fund (I.M.F .), which they saw as an agent of 
international finance capital. They were supported on these issues by a 
significant minority within both Caucus and Cabinet. One notable new 
member of this group was the future Labor leader Arthur Calwell. 
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This preoccupation with the money supply was not, however, confined to 
monetary radicals or to the left wing of the parliamentary Labor Party. 
Dedman and Holloway were, for example, seen as 'middle of the road' in 
10 d h . . fl d l f d" l" party terms, an t e1r views re ecte an ama gam o monetary ra 1ca ISm 
and more respectable expansionary economics. One of the strongest 
backbench advocates of bank nationalisation was the right-wing Western 
Australian, Tom Burke. Burke believed that 'upon the contraction and 
expansion of bank credit depends whether work shall be provided'.11 When 
Cabinet placed its 1945 bank legislation before Caucus for approval, it was 
he who moved 'that the present Bills be withdrawn and a Bill introduced 
giving the Government power to acquire the business and assets of the 
private trading banks as a going concern•.12 
Chifley himself clearly continued to regard the management of money as 
supremely important. Speaking in reply to debate on the 1945 
Commonwealth Bank Bill, he described 'monetary policy' as 'the most 
powerful instrument in the community for rectifying economic ills1• 13 It was 
Chifley who proposed bank nationalisation to Cabinet in August 1947. In 
introducing the nationalisation legislation, he told the House that 'no single 
factor can do more to influence the welfare and progress of a community 
14 than the management of the volume and flow of money'. These were views 
which he had long held. 
As we have seen, Keynesianism had - if we interpret the word in a broad 
sense - been a significant influence upon party thinking in the late 1930s. 
Labor had readily accepted the notion that expansionary public works should 
during a depression be aimed at pushing the economy right up to the point 
of 'full' employment. The party had also come to place an even greater 
emphasis upon the counter-cyclical role of public works than it had in the 
early 1930s. At a conceptual level, however, the influence of Keynesianism 
- 237 -
was much less. Most Labor politicians continued to think of money supply 
changes - whether brought about through changes in lending to government or 
to the private sector - as the main influence upon the state of the 
economy. 
Had Labor politicians come during the war years to see things more in 
Keynesian conceptual terms? One must assume that the most senior 
economic ministers - Curtin and Chifley - absorbed more of the Keynesian 
way of thinking from the economic advisors with whom they were in such 
close and continual contact. What is striking, however, is just how little the 
economic thinking of the Labor front bench as a whole had changed during 
the war years. Dedman is a good case in point. Although he presided over 
the highly Keynesian Department of Post-War Reconstruction from February 
1945, the monetary view of the world which he put forward during the 
parliamentary debate on bank nationalisation in 1947 (see above) was 
identical to that which he had outlined in his first speeches to the House in 
1940-41 (see Chapter Five). As for Chifley, it is clear that, however much of 
the 'new' economics he may have absorbed, the 'old' view of monetary 
mechanisms remained an important part of his thinking. There was a great 
deal of truth in Menzies' intimation that the Government was dominated by a 
'belief that monetary reform, as such, is the be all and end all of economic 
· I 15 reconstruction. 
In historical retrospect, it is natural to think of the decade after 1936 as 
the time when Keynesianism triumphed in Australia. Historical and 
intellectual currents are, however, rarely as clear to those who experience 
them as they are to those who write about them after the event. This is 
true of Labor's response to the Keynesian 'revolution'. The party was 
certainly aware of the shift in economic thought in the 1930s towards a 
more expansionary orientation. There is, however, little indication that 
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Labor politicians recognised the central role of Keynes and the General 
Theory - let alone that they were aware that a 'Keynesian revolution' was in 
progress. Dedman was something of an exception here (see Chapter Five), 
but even he had little real understanding of the Keynesian interpretation of 
the determinants of demand and output. An exposition of Keynesian doctrine 
by Dedman in his speech on the 1945 banking legislation can, for example, 
be traced to the pens of his economic advisers and speech writers in the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction.16 When Tom Burke cited Keynes in 
a speech defending bank nationalisation, he referred not to the General 
Theory but to the Tract on Monetary Reform of 1923.17 
Inflation and the Special Accounts 
There was, as the war drew to a close, no shortage of official advice to the 
Government about the potential dangers posed by the massive war-time build 
up of liquidity in the financial system. Ministers feared an 'inflationary 
18 boom leading to unemployment' after the war. They believed that the 
slump in the early 1920s had resulted from uncontrolled private bank 
monetary expansion during the first world war, and were determined that the 
mistakes of the post-first world war period should not be repeated. Norman 
Makin spoke for most of his colleagues when he warned in 1945 that 'the 
private banks, if they are allowed complete freedom, will extend their 
operations until, indeed, they imperil the very security and solvency of the 
nation•.19 These considerations were primarily responsible for the tough 1941 
banking regulations, and they were now reflected in the continuation of the 
special deposits procedure in the 1945 Banking Act. 
The fear of inflation ran deep in the A.L.P. of the 1940s, and was based 
both on the view that inflation was the precursor of depressions, and on the 
conviction that the distributional consequences of inflation did not favour 
workers and other low income people. Chifley1s conviction that 'the greatest 
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sufferers from inflation are the workers whom we represent' was widely 
shared within the party. Notwithstanding their easy-money theories, even the 
monetary radicals shared this view. As Ward put it: 
The Labour movement has long since learnt that unless we are 
able to establish a stable currency ••• private financial interests 
have the power to depreciate the currency ••• (and) deprive the 
workers of the benefits they have won ••• Thus, the obligation 
rests upon a Labor government to establish a stable . currency in 
this country. But no government can maintain a stabliz1currency 
unless it controls the supply of money in all its forms. 
These views had deep roots within the A.L.P. As we have seen (Chapter 
Five), Labor had, in the pre-war period, been deeply concerned with the 
danger of 'secondary' money creation by the banks. This view was still 
influential at the end of the war. Calwell, for example, spoke of the 1945 
legislation as an attempt 'to take away from the private banks the authority 
which they had improperly and, I believe, illegally exercised over many years 
of expanding or contracting the credit of the community'. 22 Chifley himself 
still spoke of the dangers of 'secondary inflation'. 23 For completely unrelated 
reasons, moreover, wartime economic management had required that 
'practically the whole of the increase in bank assets was called to Special 
Account'. At the end of the war Special Accounts requirement remained very 
high. It was hardly surprising under these circumstances that the private 
banks feared that the 1945 legislation's 'benchmark for assessing Special 
Account percentages, each bank's assets at the outbreak of war, was designed 
to prevent any expansion by a trading bank beyond its scale of business in 
August 1939'. 24 
The special accounts provisions of the 1945 legislation were endorsed by 
Cabinet without discussion, no doubt reflecting the firm consensus in favour 
of tough controls on the volume of bank lending. The decision was 
significant in another way. The special accounts approach was one which 
enabled the central bank wide discretion in the deposit requirements it 
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imposed on particular banks. It therefore gave the monetary authorities a 
useful instrument with which to place additional pressure on uncooperative 
banks. 25 It was considerably tougher than the proposal for minimum 
percentage deposit requirements which had been included in the ill-fated 1939 
draft banking bill. 
The choice between percentage deposits and special accounts was one which 
was the subject of discussion between the Commonwealth Bank and the 
Treasury. In part, the issue at stake was the degree of discretionary control 
which the Bank should exercise. There was,' however, a further persuasive 
argument for the temporary continuation of the special accounts procedure. 
This was that, because most of the banks' new deposits had been called to 
special account during the war, the size of these accounts would appear 
absolutely oppressive if expressed officially in percentage terms. 26 Bank 
officials strongly favoured the continuation of the special accounts procedure 
and cited, in support of their case, U.S. views that the minimum percentage 
deposit approach was too weak.27 Their preference for the special accounts 
approach was, in other words, based on general grounds, rather than simply 
on the exigencies of the transition to peace. When the matter was discussed 
by the Bank Board six months later, the Board endorsed its officials' advice 
in favour of the extension of the special accounts procedure. This was, 
however, qualified by a recommendation that the legislation should provide 
for a review of the matter by the Bank after five years. 28 The Board's 
position on this, as on certain other matters contained in the legislation, was 
probably the product of compromise. It was at the time deeply divided, with 
interventionists like Coombs sitting side-by-side with Sir Claude Reading and 
other conservative appointees. 
Treasury exhibited considerable uncertainty on this issue. McF arlane's initial 
memorandum to Chifley envisaged that the new bill would include, firstly, 
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the percentage deposit requirements of the draft pre-war bill and, secondly, 
temporary provisions for the continuation of war-time special accounts for a 
. . l . d 29 trans1t1ona per10 • The Treasury Secretary did, however, succumb 
eventually to the Commonwealth Bank Board view that the special account 
provisions should be continued and reviewed after five years.30 It is not 
clear whether Chifley had any views on the choice of approach. The 
Cabinet submission followed the Treasury/Bank Board line. Cabinet rejected 
the recommended review provisions, but no discussion is recorded on the 
matter. 31 
The Money Supply and Public Expenditure 
Although the Labor Government viewed itself as staunchly anti-inflationary, 
many of its conservative opponents regarded it as dominated by easy-money 
notions which would lead to rampant inflation. It was not hard to garner 
'evidence' for this view. Leading Labor monetary radicals not only publicly 
called for an end to borrowing, but reiterated the traditional view (see 
Chapter Four) that there was no limit to the use which could be made of 
the 'national' credit so long as it was applied to the creation of real wealth, 
with arrangements being made for gradual 'redemption'. As in the past, 
however, the monetary radical view of the role of monetary expansion in 
public finance was a minority one. 
Differences of opinion within the party on this matter were to some extent 
overlaid by the general adoption of the rhetoric of the 'physical resources' 
doctrine - that the expansion of the money supply was useful and justifiable 
up to the level required to ensure full employment of available productive 
resources. Even Ward could declare that 'there is no sense in expanding the 
use of credit if the resources 32 of the country are fully employed'. The 
superficiality of this consensus is, however, revealed clearly in Cabinet 
controversy over the housing loan provisions to be included in the 
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Commonwealth Bank Act. Chifley's submission to Cabinet had proposed that 
housing loan funds be drawn principally from savings bank deposits with the 
Commonwealth Bank. This clashed with notions of interest free loans drawn 
from the national credit, and an amendment was moved urging that home 
loans should instead be financed 'by the use of national credit and at the 
cost of issuance and services'. 
The Cabinet discussion which followed revealed with great clarity the 
contrast between monetary radical notions and more 'Keynesian' ideas. 
Supporters of the amendment stressed that 'immediately a home was 
constructed an asset was in existence against the advance'. Cabinet minutes 
also recorded: 
General discussion took place with regard to:-
l. the utilisation of national credit as distinct from the 
utilisation of savings bank deposits 
2. the utilisation of national credit for housing as distinct 
from the utilisation of loan money. 
It was stated that when there was a shortage of manpower or 
material the use of bank credit would eventually result in 
inflation. Against this it was asserted that the use of national 
credit for wealth production, with redemption fu~~ and other 
reasonable safeguards, would not result in inflation. 
The amendment was defeated by an unspecified margin. That the approach 
embodied in the amendment had some support within the party organisation 
was shown by the receipt at the A.L.P. Federal Executive meeting on 13 
February 1945 of a motion from the Tasmanian branch urging that 'national 
credit be utilised for the building of homes and state public works as set out 
in the platform', and warning of the 'politically disastrous results arising from 
any lack of sincerity in carrying out that Policy1• 34 
The scope and role of monetary expansion was also a contentious issue in the 
public arena. More enlightened sections of the business community had 
substantially discarded traditional quantity theory notions of 'sound finance'. 
- 243 -
The N.S. W. Institute of Public Affairs, for example, addressed the matter in 
one of its publications in the following terms: 
The vexed question arises whether the money [to finance 
deficits] is to come from borrowing from the public or through 
the expansion of bank credit. Idle savings should, of course, be 
tapped as far as possible. Whether the holders will lend at 
reasonable rates of interest will depend largely upon their 
confidence in the Government of the day and its policy. Failing 
that and in a situation where substantial producti~5 resources 
are idle, the expansion of bank credit will be sound. 
This position was a respectable one from a Keynesian viewpoint. However, 
not all sections of business - let alone of the conservative political parties -
took such an 'enlightened' view. Many conservatives continued to view 
'central bank credit' as a 'fictitious expedient1, 36 and to oppose 'theoretical 
experimentation with [Government] finances in the post-war world1• 37 These 
highly traditional fears were undoubtedly fuelled by the public utterances of 
Ward and other monetary radicals within the A.L.P. 
Monetary probity became a major issue in relations between the 
Commonwealth Bank and the Labor Government from the time the new 
Government took office.38 That a real danger existed at this time was 'plain 
to both government and Bank. The Government, however, faced serious 
politic al problems in effecting the high tax levels and economic controls 
necessary to control fully these inflationary pressures. The Bank Board - and 
certainly its Chairman, Sir Claude Reading - seems to have been influenced 
not only by quantity theory notions, but also by highly conservative fears of 
the new government's monetary intentions. 
Sir Claude Reading anticipated conflict from the very outset. Not quite 
three weeks after the change of government, he told a meeting with the 
private banks that 'an issue on the volume of Central Bank credit to be 
released might arise between the Government and the Commonwealth Bank 
39 
at a later stage'. The matter was the subject of a series of gravely-worded 
warnings from the Bank Board during 1942 and 1943. Government action and 
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reassurances were forthcoming, but not quickly enough to satisfy the bank. 
An indication of the fears prevalent in conservative business circles came at 
a meeting with the private banks in May 1943, when Reading bemoaned the 
inflationary danger and a general discussion took place on the possibility of 
the Commonwealth Bank 'going public' on the issue. The General Manager of 
the Bank of Australasia and President of the Associated Chambers of 
Commerce of Australia, George Healy, 'said that he was gravely concerned at 
the situation and that outside bodies with which he is associated held similar 
views'. Healy also told the meeting that he was 'afraid there was a 
deliberate plan to destroy wealth by eliminating the value of money1• 40 
In this tense atmosphere, it was not surprising that the issue should blow up 
during the 1943 election campaign. On 7th August, two weeks before 
election day, the Prime Minister made a statement on financial policy which 
was both restrained and impeccably Keynesian (indeed, it reads like Copland's 
work). Curtin stressed that his Government had adopted as its budgetary 
criteria not the availability of finance, but the availability of unutilised 
physical resources. He also stressed, however, the Government's commitment 
to 'a stable purchasing power', to be enforced by price and other controls to 
keep the lid on ·wartime monetary expansion. This was all straightforward 
enough. He concluded, however, on a note more relevant to the future: 
The Government has proved that, in time of war, every demand 
for money, no matter how great, can be met. In time of war, 
money is no bar to meet the demand of work for all who can 
work when the nation's safety requires it. The Government 
gives a similar pledge that when peace returns all the money 
requir~d41will similarly be found to provide work for all who 
want it. 
This statement received immediate press attention. Shortly afterwards Sir 
Claude Reading issued a 'personal' response to Curtin's statement, in which 
he warned that 
••• there must be a strict limit placed upon the use of Bank 
credit in the post-war period for any purpose. I ts improper use 
in peace-time, in spite of controls, can destroy the purchasing 
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power of our currency and wreck our standard of living and our 
economy generally. 
Sir Claude went on to question how far bank credit could be used safely to 
provide 'work for all who can work1• 42 
Reading's statement was greeted enthusiastically by the press, and formed 
the basis of editorials attacking the Government in many of the capital city 
d ·1· 43 Th l d C . ' . h' h a1 1es. e papers a so reporte urtin s response - a response in w 1c 
the Prime Minister linked Sir Claude's attitude with pre-war social evils such 
as poverty, bad housing and l t 't' 44 ma nu r1 10n. Public criticism of the 
Government by the Bank Board's chairman during a critical election campaign 
could scarcely have increased ministerial confidence in the Board. 
Fears about wild monetary expansion were raised again in the second reading 
debate on the 1945 banking legislation. Two points in particular raised 
conservative hackles. The first was the decision to abolish the note issue 
reserve. The second was the assertion of government authority over the 
central bank. The Royal Commission on Banking had recommended the 
abolition of the note issue reserve, but had urged its replacement by certain 
legal limitations on the extent of the note issue. For the Labour movement, 
the concept of a note issue reserve was as much of an anathema as the gold 
standard. It was therefore hardly surprising that Cabinet should opt for the 
outright abolition of the reserve, without adopting the Royal Commission's 
proposal of a legal limit. 
The idea of a note issue reserve to provide 'backing' for the currency or to 
restrain monetary expansion was by the 1940s grossly old-fashioned. It was, 
no doubt, concern about 'business confidence' which led Treasury to favour 
the retention of some sort of note issue reserve, albeit on a less restrictive 
basis than the 25% provisions of pre-war legislation. In the draft Cabinet 
submission he prepared in December 1944, Wheeler proposed that the 
Treasurer should indicate to Cabinet that 'for psychological reasons I do not 
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favour the abolition of the present Note Issue Reserve without some 
substitute provision'. He also suggested that the reserve be limited to £25m 
1. 45 ster mg. 
The submission which Chifley put to Cabinet contained the £25m sterling 
proposal as one option, and mentioned the 'psychological' considerations 
Wheeler had raised. But it made no policy recommendation. Two other 
options were listed, as in Wheeler's draft. The first was outright abolition of 
the note issue reserve. The second was a proposal which had been forwarded 
by the Bank Board. This urged the replacement of the note issue reserve by 
a 'National Exchange Reserve' . of £50m sterling. This reserve would be 
available if necessary for the settlement of international accounts, but there 
would be a requirement for a report to the Treasurer if reserves looked like 
falling below £50m.46 The practical effect of this would be simply to 
establish a mechanism to ring loud alarm bells when Australia's international 
reserves looked like falling too low. The National Exchange Reserve proposal 
bore no logical relation whatsoever to notions of probity in the note issue. 
In Parliament, the Opposition reacted fearfully to the proposed abolition of 
the note issue reserve, particularly as it was linked with the assertion of 
government authority over monetary policy. Menzies told Parliament that 
the Commonwealth Bank Bill ran 'a good chance of destroying the currency', 
and warned that with the abolition of the note issue reserve, 
There is nothing whatever on to which any person protecting the 
currency can seize as a means of defence. Every Treasurer will 
be utterly and literally defenceless in the presence of those 
who, in some ignorant clamour, desire to have the note issue 
expanded for th97 purpose of meeting some passing whim or 
political demand. 
So extravagant were the claims made by Opposition speakers with respect to 
the note issue reserve that Chifley commented after the speech of one 
leading Country Party member that he felt himself transported back to the 
Victorian era. 'The note issue reserve', he told his opponents, is 'a fetish1• 48 
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It was on this issue that Sir Charles Reading resolved to make his last 
valiant stand for monetary sobriety. Ten days after Chifley had introduced 
the banking bills into Parliament, Reading warned Curtin and Chifley at a 
meeting in Canberra of the 'temptation to abuses by any government' which 
would arise from the 'unbridled power to use of credit' contained in the 
legislation. He urged 'restriction' in the interests of public confidence, and 
reemphasised the national reserve proposals of the Commonwealth Bank -
apparently in the belief that the Bank proposal had something to do with 
restraint on the volume of money. Subsequently, he reinforced this message 
in a letter to Curtin on 11th April. Curtin's response was a simple rebuff: 
the Government did not propose to change the legislation. Reading ended 
the exchange of correspondence with a letter expressing his disappointment 
and warning that 
This legislation gives unbridled power to use Bank Credit to any 
amount and for any purpose. I feel strong! y that this is wrong 
in princiJ?9e and can prove at some future time dangerous in 
practice. 
This exchange was Reading's last hurrah. With the proclamation of the new 
Act a couple of months later, the Bank Board was dissolved. 
Cheap Money 
The continuation of interest rate controls in the 1945 legislation was a 
measure which had the strong support of both Labor ministers and public 
servants. Labor's preference for low interest rates, and controls to enforce 
them, was well established. The party regarded high interest rates both as a 
cause of depressions and as a source of distributive injustice. Chifley, 
moreover, had urged in his dissenting comments as a Royal Commissioner 
that interest rates should be controlled, by legislation if necessary. 
Other aspects of the 1945 legislation also reflected Labor's concern with 
ensuring fair access to cheap credit. The Commonwealth Bank Act enjoined 
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the Bank to compete actively with the private banks, so as both to expand 
its own business and to provide fairer access to capital. Cabinet also 
decided to include in this Act a provision 'to the effect that the Bank shall 
not refuse to accept any business only for the reason that it is business 
50 
which has been undertaken or refused by another bank'. These provisions 
represented a direct attack on the previous Commonwealth Bank practice of 
refraining from competition with the trading banks on the grounds that such 
competition would interfere with the proper performance of central banking 
functions. 
The consensus within government on the need for interest rate controls was 
particularly marked. Strong support came from both Commonwealth Bank 
officials and the Treasury. The only hint of dissension came from a minority 
of the Bank Board who apparently retained a laissez-faire faith in leaving 
interest rates to the 'market'. This view was not, however, shared by the 
majority of Board members, who apparently accepted bank officials' 
arguments that 'interest rates will have to be controlled if we are to ensure 
as far as possible that entrepreneurs can borrow cheaply enough to absorb 
h f 11 f · 1 51 t e u amount o savings. 
The influence of the new orthodoxy of low and stable interest rates was 
central to this consensus. As Coombs observed some years later, 'by the end 
of the war, belief in low interest rates had almost become a dogma•.52 The 
doctrine of low and stable interest rates had, as we have seen (Chapter 
Three), become very influential in the thirties. This commitment to low 
interest rates was reinforced by the public debt. The volume of war-related 
debt was such that any significant increase in interest rates would have had 
a dramatic impact on the Commonwealth budget. Higher interest rates 
could, moreover, have been politically damaging, because they would have 
reduced the value of the longer-term war bonds which had been extensively 
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subscribed to by ordinary citizens as well as the rich. Related to this was 
the belief of many economists that full employment policies could be 
expected to produce 'a steadily rising public debt in peacetime1• 53 Under 
these circumstances, as Melville put it, 'the burden of interest will remain 
tolerable ••• only if it proves possible to keep interest rates low.54 
The Commonwealth Bank was the strongest bureaucratic bastion of the 
doctrine of low and stable interest rates. The Bank's view was expressed 
succinctly in its 1945 annual report: 
In the post-war period it will be desirable to continue the policy 
of cheap money which has proved so helpful during the war. A 
rise in interest rates would make the problem of the public debt 
more difficult and would rebound to the disadvantage of 
patriotic citizens who have already subscribed to war loans. It 
would also aggravate the difficulties of the housing problem. 
The continued absorption of the community's savings by their 
use in new investment will be encouraged by low interest 
rates. In securing the highest possible leve~ff employment such 
a policy will be of considerable importance. 
The Bank's view did . not, then, reflect the exigencies of the post-war 
transition period alone. Key Bank policy-makers like Melville were 
committed to a policy designed 'to keep interest rates as low and as stable 
as possible through all phases of business fluctuations rather than to try to 
use them as 56 a regulator'. It was this doctrine which underlay the 
considerable efforts of the Bank during war and early post-war years firstly 
to reduce interest rates gradually, and then to resist increases. The 
difficulties faced in implementing this policy were extreme, and it is 
testimony to the Bank's determination that it was not until the early 1950s 
that it succumbed to the pressures and permitted greater interest rate 
variability. 
The Commonwealth Bank's commitment to cheap money principally reflected 
its concern about the public debt and its Keynesian belief that interest rates 
were too clumsy an instrument to be used for short-term demand 
management purposes. The constant references to the absorption of the 
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community's savings also indicate the influence of the stagnation doctrine, 
albeit in a mild form. As Armitage put it in a memo to McF arlane: 
If a high and stable level of employment is to be maintained, 
interest charges must be kept low enough to encourage capital 
development at a sufficient level to balance volunta~ savings 
from income, and so keep the economy fully employed. 
Once the case for low and stable interest rates was accepted, the argument 
for direct interest rate controls became very strong. It was widely 
recognised that 'in Australia, through the absence of a money market, the 
central bank cannot exercise a general control of interest rates through the 
bank rate•.58 Treasury therefore proposed from the outset that interest rate 
control provisions be included in the legislation.59 When the proposal went to 
Cabinet it was approved, apparently without debate. 
Advance Policies and Social Priorities 
As we have seen (Chapter Six), the doctrine of low and stable interest rates 
lent itself to proposals for the use of 'qualitative' monetary policy as an 
instrument of allocative policy. If a selective credit policy was desirable for 
the maintenance of stability, what could be more logical than to base that 
selective policy on a planned conception of what constituted the best 
directions for investment and economic development? This argument created 
a potential dilemma for those with pro-market inclinations. This dilemma 
was typified in Australia by the ambivalence of the Treasury on the question 
of advance policy controls. Control over bank advance policy had been an 
important part of war-time banking regulation. The first directive on 
advance policy was issued by the Commonwealth Bank in November 1941, and 
remained in force (with amendments) until July 1945, when it was replaced 
60 by new guidelines more suited to the transition to peace. These directives 
indicated the types of lending which the banks could and could not 
undertake. They operated in tandem with capital issues controls (the Capital 
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Issues Advisory Committee functioned under the aegis of the Commonwealth 
Bank). 
Important differences between the Treasury and the Commonwealth Bank on 
the question of advance policy controls emerged at an early stage. A memo 
from McF arlane to Chifley in May 1944 was vague about whether such power 
should be included in the banking legislation. 61 Perhaps in response to this, 
the Commonwealth Bank criticised a 'most undesirable' suggestion from an 
unspecified source that power over bank advance and investment policy might 
be omitted from the legislation.62 Throughout subsequent discussions about 
the legislation, Bank officials maintained strong support for advance policy 
control powers, despite the fact that the Bank Board took a somewhat 
different approach. 
McF arlane was clearly reticent on the matter. In a note in early November, 
he recorded his support for what he called the 'indirect method' of 
influencing the direction of bank advances through central bank advice to the 
banks rather than legislative compulsion. This apparently reflected a belief 
that the happy cooperation between central banks and trading banks which 
prevailed in England could be replicated in Australia. Although he 
acknowledged that there was 'some danger' of 'over-advancing in the early 
years' after the war, McF arlane was concerned that advance policy controls 
and complementary controls over bank investments would invite 'criticism 
[of] "running [the] Banks" business'. 63 
Shortly afterwards, McF arlane told officials of the Attorney General's 
Department that the 'special account procedure provides sufficient power to 
ensure the effective implementation of Central Bank functions' and that the 
functions of a central bank 'did not extend to control over the direction of 
advances'. Wheeler, however, took a different view, arguing that 'under 
modern conditions the Central Bank must take some responsibility not only 
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for the control of the volume of credit but also for its distribution'. 64 Here, 
as elsewhere, Wheeler proved far more sensitive to the 'new economics' than 
McFarlane. 
Treasury's ambivalence was natural. On the one hand, the arguments for 
investment controls in the transition period after the war were impeccable, 
and were accepted not only by Treasury but by many conservatives 
politicians. Selective monetary policy also seemed to be an unavoidable 
corollary of a stable interest rate policy. Equally, however, opponents of 
'planning' had every reason to fear the uses to which such controls might be 
put. Wheeler made his concerns on this score clear during interdepartmental 
discussions on the full employment White Paper. Some of the members of the 
Commonwealth Bank Board shared these fears about excessive government 
intervention. When it considered the question in December, the Board was 
strongly divided on the desirability of advance policy controls, and decided to 
d . . . 65 recor no maJor1ty view. 
By contrast to their Board, Bank officials believed that advance and 
investment policy controls had a permanent and important role to play in 
economic management. In a July memo they commented that legislative 
provision for advance policy controls 
would, to some extent, have the effect of providing the central 
bank with the means of regulating the volume of credit made 
available by the banks. In practice, however, it would be used 
more to govern the purpoGgs for which credit is issued rather 
than the volume of credit. 
Selective credit policy was, in other words, important for planning reasons, 
and not simply as a surrogate for interest rate variations in a stable-rate 
regime. A further indication of thinking within the Bank came in a further 
memo to the Treasury a few days later, which indicated that the 'main 
possibility' (i.e. preferred policy) was 'a special National Investment Authority 
set up to control capital issues and investment generally'. Such an authority 
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would, it was suggested, take over duties from both the Bank itself and from 
the Capital Issues Advisory Committee. It would, however, function in close 
collaboration with the central bank. 67 This proposal indicates the considerable 
influence of Beveridge's planning proposals. 
The disagreement between Treasury and Commonwealth Bank officials on 
advance policy controls was resolved by Chifley himself, although at what 
stage remains unclear. Chifley, as we have seen, understood that a stable 
interest rate policy would require at least intermittent qualitative lending 
controls. His view of the place of advance policy control provisions in the 
banking legislation is recorded in handwritten notes (apparent! y by McF arlane 
himself) on a typewritten discussion document dated 19 June 1944: 
1. Treasurer favours powers to lay down advance policy in 
in peace time if necessary and to increase the powers 
in an emergency. 
2. He does not want the power restricted to use in 
'emergency'. 
3. He recognises it may be sufficient for Bank to influence 
Advance Policy by advi1:8 but the provision is also 
necessary in peacetime. 
This suggests that McFarlane tried to persuade Chifley that legislative 
powers were not needed, or alternatively that such powers should be 
restricted to emergencies. It also indicates that although Chifley did not 
accept these arguments, he did not view advance policy controls as a 
planning instrument. 
This impression is reinforced by the form in which Chifley approved the 
submission to Cabinet on this question. The Treasury draft, unamended by 
Chifley, read: 
It is generally held that in peace-time it is the function of the 
Central Bank to regulate the volume of advances ••• It is not 
regarded as a normal Central Bank function to regulate the 
direction or purposes of advances although Central Banks can, 
and do, exert some general influence by cooperation with the 
trading banks. I feel, however, the occasion may arise when it 
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is desirable for the Commonwealth Bank to give some specific 
indication to trading banks as to the direction of the advances 
policy they should pursue ••• On balance, I feel that some 
express powers should be provided to enable the Commonwealth 
Bank to exercise some control over the direction of trading 
bank advances if necessary. Thig9 control would only be 
exercised in special circumstances ••• 
By the standards of the day, this was very lukewarm support indeed for 
advance policy controls. It is revealing both that Chifley approved the 
Cabinet submission in this form, and that there was apparently no discussion 
of the issue in Cabinet. It might be surmised that the vigorous rhetorical 
support which ministers had so often voiced for planning on a modified war 
model was more a matter of amorphous feeling than of programmatic 
commitment. Advance policy controls were no doubt just another banking 
'technicality' for most ministers, with little obvious relevance to their 
primary economic concerns. Control over the money supply to counter 
slumps and ensure reasonable access to cheap credit was fundamental to 
Labor ideology in a way which controlling the direction of private investment 
was not. 
Planning and the Industrial Bank 
Planning issues also arose in relation to the proposed creation of an 
industrial bank. The possible establishment of such a bank had been 
canvassed in the Royal Commission Report, in relation to deficiencies in 
access to the capital market for small business and new industries. 70 There 
was considerable worldwide concern in the 1930s and 1940s about capital 
market 'gaps' facing small and growing businesses. Chifley had, as Royal 
Commissioner, taken an interest in such gaps in the capital market, and had 
in his dissenting report advocated the establishment of an industrial bank. 
In the post-war context, however, such a proposal could be viewed also as an 
instrument of structural planning, complementary to advance policy and 
capital issues controls. Beveridge had, as we have seen, suggested that one 
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of the functions of his proposed National Investment Board would be to 
secure access to cheaper capital for approved private investment plans by 
means of government guarantees of the necessary borrowings. 71 In France 
during the currency of the Monnet plan, public control of banking (most of 
the banks were nationalised by de Gaulle) was used to provide long-term low 
interest rate capital for private investment projects approved as part of the 
72 plan. 
Public service opinion was divided on the industrial bank proposal. Planners 
in D.P. W.R. and elsewhere favoured such a bank both as a means of dealing 
with gaps in the capital market and as an additional instrument in the 
planning armoury. Treasury, on the other hand, opposed the establishment of 
an industrial bank, doubting even that the deficiencies in the capital market 
were significant enough to warrant the creation of a new government bank. 
Until October 1944, none of the Treasury outlines of the banking legislation 
even mentioned the possibility of an industrial bank. Pressure from the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction was foreshadowed in a letter from 
Coombs to McFarlane on 6 September. After indicating that he understood 
that Treasury work on the banking legislation included an examination of the 
question of industrial banking facilities (which was apparently not the case), 
Coombs informed McF arlane that the Secondary Industries Commission (S.I.C.) 
within D.P. W.R. 'has for some time been giving consideration to measures 
necessary to improve the financial services to industry'. Coombs promised to 
communicate the results of the S.I.C. investigations when they became 
available. He had in fact already received from B. W. Hartnell (Senior 
Research Officer for the S.I.C.) in early August a memo entitled 'Draft 
Outline of Notes on the Establishment of an Australian Investment Bank'. 74 
D.P. W.R.'s real push for involvement came in October when the S.I.C. 
endorsed a detailed statement on the 'Bank for Industrial Development', which 
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had been drawn up by departmental officers. On 21 October, J.K. Jensen, 
Chairman of the Commission, wrote to Chifley referring the D.P. W.R. 
statement (which he said the Commission found 'generally acceptable') and 
recommending that the Minister arrange for his expert advisors (including a 
member of the 5.1.C.) to examine the statement and draw up a detailed 
75 proposal for consideration by the Government. 
The D.P.W.R. statement was notable for the scale and scope which it 
envisaged for the new bank. Rather than being confined to small business 
and new industries, the bank's brief would be to 'provide long-term 
investment funds for industry'. The purposes for which funds could be lent 
were very broadly defined, and included the establishment, expansion and 
reconstruction of firms. The bank was also 'to become an additional 
instrument for the carrying out of national economic policy'. Amongst its 
powers, moreover, would be the provision 'from its own staff [of] directors, 
managers and secretaries for industrial enterprises'.* It was clear, then, that 
D.P.W.R. had in mind an institution capable of playing a significant and 
growing role in planning Australia's industrial structure. Beveridge-style 
'social priorities' planning themes had in fact been made even more explicit 
in Hartnell's earlier draft, which listed amongst the deficiencies of the 
existing capital market the fact that 'little consideration (was) given to 
social evaluation of the projects considered'. 
The macroeconomic role of the development bank, and the link between 
planning and macroeconomic policy, was an important element in 
D.P. W.R. thinking. In discussions with the 5.1.C. in early September, for 
* Hartnell's early paper had in fact envisaged that the bank could, 
in certain circumstances, provide even a majority of a company's 
board, depending on the bank's equity stake. 
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example, Coombs had stressed the need for the bank to 'adapt its policy to 
meet depressions, by stimulating investment in the private sector of 
industry•.76 Shortly afterwards, in a submission to the first S.I.C. meeting (15 
November 1943), D.P. W.R. emphasised the importance of both development 
finance facilities and public enterprise investment decisions as part of a 
'general economic policy' designed 'to maintain stability in the rate of new 
industrial development', 77 All of this was strongly reminiscent of Beveridge's 
proposal that private investment be directly stabilised in part through the 
cyclical adjustment of the volume of selective development finance provided 
by a National Investment Board (see Chapter Seven). 
The structure recommended for the new bank reflected the high profile 
envisaged by D.P.W.R. Initial capital was to be £10m, with access to further 
funds. D.P.W.R. also urged that the bank be established as a subsidiary of 
the Commonwealth Bank, giving it a substantial measure of administrative 
independence. D.P. W.R. argued than an industrial bank needed to be 
adventurous and to take risks beyond those ordinarily undertaken by financial 
institutions. If it were to become simply a department of the 
Commonwealth Bank there was (in the words of Hartnell's earlier draft) a 
'danger of banking bias and failure to develop use of "investment 
judgement"'. This point of view was strongly endorsed by the S.I.C., and 
Jensen communicated to Chifley in his letter of 21 October the unanimous 
view of the Commission that 
the attitude of the administrative body to be responsible for the 
granting of financial assistance to industry should not be what is 
commonly expressed as a banking attitude, but of necessity 
should be one of liberal discretion. 
These views, and the contents of the D.P.W.R. paper, were reinforced by 
Coombs in a letter to Chifley on 26 October. 78 On 30 October Chifley 
agreed to the proposal that an Expert Committee be set up. The Committee 
comprised Coombs (D.P. W.R. representative and Chairman), W. Scott (S.I.C.), 
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Wheeler (Treasury) and Melville (Commonwealth Bank). As on other occasions, 
Melville's contribution was offered in his personal capacity - the Board 
structure of the Bank made presentation of any formal Bank view 
79 
cumbersome. The terms of reference of the Committee did not include the 
question of the need for an industrial bank. What was to be examined was 
simply the form the bank should take. 80 It seems to have been at this time 
that Chifley told McF arlane that provision for the industrial bank was to be 
included in the new bank bill. 81 
Any suggestion that the industrial bank need not be established was, then, 
ruled out of court at the outset. The battlelines were drawn instead over 
the bank's scope, powers and ·structure. Treasury did not trouble to conceal 
its lack of sympathy for the proposal. Wheeler put the position in a briefing 
note to McF arlane on 22 November. He noted that Chifley's decision meant 
that the question of the desirability of such a bank did not arise. 
'Nevertheless', he noted, 'the considerations which would be taken into 
account in forming a judgement on desirability have some relevance to the 
definition of the scope and form of the proposed institution.' While there 
was wide acceptance of the need for such a body, 
Experience ••• suggests that the 
provided for is not very great. 
facilities which it is desired to fill 
small. 
volume of business to be 
Thus the gap in financial 
would seem to be relatively 
In his note to McF arlane, Wheeler also indicated his distrust of D.P. W.R. 's 
motives, warning that the D.P.W.R. paper seemed to imply both 'that the 
proposed organisation is to be used by the Government as an instrument for 
furthering specific developmental projects in secondary industry', and 'that 
the organisation might become an agency for the operation of Government 
factories established during the war.' He also argued that the bank should 
be established as a department of the Commonwealth Bank 'because of the 
protection it would give from undesirable outside pressures. 82 
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Wheeler's belief that D.P. W.R. wanted the bank to operate as an agency for 
the operation of government factories was not without some foundation. 
From a very early stage, D.P.W.R. had envisaged the creation of a 
government holding company which would have close links with the 
development bank. The department viewed co-operation between these bodies 
as an important part of a co-ordinated policy designed to directly influence 
the volume of industrial investment. 83 Consideration of the establishment of 
a holding company proceeded up to Cabinet subcommittee level, 84 but was 
apparently stymied by the failure of the August 1944 'powers' referendum 
because it appeared that· the establishment of a holding company 'might be 
of dubious constitutionality and interpreted as an evasion of the Referendum.' 
Because of these difficulties, D.P.W.R. thought it appropriate that the 'shares 
85 in Commonwealth industries ••• be held by' the development bank. The 
S.I.C. agreed, informing the Government in November 1944 that the 
development bank proposal was 'closely allied to the questions of the future 
of Commonwealth manufacturing assets and the establishment of a holding 
f h . . ,86 company or t e1r operations. 
The Treasury clearly regarded the issue as an important one, for at the 
meeting of the Expert Committee which took place on 22 November, 
Treasury was represented by both Wheeler and McFarlane. McFarlane had, as 
has been mentioned, already been briefed by Wheeler on the issues raised by 
the proposal. The Treasury Secretary weighed in at the outset of the 
meeting, arguing that there was little need for the new. bank. This view was 
disputed immediately by both Scott and Melville. This did not, however, 
daunt the Treasury representatives, who came back later in the meeting with 
the more subtle suggestion that the bank should start on a small scale to 
test the water, and should confine itself initially to providing 'for the 
long-term financial requirements of small and expanding business'. The scope 
- 260 -
of the bank could, they intimated, be reviewed and expanded if necessary at 
a later stage. McFarlane also argued that the bank should be constituted as 
a department of the Commonwealth Bank because of 'economies of 
administration'. These issues were not settled at this meeting. The 
Committee nevertheless agreed that the references to the bank as an 
instrument of national economic policy, and to its capacity to appoint 
managers and directors to client firms, were unnecessary. 87 
It is not clear how many times the Expert Committee met. Most of the 
drafting was, however, done by Hartnell, who consulted extensively with 
Wheeler. Partly as a result of these discussions the proposed initial capital of 
the bank was reduced to £4m. Other controversial points were discussed by 
the two men. D.P. W.R. had been arguing that there should be close formal 
links between the bank and key economic departments and ministers or, at 
the very least, direct access to relevant ministers. Wheeler successfully 
resisted this. There was also disagreement over Wheeler's desire 
to see a paragraph inserted laying down that, as a matter of 
policy, the Industrial Bank should not become a permanent 
holder of the equity investments and thus become a government 
investment trust. 
Wheeler told McF arlane on 13 December that he was drafting a paragraph to 
embody this view, but expected 'opposition from Hartnell and Melville'. He 
also reported that there was still no agreement on whether the bank should 
88 be established as a subsidiary or department of the Commonwealth Bank. 
On 21 December, Coombs sent Chifley an 'incomplete report', which had been 
agreed to by everyone except the Treasury representatives. Chifley had, 
apparently, requested an urgent report on the matter. The Committee had 
at an earlier stage agreed that Treasury and D.P.W.R. would draw up 
statements in support of the 'subsidiary' and 'department' approaches 
respectively, and that both these statements should be included in the final 
report. Treasury had, however, not yet completed its statement. The 
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majority report therefore argued for the 'subsidiary' approach, on managerial 
independence grounds. The failure of the Treasury to strongly imprint its 
views on the report was also apparent in the retention by the Committee 
majority of a broad definition of the bank's powers of lending for the 
f . d . f f" 89 purposes o expansion an reconstruction o irms. 
It is not clear whether the Committee met further after this point. 
Treasury did not, however, accept defeat. In a memo to Chifley on the day 
the matter was due to go before Cabinet, Wheeler argued that on the 
grounds of economy and administrative caution the industrial bank should 
90 become a department of the Commonwealth Bank. Treasury's draft Cabinet 
submission had mentioned both options but recommended the 'departmental' 
approach.91 Chifley apparently altered this draft, and the final submission did 
not recommend between the two options. Discussion in Cabinet seems not to 
have even touched on the issues which divided the government's official 
advisors. Instead, Labor's traditional support for a strong Commonwealth 
Bank came to the fore. Ministers objected to 'this specialised business being 
cut away from the Commonwealth Bank proper.' Some even opposed the 
suggestion that a special department should be formed, arguing that such 
lending should be 'an integral and essential portion of the bank's trading 
activities.' Ultimately, the establishment of a special department was agreed 
to only with the specific stipulation that general industrial lending by the 
main trading arm of the Commonwealth Bank should continue.92 
This was the only aspect of the industrial bank proposal which received 
Cabinet attention. The Cabinet submission presented the proposal in a very 
low key way, under the heading 'Assistance to Small Industries.' Any 
suggestion of a broader economic policy or planning role for the proposed 
bank was absent from the submission and apparently also from the minds of 
ministers. The new department of the Commonwealth Bank which was 
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eventually established had little bureaucratic 'punch', and was limited to the 
provision of 'finance for the establishment and development of industrial 
undertakings, particularly small undertakings1• 93 
Bank Nationalisation 
The 1945 banking legislation was the product of close dialogue between 
Chifley and his public servants about the principles which should regulate the 
banking system in the post-war world. The 1947 nationalisation bill was a 
very different matter. Chifley alone initiated the move, which most of his 
economic advisers thought to be 'ill-advised1• 94 
Why did Labor opt for nationalisation? The action was triggered by the 
decision of the High Court on 13 August 1947 to overrule s.48 of the 
Banking Act - a section which sought to compel the States and local 
government to transfer their banking business to the Commonwealth Bank. 
This particular section was of no great importance, and the Government's 
principal concern was that the special accounts sections of the Act might be 
challenged. As we have seen, Labor regarded these provisions as of 
fundamental importance as indeed they were. In 1947 inflationary 
pressures were becoming particularly intense and there were prognostications 
of an international recession (see Chapter Nine). Ministers feared that 
Australia might face a repetition of the slump which had followed the first 
world war. Firm control of the monetary system appeared essential in these 
circumstances. 
For all this, the Government apparently had no doubts about the 
constitutionality of the special accounts provisions.95 It was the High Court, 
rather than the Constitution per se, which was the problem. The same was, 
however, true in relation to nationalisation. As Evatt commented in a 
cablegram to Chifley in September 1947 
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The trouble is, as you know, not with the Constitution itself but 
with the interpretation of the law by Judges who have recently 
delivered a Judgement which in the opinion of Bailey and all 
the constitutional l~~yers, including myself, is so bad as to be 
almost indefensible. 
Labor was confident that the Constitution, properly interpreted, gave ·the 
Commonwealth comprehensive powers over banking and the monetary 
system. It looked to the Privy Council - rather than the High Court - to 
uphold these powers. 
There is, then, no evidence that the Government regarded the special 
accounts provisions of the 1945 legislation as any less constitutionally robust 
than nationalisation. The underlying reason for nationalisation seems to have 
been the unwillingness of the private banks to cooperate in the operation of 
the regulatory structure established by the 1945 legislation.97 As H.W. Arndt 
wrote in an anonymous Fabian Society pamphlet at the time 
the effective use of the powers of control given to the 
Commonwealth Bank by the 1945 legislation .•• presupposed a 
minimum degree of willingness to co-operate on the part of the 
trading banks. The attitude of the banks towards 
Commonwealth Bank control during the past two years has 
strongly reinforced the convictions held by some observers long 
before the 9r:f 945 legislation that this willingness was not 
forthcoming. 
By 1947, there was considerable tension between the Commonwealth Bank 
and the trading banks. Shortly after the nationalisation decision, for 
example, the banks leaked to the press details of new, more restrictive 
advance policy guidelines which had been issued by the central bank. This 
prompted the Governor of the Commonwealth Bank, Armitage, to send a stiff 
note to one leading banker in which he charged that the trading banks had 
been motivated by a 'desire to hold the Commonwealth Government and the 
Commonwealth Bank up to criticism'. He also raised the nationalisation 
issue: 
Without preaching a sermon, may I say that it seems to me 
that the lingering opposition and hostility of the Trading Banks 
to control by the Central Bank has contributed to no s~ll 
extent to bringing about the present controversial legislation. 
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A week or so before this letter, L.F. Giblin had penned a memo to Armitage 
and McF arlane enti tied Irresponsibility of the banks, in which he suggested 
that the banks had 
••• shown conclusively that they have not grown sufficiently in 
public responsibility to be trusted to carry out general direction 
measures for the maintenance of monetary stability. They must 
be subject, dirinfOy and in the detail of procedure, to some 
public authority. 
Under these circumstances, Cabinet's decision to nationalise the banks was 
hardly a gratuitous step. The regulatory approach to monetary control 
appeared to Labor to be a failure, so nationalisation was the obvious 
alternative. The banks had, it seemed, 'resisted every attempt made ••• to 
place any limits on their power' and had 'shown by numerous example that 
they [could not] be trusted with the credit power and financial authority 
h. h t th t f t• l . t I lOl Ch" fl h d f w ic are a e cen re o na 10na prosperi y • i ey a , o course, 
made clear his personal sympathy for bank nationalisation in his 1937 Banking 
Commission minority report. In Dedman's view, Chifley would have preferred 
nationalisation to the 1945 legislation, but deferred to Curtin, who believed 
both that the regulatory approach would work and that nationalisation was 
too politically risky. Once the 1945 legislation was on the books, however, 
Chifley was prepared to wait and see if it would work.102 As Crisp notes, 'if 
the private banks had settled down and worked harmoniously within the 1945 
banking legislation, Chifley would have never moved for their 
t . l" t• I 103 Th" . . l h h b k t d t na 10na isa 10n. is is precise y w at t e an s were no prepare o 
do. 
When the nationalisation proposal was put to Cabinet, it was approved 
unanimously. Caucus subsequently approved the proposal, again 
· l 104 Th h · f th f t f unanimous y. ere was great ent usiasm or e measure rom mos o 
the party. Nationalisation, it was thought, would directly accomplish Labor's 
traditional goal of undisputed public control of the supply of money. In the 
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upshot, however, nationalisation was blocked in both the High Court and the 
Privy Council. By July 1949, the episode was over. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
PLANNING IN THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE 
The management of a difficult transition from war to peace dominated 
economic policy throughout the years of Chifley's prime ministership (July 
1945 to December 1949). War had eroded the nation's capital stock and 
disrupted civilian production to a degree which could only gradually be 
overcome. Constitutional and political problems forced the relatively early 
relaxation of many of the forms of rationing and other controls which had 
played such a crucial role in maintaining economic stability during the war. 
As these controls were relaxed, the considerable volume of liquid funds which 
both consumers and firms had accumulated during the war financed a rapid 
expansion of both consumption and investment demand. A combination of 
high export earnings and import restraints led, under the managed exchange 
rate system of the time, to the further expansion of domestic liquidity and 
demand. The maintenance by the Government and Commonwealth Bank of 
the policy of low and stable interest rates further exacerbated these 
economic difficulties.1 
There were limits, both political and technical, to the role which fiscal 
policy could play in restraining excess demand. Post-war reconstruction 
itself gave rise to major public expenditure requirements, at a time when 
there was intense political pressure for the reduction of high war-time tax 
levels. Deficits continued, as a result, in 1945-46 and 1946-47. The 
Government's commitment to fiscal restraint paid off, however, with 
moderate surpluses from 1947-48 (although the surplus in that year was 
obtained unexpectedly early because of fiscal drag in a year of accelerating 
inflation). 2 
- 272 -
To restrain consumer demand was not easy under such circumstances. The 
Government sought for macroeconomic reasons to wind back tax rates only 
slowly, but in doing so attracted much political criticism for not acting 
faster. The possibility of action to sterilise some portion of the substantial 
balance of payments surplus (through, for example, changes to rural price 
stabilisation schemes) was politically difficult.3 There were, however, less 
controversial measures which could help. The Commonwealth Bank, for 
example, issued to the private banks advance guidelines for curbing lending 
for consumption purposes. 4 
There was particular concern within government about the pace at which 
private investment was growing. As early as 1946, 'conflict existed between 
the desire on the part of public authorites to push forward with urgently 
needed utilities and ••• [the] strong upward trend in various fields of civil 
industry1• 5 The question raised in the White Paper debates be~ame highly 
pertinent: how far should the public sector play an accommodatory role, 
deferring to private investment plans? As we have seen, ministers and many 
of their public service advisers favoured the maintenance of a large public 
investment program, and rejected a highly accommodatory approach. To 
maintain public investment required, however, that action be taken to 
restrain private investment. The White Paper had given little attention to 
how this might be accomplished. The consensus on the need for low and 
stable interest rates ruled out dearer money as a means of dampening 
investment fervour. The Government was, consequently, forced to rethink 
and to look for other instruments for this purpose. In the meantime, it was 
obliged to adopt a position on public works expenditure which was 
considerably more accommodatory than it would have wished. At Loan 
Council meetings throughout these years, the Commonwealth applied continual 
strong pressure upon the States (which had direct responsibility for most 
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public investment, and which were now dependent upon the Commonwealth 
for a very high proportion of their revenue) to 'keep their works programs to 
••• only the most urgent works'.6 Rather than the private sector being 
squeezed in the way business had expected (see Chapter Seven), it was the 
public sector which found itself being 'crowded out'. From 1945-46 to 
1947-48, the public share of gross capital formation was at historically low 
levels, comparable only to the previous low point in the two years 
immediately preceeding the outbreak of war.7 
The crowding out of the public sector was not the only problem. There 
were also signs of increasing imbalance in the pattern of growth within the 
private sector. Consumption industries boomed while basic industries like 
coal and steel lagged behind. The expansion of agricultural output and 
export volumes was severely constrained by labour shortages. These 
structural imbalances reflected not only the unleashing .of pent-up consumer 
demand, but the artificial incentive to import replacement created by the 
dollar shortage. There was, as Copland put it, a virtual 'disappearance of 
competition from imports'. The problem was so severe that as early as 1946 
one Treasury official questioned whether the 'boom in manufacturing may 
well represent a major distortion of our economic structure, a case of 
sectional over-investment which could develop for several years and then 
collapse - leaving perhaps 150,000 to 200,000 unemployed on our hands'. 8 
These difficulties became evident very early on. By 1947, however, there 
was serious alarm as inflation accelerated markedly. In its 1947-48 annual 
report, the Commonwealth Bank commented on the 'disquieting signs of 
inflationary pressure' and the worrying rate of monetary growth.9 By this 
stage, the maintenance of low nominal interest rates in the face of 
increasing inflation was forcing the Commonwealth Bank to add substantially 
to the liquidity base. This was because the bank was obliged to soak up 
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government bonds being sold by the public because of their low return (and 
perhaps also because of the expectation that interest rates would have to 
rise).10 By 1948, structural problems in the economy had become even more 
acute, and the Bank referred in its 1948-49 annual report to the 'distorted 
pattern of development' which, it warned, was not only 'seriously retarding 
industrial productivity' but had 'introduced unwelcome elements of instability 
in the economy•.11 These concerns were summed up by Copland in 1949 with 
his well-known reference to the 'milk bar economy•.12 
The Investment and Employment Committee 
The White Paper was ambiguous about the approach that might be adopted to 
the management of excess private investment. As a result of the rejection 
of D.P.W.R. proposals for a National Investment Board (N.I.B.) and a Central 
Planning Office, the paper had also said little about the administrative 
structures which might be required. The needs which these bodies were to 
have filled were, however, very real. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that 
for some at least the rejection of the N.I.B. proposal in the drafting of the 
White Paper had not ended the matter. In a memo to Coombs in August 
1945, Trevor Swan urged that the inter-departmental War Commitments 
Committee should be transformed into a peacetime National Commitments 
Committee, with the explicit function of evaluating investment plans and 
resources and then recommending on means of either making up investment 
deficiencies or of 'adjust(ing) commitments downwards, with due regard to 
the priority of various types of commitments, to the point where they will 
be capable of execution by the available resources'. Even more interesting 
was Swan's suggestion that the Committee would recommend on means 'to 
stabilize the levels of commitments in accordance with full employment 
policy'. Swan linked his proposal to the White Paper on Full Employment. 
He also acknowledged that investment planning would require close 
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cooperation with the States.13 
Swan's proposal was consistent with the 'social priorities' view of planning 
which he and others had unsuccessfully proposed in deliberations over . the 
White Paper. Not only was investment to be planned with regard to social 
priorities, but the balance between public and private investment would 
reflect this, rather than being decided on other a priori criteria. Coombs, 
however, apparently believed that such a broad proposal was now either 
unsaleable or unworkable. What emerged from discussions within 
D.P.W.R. was a much more modest proposal, which was put to Treasury (in 
the persons of McF arlane, Joyce and Wheeler) at a meeting at the end of 
March 1946 by Coombs, with Swan's assistance. The interdepartmental body 
proposed by Coombs was to be concerned, firstly, with collecting and 
moni taring business cycle indicators. No suggestion was recorded from 
Coombs of a broad investment planning role for the Committee. The proposal 
was simply that it would play a key role in the formulation of public 
investment plans in the light of trends in private investment and other 
aggregates. 'Coombs', Wheeler recorded in his notes of the meeting, 
'suggested that the Commonwealth also needed a purely Commonwealth body 
(e.g., Labour, P.W.R., Bank(?) and Treasury) to meet before Loan Council 
meetings and to arrive at a common judgement regarding employment and 
. d" . d l' I 14 investment con 1t1ons an consequent po icy. 
Treasury readily agreed to Coombs' proposal. Before Ministers were 
approached formally on the establishment of the Committee, there were 
negotiations between Treasury and D.P. W.R. on the terms of reference of the 
Committee, its structure and its membership. There was disagreement as to 
which department would play the influential secretariat role for the 
Committee - this being settled by· a compromise in which the Committee 
was to be supported by a Working Committee, the Secretary to which would 
- 276 -
be Wheeler.15 Negotiations between the two departments were concluded 
with agreement on the text of a formal letter to be sent by Dedman to 
Chifley. This letter was sent on 3 October and proposed a committee to be 
chaired by Chifley, and comprising a number of other senior ministers and 
public servants (including a nominee of the Commonwealth Bank). Membership 
was, however, to be flexible - in fact it expanded considerably during the 
life of the Committee.16 The establishment of the Committee was broadly 
forshadowed by Chifley in his budget speech in November 1946.17 The 
Treasurer did not, however, formally approve the proposal until 17 January 
1947, following some prodding from Coombs.18 Ministers were on 31 January 
formally notified of the Committee's establishment, and the first meeting 
was held on 3 February - al though there had been an informal meeting in 
August 1946, before the Committee's formal establishment.19 
The terms of reference of the new Committee were as follows: 
(a) To advise the Government generally regarding policy issues 
arising out of the ••• responsibilities of the Commonwealth 
Government, in collaboration with State Governments, in terms 
of the Parliamentary Paper 'Full Employment in Australia'. 
(b) To advise the Government regarding the general level of 
public and private investment and other expenditure programmes 
consistent with the maintenance of full employment and with 
the availability of manpower and other resources. 
(c) To submit regular reports regarding the trend of employment 
and investment •••• 
(d) To prepare special reports 20 
These terms of reference clearly implied an aggregative approach to the 
management of excess demand pressures. The exercise was, in short, defined 
in terms of striking the right balance between public and private investment, 
rather than as a matter of determining which fields of industry, public or 
private, had the best claim to investment resources. This approach, and 
indeed the whole White Paper strategy itself, were subject at the outset to 
very telling criticism from an unlikely source within the Treasury itself. 
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In a memo to Wheeler in November 1946, Richard Randall* commented in 
some detail on the suggested machinery of the Investment and Employment 
Committee. Randall wrote: 
If my understanding is correct the object of the proposed 
machinery is to supervise and give effect to the White Paper 
full employment programme. I regard that programme as 
inadequate insofar as it does not provide for the effective 
direction of investment, particularly of private investment, as 
distinct from control of the volume of investment. My strong 
feeling is that a policy which is content merely to balance 
public with private investment so as to maintain a certain level 
of total investment and consumers demand is not merely 
inadequate to preserve full employment on a stable basis but 
carries within it the seeds of great difficulties. 
Randall then outlined the structural problems he and others saw emerging in 
the economy, stressing the dangers of the uncontrolled boom in 
manufacturing. 'The vital point', he argued, 'is that we are not in a position 
to do anything about it'. Implicitly ruling out across-the-board demand 
restraint as an adequate answer, Randall went on to comment 
The White Paper scheme prescribes virtually nothing for a 
situation of the sort. It could support manufacturing if it were 
slack but can do nothing to rein it in when it shows a clear 
disposition to bolt. We hold back on public works to avoid 
competition for resources - with what result? Manufacturing is 
given an open order for all the labour it can get .•• I feel 
therefore that in setting up machinery in the proposed form we 
are blinding ourselves to difficulties with which it cannot 2qeal, 
but about which something must be done, however difficult. 
Randall's suspicion that the Investment and Employment Committee would 
end up simply accommodating public investment levels to the private 
investment boom was partly borne out by the experience of the next couple 
of years. In practice, year after year the Committee found itself advocating 
a Commonwealth position for Loan Council negotiations with the States 
* Randall was later (1966-71) Secretary of the Treasury. He had at this 
time not been long back at the Treasury after war service. He was one 
of the Treasury participants in the Investment and Employment Committee. 
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which in effect involved the restriction of public investment to a level which 
many senior public servants (and Chifley himself) believed to be inadequate 
in view of the social needs of the time. 22 In the upshot, however, this did 
not happen as a consequence of a failure to consider a more active priorities 
policy for investment control. Despite the restrictive terms of reference of 
the Investment and Employment Committee, pressure from the 
Commonwealth Bank and the seriousness of the problems which had emerged 
by 1947 led the Committee to attempt to lay down the basis for the more 
discriminating use of investment controls within the manufacturing sector. 
The Secondary Industries Investigation and Selective Monetary Policy 
The war years had transformed the Commonwealth Bank into one of the 
strongest advocates within government of a selective monetary policy. Bank 
advocacy of such a policy was, as we have seen, based not simply on support 
for a doctrine of low and stable interest rates, although this doctrine was 
indeed held to very strongly. The Bank had been influenced by broader 
notions of priorities planning and also by a suppressed-inflation model of full 
employment. The position it took reflected, however, not merely intellectual 
influences, but also its own role in administering selective monetary policy 
and capital issues controls during the war years. 
There were, from the outset, a range of speci fie obstacles to the 
implementation of a thoroughgoing selective investment control policy. The 
absence of any broad Commonwealth power over investment was the most 
fundamental of these. This · was particularly serious because in post-war 
Australia 'industry and trade [were] to a much greater extent self-financing' 
than they had previously been.23 The Commonwealth Government was forced 
as a result to rely on controls over externally financed investment, through 
the advance policy powers of the Commonwealth Bank and through the 
powers over capital issues temporarily granted by the States.24 The contrast 
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with a country like France - where not only could the government exercise 
direct control over private investment plans, but where in the post-war years 
the government itself was a key source of investment capital for the private 
25 
sector - was very strong. 
There were other problems. Advance policy control relied essentially upon 
the goodwill of the trading banks, which were the real administrators of the 
policy. Goodwill was not a commodity in abundant supply in the banking 
system at the time. Capital issues control, on the other hand, suffered from 
the same fundamental deficiency that the Radford Committee pointed to in 
relation to British capital issues control administration - that it was never 
really a priorities system because it never operated with any notion of a 
specified aggregate limit on calls on the money market. The Radcliffe 
Committee's comment on the British Capital Issues Committee is equally 
applicable to the Australian experience: 
It has not been asked to choose the best candidates to fill a 
limited number of places, but to say whezger or not a candidate 
meets certain very general qualifications. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Commonwealth Bank and the Capital 
Issues Advisory Committee sought consistently in the early post-war years to 
develop a system of selective controls based on an articulated notion of 
social priorities. Although the bank's enthusiasm for the development of a 
thoroughgoing selective policy was, by 1947, reinforced by a concern that the 
special accounts system was not working as it should, selective policy was 
never viewed as a mere expedient. A selective policy nevertheless proved 
frustratingly difficult to achieve. At the end of the war, both capital issues 
and advance policy controls were very general in nature. They were definite 
in ruling out lending for ventures of an obviously speculative or unessential 
nature (such as the production of luxury goods). Beyond that, guidelines 
were vague and unspecific. A good example of this was the guideline which 
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ruled out 'industrial schemes ••• which clearly had no prospect of success as 
economic propositions1• 27 In practice, a project's viability or priority was 
often very difficult to judge - particularly when the authorities approached 
the question on a highly ad hoc basis. What seemed to be missing was a 
researched and well-developed conception of precisely which areas of 
production were important and viable in the long term and which were not. 
The Commonwealth Bank did not take long to press for a better policy upon 
which to base the exercise of monetary controls. Bank concern at the pace 
and pattern of manufacturing expansion, and its implications for high priority 
public investment, had led it by late 1946 to call for an urgent evaluation of 
manufacturing industry trends. In a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury 
on 19 November, the Governor, Armitage, set out the Bank's views. He 
pointed to the excessive pace of investment and to the fact that the recent 
Loan Council meeting (August 1946) had been forced to apply major 
restrictions to the public works programme. 'The question arises, therefore, 
whether some projects which Governments have been obliged to defer may be 
regarded as having an equal or possibly higher priority than some forms of 
private investment'. 
With these problems in mind, the Bank called for action: 
The Bank is firmly of the opinion that the. time has arrived 
when a more positive lead should be given to the direction of 
investment and it is, therefore, suggested that the appropriate 
authorities within the Government organization should make a 
comprehensive review of the present and future likely situations, 
covering individual secondary industries ••• and give authoritative 
advice which would assist the Bank in formulating the policy, to 
be followed by trading banks, in relation to advances. Such 
information would, no doubt, also be of value to the Capital 
Issues Advisory Committee ••• In seeking guidelines of this 
nature it [the Bank] has in mind not only the limitation of 
funds to those branches of industry which are tending towards 
over-production, but also the encouragement of other branches 
of essential industry which have not reached the desired 
standard of production and which, in 2~e interests of the 
Nation's economy, it is desirable to foster. 
The Commonwealth Bank's request was well timed, in the light of the 
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advanced state of moves for the establishment of the Investment and 
Employment Committee. By this stage the intensity of investment pressures 
was clear to all concerned, and the Commonwealth Bank's letter was 
attached to an agenda item on The Direction of Private Investment for the 
first formal meeting of the Committee in February 1947. The agenda 
document supported the Bank's concerns about bottlenecks, delays in vital 
public works and problems in key industries, and urged that an investigation 
be established under the authority of the Investment and Employment 
Committee to provide information for shaping policies to influence 'the 
direction of investment in manufacturing industry'. 29 
By agreeing with the Commonwealth Bank on the need for a more effective 
selective policy, D.P. W.R. and Treasury officials were not necessarily 
endorsing the Bank's view of the role of advance policy and capital issues 
controls in normal peacetime economic manangement. There were, as we 
have seen, substantial differences of opinion within the bureaucracy about the 
relation between selective policy and 'planning'. D.P.W.R. officers tended to 
be strongly sympathetic to planning. Treasury attitudes were for the most 
part quite the reverse. (Wheeler, in particular, accepted that macroeconomic 
policy would occasionally require the selective control of private investment, 
but abhored any attempt to develop such controls into instruments for 
peacetime planning of the structure of the economy.) There was, moreover, 
the question of the efficacy of controls over private investment which 
operated solely through the supervision of external financing. On this 
question, notably, Wheeler seems to have been much more sanguine than 
Coombs. Notwithstanding these differences of opinion, there was consensus by 
1947 that the serious transitional problems being experienced made more 
systematic structural planning through advance policy and capital issues 
controls unavoidable in the short term. 
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At the February meeting of the Investment and Employment Committee, 
Melville represented the Bank and strongly reiterated its selectivist line. In 
response to Chifley, who seemed to believe that selective policy was already 
well established, Melville commented that 'the banks will give advance [sic] 
to any undertakings that [are] not clearly speculative'. In short, selective 
policy instruments were not being used particularly selectively. Reflecting 
consensus between D.P. W.R. and Treasury on the matter, a suggestion from 
Coombs was endorsed by the Committee. This proposed the establishment of 
what came to be known as the secondary industries investigation. It also 
required that the Secondary Industries Commission, Capital Issues Advisory 
Committee and Commonwealth Bank be informed of the economic situation 
and be asked to take steps to obtain the deferral of manufacturing projects 
which were of a less essential nature or which were likely to make 
bl d d . l l 30 unaccepta e eman s on part1cu ar y scarce resources. 
It seems to have been initially envisaged that the secondary industries 
investigation could be conducted quickly and provide information from which 
the next meeting of the Investment and Employment Committee could derive 
sufficient leads about which manufacturing sectors had a viable future. 
When an interdepartmental meeting was finally held to inaugurate the 
investigation,* the explanatory document took the extraordinarily optimistic 
view that, while it might take 'some months' for a 'thorough investigation', it 
was not only possible but 'essential' that a 'tentative report' be prepared in 
time for decisions to be made by a meeting of the Investment and 
Employment Committee scheduled for July.32 The task had been entrusted by 
* It took about four months, from the time of the initial decision by the 
Investment and Employment Committee, for this meeting td be called. 
It was not, in fact, until almost three months after the Investment 
and Employment meeting that McF arla~I wrote to Balmford formally 
requesting him to undertake the study. 
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the Investment and Employment Committee to the Commonwealth Actuary, 
W.C. Balmford - McFarlane having suggested that Balmford could manage the 
job as a sideline with the help of 'two assistants•.33 Not surprisingly, things 
did not work out this way. At the interdepartmental meeting the director of 
the D.P. W.R. Division of Secondary Industry, Harold Breen, pointed out that 
it was 'impossible to make a general survey of the whole of secondary 
industry within any brief limited' period. Nor did many participants at the 
meeting believe that the task could be carried out without a significantly 
greater commitment of staff resources. There was, however, an 'acute 
shortage of staff throughout the [Public] Service'. Work pressures led 
Balmford to announce almost at the outset that he would be unable to take 
an 'active directing part' in the enquiry. As a result, a working committee 
was formed, chaired by Melville. 34 
It was hardly surprising that the quick results anticipated by Treasury and 
others were not achieved. In the meantime, however, the inflationary 
position had become so acute that the Commonwealth Bank was forced to 
consider further action, without the benefit of the guidelines for 
manufacturing industry which it so keenly desired. On 3 October, members 
of the Bank Advisory Council received two memoranda from bank officers, on 
Advance Policy and Measures Against Inflation. The first memorandum noted 
the lack of a real selective policy and commented that it might be necessary 
to consider the use of 'less satisfactory' measures to control inflation.35 The 
second memorandum took up from this point and suggested three possible 
anti-inflationary measures: exchange appreciation, quantitative limitations on 
bank advances and 'a temporary increase in interest rates•. 36 Given the 
Bank's strong commitment to the low interest rate/selective monetary policy 
formula, these suggestions testified to the seriousness of the situation 
confronting the authorities at the time. 
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The inflationary problem was discussed by the Bank Advisory Council at its 
meeting in mid-October and the Council requested the Governor to transmit 
these policy options to Chifley. Armitage put the position plainly in a letter 
to Chifley on 28 October: 
The Council generally would prefer selective control of advances 
by limiting advances to industries which seemed in danger of 
over-expansion to a general quantitative control ••• There is the 
difficulty, however, which was referred to in my letter to the 
Treasury dated 19 November 1946, that no adequate information 
is at present available to the Bank on which a firm selective 
control of advances can be based. A general quantitative 
control is,37therefore, an alternative which will need to be 
considered. 
Although he faithfully outlined the options discussed by the Advisory Council, 
including interest rate increases, Armitage informed the Treasurer that he 
was not in agreement with some of those options. Indeed, at a meeting held 
shortly afterwards in Canberra (attended also by Chifley, Dedman, McF arlane 
and Coombs), Armitage made clear his opposition to interest rate increases 
and revaluation. Instead, Armitage and Chifley agreed that, notwithstanding 
the problems, a further tightening of advance policy was desirable.38 
The substance of the resulting measures was discussed in detail at a meeting 
of the Investment and Employment Committee on 6 November, in the light 
of two related agenda documents (Bank Advance Policy and Information About 
Industrial Expansion). A new and tougher set of advance policy guidelines was 
endorsed by the Committee, and took effect on 21 November.39 These 
guidelines did not however, represent a more industry-selective approach to 
advance policy. Rather, the main new feature of the guidelines was the 
attempt to restrict the banking system more to its traditional function of 
providing working capital, as opposed to long-term investment capital. 
Restrictions on speculative lending (particularly for land) were also 
strengthened. The goal of a more industry-selective monetary policy still 
eluded the Bank. 40 
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The Bank had not, however, given up. Its concern that the information base 
for a selective policy should be developed remained unabated. Indeed, there 
was some Bank discussion of the possibility of setting up an internal 
investigation section to conduct this work. There was also some anticipation 
in late 1947 that nationalization might greatly facilitate the internal 
development of a thoroughgoing selective policy.41 Prodded again by the 
Bank, the Investment and Employment Committee also decided at its meeting 
on 6 November that 'to provide a factual basis for a selective advance policy 
designed to direct resources to the industries offering best prospects of 
lasting stability, a fresh start should be made with the investigation proposed 
at the meeting of 3 February, 1947'. This time, the Commonwealth Bank was 
to direct the study, with the active research involvement of the Secondary 
Industries Division.42 As a consequence of this, direct collaboration between 
the Division and the Bank led not only to special priority being given to the 
Bank's informational needs in the conduct of industry studies by the S.I.D., 
but also to the subsequent preparation by the Division of a quarterly review 
43 
of manufacturing sector development. 
Despite the steady stream of industry information which became available in 
the late forties,* the Commonwealth Bank and the Capital Issues Advisory 
Committee (C.I.A.C.) at no stage felt themselves in a position to implement 
an effective selective policy. This became painfully clear during a 
government review in August 1948 of the control of capital issues. From 
* By late 1948, reports produced by the Division covered the following 
industries: footwear, tractors, cosmetics, cotton, textiles, leather, 
carpets, agricultural implements, furniture and rubber. (See A Brief 
Review of Australia's Manufacturing Economy in the Post War Period, 
D.P.W.R., 1948, p.9). The work of the Division (by then renamed) 
culminated in the publication in 1952 of the large-scale study The 
Structure and Capacity of Manufacturing Industry. 
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Treasury, the Bank and the C.I.A.C. the advice was all the same: capital 
issues control should be continued. 44 This paralleled Chifley's own inclinations 
on the matter.45 There was, however, evidence of growing disillusion about 
the potential use of this control, particularly in the absence of a 
development plan for manufacturing and the economy as a whole. 
Responding to the review, the Chairman of the C.I.A.C., Gordon Shain (who 
was also deputy governor of the Bank), wrote to Chifley on 13 August 
informing him of the Committee's strong support for the continuation of 
capital issues controls, but noting also that 'the Committee has been 
hampered in the past by lack of information as to industries which should be 
encouraged, and those which should be discouraged.' Information from the 
Division of Industrial Development (as it was now called) was, he wrote, 
useful, 'but there is a pressing need for a thorough survey from this 
46 
standpoint for Australian industry and commerce generally'. 
Even more revealing, however, were comments sent on 25 August to the 
Treasury by Balmford, who was also a member of the C.I.A.C. While 
acknowledging the sound theoretical case for selective policy, Balmford made 
it clear that he regarded it as a failure in practice. Few capital issues 
applications were, he noted, refused. (He did, however, comment that the 
mere existence of capital issues control probably scared off a certain number 
of clearly undesirable projects.) As for advance policy guidelines: 
I have no knowledge as to whether the policy, if understood [by 
the banks], is strictly applied. I rather suspect that most good 
customers get what they require. While the Commonwealth 
Bank is blamed for those that are refused accommodation [sic]. 
Balmford pointed to a number of reasons for this situation. Prime amongst 
them was the lack of definition of the aims of selective policy - that is, the 
lack of any plan. Speaking as a member of the C.I.A.C., he commented: 
The precise lines on which ••• tests [of capital issues 
applications] should be applied at the present time are not easy 
to define especially in a country with an expanding economy ... 
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In spite of various requests we (like the Commonwealth Bank) 
are still in the dark as to which industries should be encouraged 
to expand. 
The situation, he surmised, was very similar so far as bank advance policy 
guidelines were concerned. These guidelines were 'nebulous', and he 
suspected that 'the Trading Banks are as much in the dark as we are as to 
when restrictions should be applied'. 4 7 
All of this strikingly paralleled the British experience of capital issues 
controls in the early post-war years. In particular, the Radcliffe Committee 
comment, that 'one reason for the inefficiency of the control has been that 
the qualifications have been so vague and general that very few applications 
have failed to satisfy them', was clearly borne out in Australia by Balmford's 
comments and by other commentaries by the C.I.A.C. over the next couple 
48 
of years. 
The ultimate consequence of the failure of selective policy was its 
abandonment. By 1951/52 there had been a 'virtual removal' of advance 
policy controls from the banking system.49 Coombs himself later commented 
that the control had been 'cheerfully abandoned1• 5° Capital issues control 
wound down more gradually in the late 1940s, with the emphasis shifting in 
the first instance to more peripheral (but less problematic) aims such as 
ensuring 'orderly' approaches to the money market by influencing the timing 
of major flotations. The 'pronounced deterioration in the market for ordinary 
shares, and hence in new issues of such shares' in 194951 helped take the 
pressure off the C.I.A.C. When the incoming Liberal Government announced 
in 1950 the abandonment of capital issues controls, this was done without 
much pain on the part of the Commonwealth Bank. It is true that the 
control was resurrected briefly (and not particularly successfully) shortly 
afterwards in response to the Korean War boom. The experiment with 
selective policy was, however, more or less over by the early 1950s. 
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The failure of selective policy was an important element in the shift of 
Australian central bank doctrine in the early 1950s towards the more active 
use of interest rate variations as an instrument of economic policy:· what 
Coombs later called the 're-emergence' of monetary policy.52 This shift was 
symbolised by the slight, but deliberate, increase in the interest rate on 
government bonds to 3~ 0/o in late 1951. Although monetary policy remained 
distinctly subordinate to fiscal policy, and operated principally in terms of 
interest rate targeting, this move nevertheless marked an important break 
from the extreme form in which the doctrine of low and stable interest 
rates had dominated the Commonwealth Bank in the 1940s. While it was 
quite premature for contemporary economists to talk, as some of them did, 
of the 'end of cheap money•, 53 it was true that a new phase of economic 
policy-making had commenced. 
The Failure of Planning 
The Australian experiment with planning was, by international standards, a 
half-hearted one. This was true despite the Commonwealth Bank's strong 
commitment to industry-specific selective controls, the use of which was 
'probably ... carried further in Australia than elsewhere1• 54 From the outset, 
the complexity of allocating priorities to the investment plans of various 
firms and industries was grossly underestimated. This was exemplified in the 
relevant administrative arrangements. The Investment and Employment 
Committee comprised the most senior economic ministers and advisers. Its 
support arrangements were, however, hopelessly inadequate and made ad 
hocery inevitable. The attempt to conduct, on a purely interdepartmental 
basis, the research and secretariat functions of the Committee (and those of 
the secondary industries investigation) contrasts strikingly with the 
administrative arrangements made in France and the United Kingdom at the 
time. The French had established in 1946 their renowned Commissariat 
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general du Plan - a small body, but nevertheless a far cry from the 
makeshift Australian arrangements.SS Even in Britain, a country in which 
laissez-faire ideological traditions were relatively strong, there was a 
separate planning staff, under the Lord President (Herbert Morrison). The 
British Central Economic Planning Staff became in 1947 the nucleus of the 
short-lived Ministry of Economic Affairs. When that Ministry was absorbed 
into the British Treasury shortly after its creation, the Treasury maintained a 
high-powered planning staff for a considerable time.s6 
Part of the problem was, no doubt, the shortage of staff, and particularly of 
the sort of specialist staff needed for this type of work. The rapid 
expansion of Commonwealth powers and responsibilities through the war years 
had placed an enormous burden on Commonwealth public servants.s7 There 
was, however, more to the problem than this. The contrasting attitudes to 
planning of Treasury and the Commonwealth Bank were probably important. 
As we have seen, the Commonwealth Bank took a position that was 
consistent with the view, held by Melville and others, that selective controls 
should be a permanent feature of peacetime economic policy. By contrast, 
the Treasury was ambivalent about such controls, and believed that their use 
should be temporary. From such a viewpoint, it was no doubt easy to 
downgrade both the importance and complexity of the 'details' of defining the 
targets of selective controls. 
The complexity of the task was clearly a fundamental factor in the problem 
confronted by the secondary industries investigation. Copland's 'milk bar 
economy' epithet (see above) was, in this context, profoundly misleading. 
Had the implementation of an effective selective policy in manufacturing 
been a simple matter of identifying and then blocking spending of an 
obviously unnecessary, peripheral or low priority nature, then the research 
undertaken by the Secondary Industries Division and its successors would 
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undoubtedly have yielded results which could have permitted the more 
successful and rapid delineation of an industry-selective monetary policy. In 
fact, what was involved was a series of very hard choices. If consumption 
was to be squeezed harder to provide greater scope for investment, or if 
private investment was to be squeezed to make more room for public 
investment, the result was likely to be contraction in production and 
investment in industries which no-one could regard as luxury production. 
There were, in short, no 'easy options'. 
The difficulties of the choices involved in a thoroughgoing selective policy 
were clear to those directly involved. George Watt encapsulated the 
fundamental point in a memo sent as acting Secretary of the Treasury to 
Chifley on 30 August 1948, when he noted, in relation to capital issues 
controls, that 'although in wartime it was comparatively easy to decide 
whether a proposal would be of direct assistance to the war effort, the 
principles which should operate in peacetime are not so clear1• 58 This was a 
point which many 'planners' in the Beveridge mould had, indeed, continually 
underrated. For all the talk of the peacetime pursuit of a 'common 
objective', social goals in peacetime where inevitably far more diverse and 
complex than the goals of a society involved in total war. 
One implication of this was that the decisions about social priorities which 
were required for a thoroughgoing selective policy were necessarily highly 
political. 'It is placing a heavy (and possibly undesirable) burden on a 
Government department', Balmford had noted, 'to decide where expansion 
59 
shall not take place'. Clarity and enforceability required ministerial 
decision or endorsement of any set of 'social priorities' to be enforced 
through selective policy. The Investment and Employment Committee might 
have been a useful forum for such top-level discussion and decision-making. 
The problem, however, was not merely that the Investment and Employment 
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Committee was never presented with options for a 'plan', but that there 
appeared to be considerable ministerial reticence about the application of a 
tougher selective policy. 
Chifley's equivocation about selective controls was clear at the time when 
the matter was first discussed by the Investment and Employment Committee 
in February 1947. Not only did he raise doubts about 'whether industries 
giving or promising local employment could be stopped', but he 'stressed the 
need for cautious handling of any approach to private enterprise for a 
deferment of plans'. 60 It was apparently with some reluctance that Chifley 
approved, at this stage, moves towards the development of a tougher 
selective policy. By late 1947, his view had changed, although not 
apparently as a result of any greater taste for selective planning, but simply 
because of the way in which economic developments in 1947 had so greatly 
increased inflationary fears within the Ministry. Labor was not intellectually 
prepared for the problems of managing an economy characterized by over-full 
employment. Little thought had apparently been given to the problem of 
competition for resources between industries within the private sector, or 
even to possible conflict between the public and private sectors. As Chifley 
confessed, with some evident surprise, in 1947 
Originally, it had been hoped that whereas private enterprise 
would afford employment for the majority of workers, public 
works would be needed only to take up any residue. Now, 
however, it was being found that many essential public works 
had been postponed so long that the need for them had become 
urgent and in consequence there was pressure to increase the 
volurgi of public works even though private employment was 
high. 
The Government was, instead, preoccupied with the danger of a new 
depression. With some reluctance, it agreed in 1947 to action, including a 
tightening of advance policy guidelines, design~d to restrain bank lending and 
to curb inflation. It did so because it believed that 'inflation is almost as 
bad as deflation, because finally it brings about an economic collapse'. 62 The 
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concern was overwhelmingly with the preservation of economic stability, and 
the deployment of selective monetary policy was merely a technical detail in 
the pursuit of that end. As in the past, it was the volume and price of 
bank credit - rather than 'planning' - which dominated Labor thinking. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONQUSION 
This thesis has examined the influence of economic ideas upon Labor 
politicians and governments in the period from the Great Depression to the 
defeat of the Chifley Government in 1949. No party develops or implements 
its policies in an intellectual vacuum. Because of the demands of political 
life and the limited internal resources of political organisations, politicians 
are in general better at adapting economic policy ideas than at generating 
them. In office, they depend greatly upon the public service and therefore 
find that their actions are often significantly influenced by the views which 
are prevalent in key sections of the service. 
Throughout the period under review, Labor was preoccupied with the question 
of monetary management. There was consensus within the party on the 
fundamental importance of cheap money, the undesirability of large-scale 
public borrowing, and the need for public control of the money supply (and 
perhaps even of the money creation process itself). 
In part, Labor's preoccupation with money reflected the influence of a very 
old tradition of unorthodox monetary thought. This 'monetary radical' 
tradition was not, as has sometimes been suggested, underconsumptionist. Its 
roots lay instead in anti-commodity money ideas, and its distinctive features 
were a doctrine of liberal credit creation, and complete opposition to 
interest and borrowing. 
Although monetary radicalism was an important influence upon the A.L.P., it 
never dominated party thinking and cannot, in itself, explain the degree to 
which Labor focussed its attention on monetary matters. Labor thinking can 
only be understood properly in a wider intellectual context. The notion that 
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money creation should be a public prerogative, for example, could not only 
be supported by the 'respectable' authority of Ricardo himself, but had 
commanded considerable support from Australian liberals in the early part of 
the twentieth century. It is doubtful that the idea could have commanded 
such widespread support within the A.L.P. had it been an exclusively 
monetary radical theme. 
Although the party's preoccupation with monetary issues partly reflected the 
influence of monetary radical ideas, a more fundamental factor was the 
intellectual pervasiveness of monetary explanations of the trade cycle. Labor 
was not alone in believing that money supply fluctuations were the principal 
cause of booms and depressions. This view was commonplace in Australia 
from the nineteenth century right up to the Second World War. It was a 
view with considerable empirical and intellectual plausibility. Bank crashes 
and unregulated waves of financial speculation were a prominent feature of 
economic life, particularly in the nineteenth century. Economic theory also 
emphasised the role of money. Despite its presumption that money was 
irrelevant to the equilibrium values of real variables, even neoclassical theory 
emphasised the role of money in short-run economic fluctuations. 
Less commonplace was Labor's support for monetary activism. Orthodox 
opinion in Australia held that economic instability could most effectively be 
minimised by forswearing monetary 'manipulation'. This was a view which 
changed only after the Great Depression, and even then only slowly. By 
contrast, Labor was united from 1931 in advocating an activist monetary 
policy. Although the influence of monetary radical ideas within the party 
was an important predisposing element, it was stabilisationist doctrine which 
was the true catalyst in this strengthening of party attitudes. Labor found 
in stabilisationist economics a credible rationale for monetary activism 
directed towards controlled reflation. 
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Stabilisationist economics was able to make a rapid and substantial mark 
upon Labor thinking because it was consistent with Labor's traditional 
conception of the economy as a machine driven by monetary forces. 
Stabilisationism was also reasonably compatible with monetary radicalism, as 
was shown by the way in which many Labor politicians blended the two 
doctrines together in their thinking. This compatibility was not accidental. 
Stabilisationist economics and monetary radicalism had some common 
intellectual roots in nineteenth century American economic thought. The two· 
doctrines should not, however, be confused. Despite their attacks on the 
banks and their frequent resort to 'money power' rhetoric, Labor leaders like 
Theodore, Scullin and Curtin were in no sense monetary radicals. The 
policies they proposed for dealing with the Depression were, rather, purely 
stabilisationist. 
Labor's response to the 'Keynesian revolution' was a rather different matter. 
The party was entirely at home with the 'Keynesian' policy message. Its 
leaders had, like so many others around the world, embraced the principle of 
counter-cyclical public works well before the publication of the General 
Theory. In the late 1930s, they welcomed the 'full employment' doctrine that 
the only limit to expansionary action was the availability of 'physical 
resources'. The party was also naturally sympathetic to the view that 
interest rates should be maintained at low and reasonably stable levels, and 
that 'boom control' by means of high interest rates was undesirable. 
Although it is legitimate to describe these policy themes as broadly 
'Keynesian', the aim of the General Theory was not to prescribe policy, so 
much as to explain how the economy worked. At this conceptual level, 
Keynes presented a picture of things very different to the monetary 
perspective which was so deeply ingrained in the A.L.P. Keynes denied that 
it was possible to view money as 'the drink which stimulates the system to 
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activity'. He focussed his attention directly on the factors which influenced 
the various components of 'aggregate demand', and dismissed the notion that 
there was a determinate relationship between the level of demand and the 
stock of money. He saw changes in the willingness of business to invest as 
the principal cause of the business cycle. This analysis accentuated the 
declining faith of economists in the capacity of cheap money alone to 
prevent depressions or promote recovery. It also led directly to a conception 
of economic management as a complementary mix of 'fiscal' and 'monetary' 
policy. 
This view of the workings of the economy was to become, by the 1960s, a 
new orthodoxy which governed the way in which most reasonably informed 
people thought about economic matters. The conceptual shift did not, 
however, take place quickly. Notwithstanding the practical lessons of 
wartime economics, the political leaders of the immediate post-war period 
remained with few exceptions heavily influenced by pre-Keynesian views of 
the economy. Despite its natural attraction to activist economic 
management, the A.L.P. was not quick in adjusting itself to the Keynesian 
conceptual framework. A few of the party's more able and sophisticated 
leaders, like John Curtin and Forgan Smith, displayed a good deal of 
intellectual flexibility in remaining abreast of changing views of the way in 
which the economy worked. They were, however, exceptions. At the end of 
the war, most senior Labor politicians still believed that monetary 
disturbances were the fundamental cause of depressions. Many still viewed 
public works as a means by which 'new' money could be injected into an 
ailing economy. These rather old-fashioned views were not confined to the 
party's monetary radicals. Even Chifley can be said to have gone only part 
of the way in absorbing the 'new economics'. 
Labor's continued monetary focus was symbolised by the pride of place which 
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the post-war Labor governments gave their banking legislation as the 
principal bulwark against a new depression. From a Keynesian viewpoint, 
firm control of monetary policy was of course necessary in active 
counter-cyclical policy as a means of ensuring that fiscal stabilisation policy 
was underpinned by any necessary monetary accommodation. Labor still 
tended, however, to see the management of the money supply as the cutting 
edge of stabilisation policy. It was this preoccupation, and a continued 
desire to make money creation an exclusively public prerogative, which led 
Labor to its unsuccessful and politically costly attempt to nationalise the 
banks. 
Labor's view of the economy can also be seen in its attitude to the 1945 
White Paper on full employment policy. The White Paper has often been 
represented as the key statement of the political philosophy of the post-war 
Labor governments. There was, however, relatively little ministerial 
involvement in the formulation of its basic principles. Ministers seem to 
have regarded it as an exposition of the technical details of a public works 
policy. The White Paper was, in fact, far more a statement of public 
service policy views than a Labor manifesto. 
The Labor governments of the 1940s were almost uniquely fortunate in that 
the times were with them. However, old-fashioned some of Labor's notions 
about the economy may have been, the interventionist spirit of the 
immediate post-war period sat well with the party's values. Ministers and 
public servants were able to work harmoniously to establish a new framework 
for economic management and to greatly extend the redistributive and 
welfare functions of government. The interventionist mood even affected 
that most conservative of institutions, the Commonwealth Treasury. Only in 
rare instances - most notably the attempt to nationalise the banks - did this 
broad commonality of purpose not prevail. 
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This is not, however, to suggest that there was policy consensus within the 
bureaucracy. Economists within and outside the public service were deeply 
divided about the degree of 'planning' which would be required in the 
post-war world. The key issue was the extent to which it would be 
appropriate for government, in the interests of economic stability, efficiency 
and welfare, to plan the pattern of private investment and the structure of 
industry. 
Labor was fond of rhetoric about post-war planning, and fought hard to 
secure the extension into the peace of many of the regulatory powers which 
had been employed during the war. Labor ministers were, like so many 
other people, greatly impressed by the success of war-time planning. The 
party's commitment to planning did not, however, run very deep. Outside 
the banking sphere, Labor had little ideological enthusiasm for controls and 
other forms of direct 'interference' in business decision-making. It recognised 
that controls were vital in the reconstruction period after the war. For 
normal times, however, Labor thought principally in terms of indirect, 
supportive forms of intervention, directed mainly towards the limited goal of 
strengthening the manufacturing sector. It was this, as much as any political 
sensitivities, which explains the speed with which, during the 'powers' 
referendum battle of 1944, Labor backed away from suggestions that controls 
would play a major long-term role in economic management. 
A limited experiment in planning was conducted in the late 1940s, when the 
Commonwealth Bank and certain key economic departments sought to adapt 
the war-time system of selective controls on business financing to the task 
of restraining excessive investment and dampening 
This required the authorities to determine which 
inflationary pressures. 
products and sectors 
deserved priority in the competition for the country's limited investment 
resources. The experiment was not successful, and underlines the well-known 
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difficulties of this sort of planning. Although its immediate inspiration came 
from the difficulties of the transitional period, there were many influential 
public service economists who believed that this sort of planning could play 
an important longer term role. Cabinet, by contrast, took little interest in 
the matter. Even Chifley - who understood that selective credit rationing 
might be needed at times if interest rates increases were to be avoided -
showed no interest in the use of such controls as a means of shaping the 
structure of the economy. 
It was somewhat paradoxical that, when Labor lost office in 1949, the issue 
of controls was one of its greatest political liabilities. Although the Liberal 
opposition claimed that petrol rationing and other similarly unpopular 
measures were part of Labor's 'socialistic' vision of a planned economy, these 
sorts of controls were in fact more illustrative of Chifley's commitment to 
responsible economic management and the careful husbanding of Australia's 
foreign exchange reserves. The attempted nationalisation of the banks was 
more representative of the true Labor vision, in which undisputed public 
control of the money supply was to pave the way to an economic future of 
unprecedented stability and prosperity. 
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